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FOCUS ON EUROPE

LYNNE CHISHOLM

1994 marks the fifth year into a New Europe. The (in retrospect, incomprehensively) unforeseen collapse of political barriers between east and west burst into what had begun as a fairly controversial trajectory into post-1992 European Union. The rest, as they say, is contemporary history. The upswing of optimism about the prospects for positive economic and social reconstruction in a rejuvenated and humanitarian European 'kinship network' rapidly disintegrated into despondency in the face of intergroup intolerance, armed conflicts and deep economic recession. Pubic opinion surveys on attitudes towards Europe and its future have mirrored this rapid shift of mood towards pessimism. Presently, discourse about Europe typically uses a language of crisis.

Our information about young people's views remains slim and patchy in these respects, but that which is available[1] suggests that a clear majority of young Europeans everywhere support the idea of an open and integrated Europe - but on the condition that this be a polity and society founded on solidarity, justice, and tolerance both within its own borders and in its relationships with the Third World. In practice, however, many young people are disillusioned and sceptical about Europe's future, because - in their view - quite contrary values underlie European integration policies and practices, in particular as exemplified by the EU. This tension between ideals and realities, hopes and fears, expresses itself particularly strongly amongst eastern European youth.

Young people's 'idealism' has always been discounted by older generations as a passing phase - and regularly judged as dangerous by those holding political power and authority. Disregarding the validity or otherwise of such accounts, 'youth' patently acts as a symbolic vessel for positive and (even more so) negative projections. This means that, ideologically, youth embodies problems and conflicts (and perhaps desires) originating quite outside young people's scope of action and influence. Accounting for structural unemployment in western economies is the example that immediately springs to mind: young people are themselves responsible for their 'unemployability', either because they do not hold appropriate qualifications and competencies or because they no longer subscribe to dominant work ethics. Political and intellectual discourse about the resurgence of nationalism and neo-fascist violence in early 90s Europe is a highly topical further example. Young people are portrayed as the vanguard of these unsavoury developments; feverish activity surrounds pinpointing the characteristics of the typical miscreant and devising social and educational prevention programmes. Yet young neo-fascists are a tiny minority of young people (who are not necessarily typically the socially dispossessed) and nationalist sentiments are more widespread amongst older generations (as any recent analysis of voting patterns will demonstrate). Right-wing opinions and neo-fascist violence are serious issues for youth research and policy, but they are still more serious issues in relation to overall social and political patterns and trends. It is not, after all, young people who found right-wing political parties and who make inflammatory public pronouncements as politicians about immigration or national sovereignty. They are seldom in a position - financially or occupationally - to do either.

It remains the case that young people are crucial to any society's future and that the shaping of the New Europe - whatever lines it pursues - has significant implications for

the profiles of chances and risks in young European's lives and futures. The 10th anniversary edition of *Youth and Policy* (No. 40, Spring 1993) took stock of developments in British youth policy and practice in the 1980s and identified key research and policy issues for the 1990s - one of which is the emergence of European youth research and, hopefully, of more coordinated, transnational approaches to youth policy (discussed in my contribution to that edition). It must be some three years ago now since I opened a box file under the label 'European youth research'. Its contents were made up of a motley selection of research and policy papers and documents that had accumulated rapidly since the late 1980s, when the notion of a New Europe began to surface into people's thinking and writing. Today, at the beginning of 1994, the single box file has become four and the first major sub-divisions have appeared: education and work; culture, society and politics; theoretical contributions to defining the field and its concerns; and sets of conference papers. Their contents do not include essays about young people in country X or Y, nor studies that compare (for example) the young unemployed in region A with region B. These are in many other box files: they comprise a fund of essential input into European youth research, but their purposes and problematics are differently contoured. In other words, *'Europeanisation processes' as social change*, together with their implications for the social construction of youth and young people's lives, *is the guiding problematic* for European youth research, in which *multi-dimensionality and interrelatedness* structure analytic perspectives. In many ways, these definitional elements remain programmatic, i.e., imperfectly understood and hardly at all realised in research practice, but they do comprise a recognisable consensus about the way forward. This fledgling is equally committed to supporting an *organic triangle research, policy and practice*, in which no element uncritically services or is automatically subordinate to another. Rather, symmetrical connections between all three are not only theoretically productive but also politically essential and socially effective.

This issue of *Youth and Policy* takes up the European theme by collating five papers which are both thematically diverse and which represent different ways of approaching research, policy and practice interconnections. The five contributions also occupy varying positions in relation to the European youth research programmatic, and none concern young people or youth policy/practice in the UK (except, in some cases, for purposes of comparison). For this reason alone, the papers are of particular interest for British readers, since it is still the case that very little information about youth question in other European societies is readily accessible in the UK professional literature or popular press. One contribution is drawn from north-west Europe (FRG), one form the Nordic sphere (Denmark), two focus on eastern Europe (Poland/Bulgaria) and one looks at youth policy in a European-wide context (Taylor). All supply new information: about youth services legislation and provision, about social problems affecting young people, or about young people's circumstances and actions. Two papers focus on policy and practice issues (Gaiser and Munchmeier, Taylor), two are mainly research oriented (Kovacheva and Wallace, Szumlicz and Roberts), and one spans both research and policy (Kristensen).

The five papers are joined by a Working Space short report from a Russian correspondent, Radost Sviridon. Her contribution reminds us that innovations have always travelled across frontiers: the Scouting movement, a progressive idea in its time, spread from the UK throughout the world. In prerevolutionary Russia, it represented an attractive contrast to the stiff corset of formalised schooling but, in common with other liberalising youth movements of the time, scouting was swamped during the 1920s by the development of communist youth organisations

under state tutelage (and on this topic, see Kovacheva and Wallace's contribution). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, youth movements and youth services are reforming and reasserting themselves in diverse ways. They cannot turn to government and the public purse for much assistance - there are more pressing problems and demands - but to western European eyes they are, in one sense, well-equipped. Youth service providers have inherited a vast infrastructure of centres and traditions of provision for young people's leisure and sports activities, which can potentially be turned to new purposes and uses.

None of the papers included in this edition are comparative studies in the standard sense of the term, but each makes reference to similarities or differences with circumstances in other countries (or what were formerly other countries, as in the case of the two Germanies). Essentially, the papers are 'additive-descriptive' in character, in that they offer information about the insight into dimensions of young people's lives or of youth service provision in given national contexts. Currently, most studies and analyses naturally fall towards the additive-descriptive pole of the continuum of youth research in Europe, simply because this is the necessary starting-point for developing innovative perspectives.[2] Kovacheva and Wallace's contribution has a more 'expanded-integrative' character, in that it is guided by a general question (young Europeans' scope for political action and influence) and informed by material form different contexts (Bulgaria, supplemented by Poland and Britain).

Mark Taylor's description of anti-racist initiatives spearheaded by youth organisations and networks located in different countries and the support they receive from European-level organisation and policy making also takes a more integrative line, in this case in relation to politics and practice. As he points out, the tenth anniversary of International Youth Year in 1995 falls together with anti-racist campaigns from the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the EU. These initiatives follow a decade in which youth organisations and more informal youth action networks have developed a wide range of educational and lobbying activities to promote intercultural understanding and to oppose racist intolerance. Taylor provides examples of this work, originating in different countries but communicating and cooperating via the channels and resourcing made available by, for example, the Council of Europe. He equally shows that an integrative approach to youth policy and practice in Europe is not equivalent to a homogenised perspective: understandings of racism differ considerably between European communities and individual youth fora, so that productive mutual communication and action pose big challenges and demand great commitment for those involved.

Wolfgang Gaiser and Richard Munchmeier consider youth services in the context of contemporary modernisation processes. In recent decades, youth services in the former West Germany have experienced significant expansion of facilities and professional resources. Reunification and economic recession now mean large scale public expenditure cuts, but precisely at a time when the need for youth services is intensifying. Young people's life worlds are characterised by increasing individualisation of chances and risks, but equally by widening gaps between more and less advantaged groups. The changing contexts of both demand and resourcing imply that the pattern of youth services in the 1990s will see shifts in the internal structuring of provision towards decentralised and socially preventative services, increasingly integrated into networks within and between other social and educational services. Gaiser and Munchmeier then describe examples of projects in

Nurnberg, Munchen and Berlin that respond to changing demands in relation to young people's living circumstances and rising rates of homelessness.

Catharina Juul Khristensen also draws attention to youth homelessness, a problem that she attributes to the political and cultural consequences of contemporary modernisation. Statistical indicators show a sharp rise in the proportion of young homeless women in Denmark. Homelessness is a continuum, not a single state defined by literally having no roof over one's head, although social organisation and social policies can influence the relationship between overt and covert homelessness. Khristensen concludes that a greater proportion of the UK homeless are forced into sleeping rough because social class polarisation processes are much more intense here than in Denmark, where publicly-funded hostel provision is more extensive. But she argues that a fuller explanation of rising homelessness amongst young Danish women must take what she calls 'cultural confusion' into account. This is an inherent consequence of 'post-modern conditions in modernity', in which traditional norms and values continue to exist alongside the dissolution of tradition and the incursion of individualised pluralism. Contemporary social life is shot through with contradictions, but the rapid pace of social and cultural change leaves many young people with few reliable sources of orientation and advice from older generations. Whilst disadvantaged youth are more likely to lack the 'personal cultural capital' to cope positively with these pressures, the relatively advantaged are by no means immune against 'cultural confusion'. The combination of gender inequalities and contradictory changes in gender role prescriptions mean that young women have become much more vulnerable to homelessness than was the case twenty and thirty years ago, and social youth policies to cope with the problem are out of date.

In contrast to Khristensens' qualitatively researched and theoretically interpreted social problem analysis, Szumlicz and Roberts report empirical findings from a large-scale cross- sectional 1993 survey of two cohorts of young people (just before and four years after leaving school) from three Polish regions. The data describe patterns of school-work transitions in times of rapid social change and severe economic disruption consequent upon massive political reform. They underline that in the space of a single year from late 1989 the labour market went into free fall. The sudden change from pre-1989 conditions (guaranteed training and an apparent jobs surplus) has constituted a major social/psychological earthquake for those making the transition from school to work during this period. Nevertheless, economic restructuring has not (yet) brought fundamental educational restructuring to meet new training and qualification needs, although the proportions of those young people continuing on to higher education in the coming years is expected to increase quite quickly as reward hierarchies shift more closely to a western European model. Szumlicz and Roberts argue that although young people's labour market and accommodation prospects are currently bleak and migration to western Europe exercises strong attraction, Polish family and community structures lend stability and support to their lives and young people are showing optimism and initiative. In comparison with young Britons of recent generations, the young Polish have been hit much harder by social and economic upheaval, but there are indications that they are better equipped to adapt and cope positively.

Finally, Sijka Kovacheva and Claire Wallace explore conditions under which youth can become actively politicised, using the example of gathering opposition forces in eastern Europe during the 1980s, which led to the peaceful revolutions of

1989 and in which youth was a prominent social actor. Euro-American experience suggest that young people are more likely to find a channel of political expression through oppositional 'cultural politics' (subcultures, counter cultures, outrageous persiflage, etc.) than through the institutionalised channels of representative democracy (political paries, lobby organisations, etc.), which are firmly controlled by older generations. In eastern European state socialist societies, all citizens, and especially young people, were 'obliged' to participate in official political organisations that simulated democracy and exercised surveillance. Over time, this produced widespread political alienation amongst young people, many of whom found an effective medium of opposition in a cultural politics rooted in the adoption of western subcultural styles. Political disaffection combined with young people's dissatisfaction with opportunities to use their talents productively to reject the old rationales for maintaining the east-west divide. The youthful elan that accompanied the velvet revolutions has since begun to fragment and dissipate. This is a typical consequence of the institutionalisation of innovatory change, in this case exacerbated by high levels of emigration amongst young people, who had hoped for more rapid and fundamental reforms and had not anticipated the severity of economic collapse. Kovacheva and Wallace argue that the resulting confusion and uncertainty, combined with politicians' attempts to take cover behind scapegoating, has contributed to the upsurge in inter-ethnic conflict and neo-nationalism that has risen to no less prominence in eastern than in western European countries. Whilst the absolute scale of the problem may not differ between eastern and western Europe, the consequences of this kind of oppositional cultural politics, they suggest, may well be more explosive in the context of extremely fragile eastern European economies and democracies with weak social integration.

We are, then returned to the starting-point of this introductory contribution: young people's disillusion and its potential mobilisation by unsavoury political elements with much greater power and resources than youth in contemporary societies can dream of. Last week (in January 1994) a 17 year old disabled woman from Halle (in Sachsen-Anhalt, ex-GDR) was found in an extremely distressed state. She reported that she had been insulted and attacked by three skinheads, who had scratched a swastika into her face. Several days later thousands of young people gathered in Halle to demonstrate publicly their opposition to right-wing politics and neo-fascist violence. The next day, newspapers were full with reports of the police investigation results: Elke had invented the story, the swastika was self- mutilation. Despite initial mistrust from all quarters, the conclusions now seem beyond doubt. What is it possible to say about this literally dreadful sequence of events? Possibly nothing better than this extract from M.G.'s commentary in *Die Zeit:*

> *No, it wasn't hysteria, unfortunately, when 15,000 people in Halle demonstrated and the media, including this newspaper, commented [on the horror of what appeared to have happened]. A swastika on the cheek of young girl paraplegic. ...What sort of a world do we live in, a world in which suffering people can do such a thing to themselves - and what sort of a world does it look like, a world in which people must spontaneously and publicly react so that their society can call itself human? Last Thursday, two days after the demonstration [against right-wing violence], the Verfassungsschutz* described the world we live in thus: compared with 1992, violence against the disabled and the homeless has more than doubled.*

'The ground has been taken out from under our feet at bit', says a 16 year old pupil who took part in the organisation of the demo, 'but we're not pissed off. ... and if you care to look more closely at the right-wing scene in Halle, then I'd have to say that a lot worse things have happened than what Elke made up. And for all those things there wasn't any demo.'

*No, there was certainly no room for doubt that it had really happened, when the first reports broke of the Halle incident. Afterwards, the fright remains, for even in the lie there is a grain of truth. [(No. 4, 21. January 1994, p.2) trans. LC; *approx.: MI5, responsible for the protection of the Constitution]*

In the intense and justified concern about young neo-fascists, it is good to know that there are many more young Europeans who are prepared to get out on the streets and oppose right wing thinking and violence of any kind. This is what gives me, at any rate, a shot of optimism in young people's potential contribution to the shaping of a more humanitarian citizens' Europe.

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Notes

1 The main sources of European comparative data are the European Commission's *Eurobarometer* and *Young Europeans* surveys, which, of course, cover only the EU member states. National and bilateral small scale surveys emerge intermittently at international conferences, the results of which may well remain unpublished and which are seldom available in English. Eastern European data is particularly inaccessible for westerners, partly because the research scene itself is fragmented but also because few of us can read Slav languages or Hungarian. Apart from this opportunistic and ephemeral research-based information, more qualitative material gradually accretes from taking part in meetings and training courses that are regularly provided by a range of international groupings (such as the Council of Europe's European Youth Centre) to service and develop transnational and intercultural youth services and political/social education. More specifically, small studies about young people's images and responses to 'Europe' are currently in progress; the results of the first of these will appear in the *1994 CYRCE Yearbook on Youth Research and Youth Policy* (De Gruyter, Amsterdam; planned for publication late this year, CYRCE e.V. is a ginger group for the development of European youth research).

2 this distinction is drawn from du Bois-Reymond and Hubner-Funk (1992) and is summarised in Chisholm (1993). The ultimate aim of European youth research would be to move gradually towards the expanded-integrative pole.

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WHY DO YOUTH REVOLT?

Some reflections from young people and politics in Eastern and Western Europe[1]

SIJKA KOVACHEVA AND CLAIRE WALLACE

Youth is a transitional stage in life, one generally subordinated to adult authority and we would not therefore expect it to provide a sufficient base for political parties or movements. Yet under some circumstances, youth can become politicized. In this paper we consider some of the circumstances under which this can take place. By drawing some comparisons between the political activity of young people in market societies and in state socialist ones within Europe we can cast some light on this issue.

The attitudes and activities of young people cannot but be shaped by the events taking place around them. When there are dramatic historical changes young people play a very important part and this can serve to politicize them and to create 'youth' as political force. Such changes would include the civil rights movements of the 1960s, the protest against nuclear weapons and environmental destruction of the 1970s and 1980s and the popular movements against repressive governments in state socialist countries in the late 1980s and 1990s followed by the rise of nationalist populist movements. Rising unemployment since the 1970s particularly affects young people as well and this has likewise had some influence on their perceptions and actions.

Such changes affect everyone. So why should youth be a particular focus? Some have argued that psychologically youth are in an unstable life-stage and this would account for their more radical and romantic tendencies or that there is an inevitable conflict of generations (see Schneider 1990 for a review). However, we would not support such arguments. Rather it seems to us that young people encounter political and social institutions or events less encumbered by the weight of previous socialization than do their older contemporaries and that their marginal position between family of origin and family of destination and between education and work makes it more easy for them to adopt critical or oppositional postures: they have invested less in the status quo than have older people. However, age alone does not lead to a likelihood of political activity. This requires crystallization through external political and social events. In this way we can identify the influence of 'generations' in politics (Mannheim 1952) and this has lead Braungart and Braungart (1990) to argue that distinct political generations can be identified dependent upon the interaction of historical periods and generational cohorts. The different situation of young men and women in political activity is an important issue, but one which we do not tackle in any detail here.

The active participation of youth in political movements is however, the exception rather than the rule. Recent surveys carried out in Britain and Germany[2] confirm those of earlier studies, finding that young people are not politically radical; on the whole they follow the same political parties as their parents and regions (Bynner 1990). If anything, they tend not to vote at all and to express cynicism and detachment from political institutions and the political process.

What political movements have young people become involved in? The movements against nuclear power, against nuclear weapons, against NATO bases in

Europe and against environmental destruction engaged many young Europeans in the 1970s and 1980s. New forms of political protest joined with older ones as young people joined demonstrations, blockaded new motorway and airport ventures or demonstrated outside American military bases. In the Anglo-German survey young people expressed strong support for 'Green' Parties and for nuclear and environmental issues (Evans and Heinz 1994, Bynner and Roberts 1991). Such activity took place outside of mainstream political parties, but had some impact upon contemporary politics. In addition students have been involved in protests over educational reforms or educational cuts, particularly in Higher Education, often concerned over equal access to education and sometimes managing to change the course of educational reforms or to delay them. Demonstrations in the 1970s and 1980s against cuts in education and in the 1960s against unpopular curricula and the conservative organization of education later developed into more generally critical social movements (Rootes 1980, 1990). From the opposite political perspective, in the 1980s the Young Conservatives were a dynamic political influence in contemporary politics.

Those most involved in political movements and who are most interested in politics generally are the more upwardly mobile young people. The higher up the educational ladder one moves, the more interest in politics and the greater likelihood of joining a political movement (Roberts and Parsell 1990, Banks et al. 1992). However, working class young people have also experienced strong social and economic changes in their conditions of life. In the post war period they were the first to encounter and to shape the 'consumer society' and later on they were the first to suffer from rising unemployment, deteriorating public services, homelessness and escalating racial tension. Although less likely to join political movements, they have been important in shaping the 'cultural politics' of youth sub-cultures which have taken on a different dimension in the context of the 'new Europe' (Hall and Jefferson 1976, Mungham and Pearson 1976). It is they who have confronted police and fought other groups in a struggle for control of the streets and shopping malls (Presdee 1990). Such unarticulated and spontaneous actions can also be seen as a form of political protest, as can rioting (Ridley 1981).

The significance of 'cultural politics' can best be exemplified by considering the case of state socialist societies.

Youth Politics under Socialism

In state socialist societies, civil society was as far as possible extinguished and there was an attempt to exert state control over every aspect of people's lives, which made all protests of the kind described above impossible. Politics dominated society, but was seen as something alien, something imposed from above, something which failed to engage or inspire the majority of people. This imposed uniformly conservative regimes in terms of dress, speech and behaviour. Anything which deviated from the imposed norm was seen as deeply suspicious (Zelev 1982, Schopflin 1991). However, participation in official political activities was a strong obligation with all members of society being organized into various movements and structures which were all ultimately controlled by the Communist Party.

One of the most important of these structures was the organization for youth, the Komsomol, the Young Communist League, which enrolled young people from

ages 14 to 30 and this was preceded by the 'Young Pioneers' for the younger age cohorts. The majority of people joined and membership was particularly strong amongst the younger groups, because it was obligatory. In societies which were very much future-oriented, young people were seen as the 'builders of communist future' and were for this reason given a high priority. Komsomol organized social activities, mass rallies and cultural events. The extent of the influence of youth organization varied from country to country - in Poland for example people were more sceptical of socialist authorities but in Bulgaria they were more strongly committed to socialism at least in its initial stages, and the influence of this organisation was more pervasive. Although ostensibly autonomous, it was in fact the instrument of the party control of youth because it was a way of keeping young people under constant surveillance. The Komsomol was the main way in which the ambitious young people could climb to better positions. It's organization reflects that of the Communist Party by which it was dominated.

However, despite this apparently privileged role for youth, state socialist societies were in fact gerontocratic in terms of the composition of their ruling groups and the organizations for youth were a way of keeping them away from any real political influence. Professional careers started later and advanced slowly with delayed acquisition of material goods which ensured that power was transferred only to those who had been in and conformed to the system all their lives. The position of youth was in practice relatively powerless within this political and social structure (Mitev 1982). Komsomol and other things carried out for youth were paternalistic in their outlook and young people's representation in political institutions was of a 'token' character. The result was that by the 1980s the majority of youth became politically disaffected and felt alienated from their own organization and from the political system in general. At the time this was explained as faulty Komsomol organization or bad Komsomol leadership (Draganov 1979, Savov 1985). The problem of political apathy and cynicism amongst youth in communist societies was identified by the authorities already in the 1980s and was a source of grave concern (Riordan 1986). Although they might dutifully turn up to rallies and meetings they saw the Komsomol as a career route for the politically ambitious rather than as an organization representing them: politics was something over which people felt they had no power or control (Marody 1989). Sociological surveys in Bulgaria indicated that by the 1980s young people no longer identified with the official ideology and saw this as a set of incoherent ideological postulates and one-sided explanations - as empty political slogans (Raychev 1985). Thus, by the 1980s there was evidence of massive political alienation amongst young people in many state socialist countries.

Thus, youth were in a paradoxical position: on the one hand a highly privileged and prioritized group and on the other hand a completely powerless group. Although their symbolic importance was great and they were recruited into age-specific organizations where they were expected to show evidence that they were working enthusiastically for the high ideals of socialism, in practice they had little real independence. In economic terms, their real position was one in which they often had to live with parents into their 30s even after marriage and were only later in life likely to achieve any real economic independence - and this was of course a main priority at an individual level. Having been initiated into this form of orches-

trated political citizenship from their teens, they held no real economic or political autonomy. Youth was thus a heavily constructed social category but in ways which were considered meaningless.

Under these circumstances, anything which deviated from officially-sanctioned activity and behaviour was seen as threatening to the authorities. The consequence was that the authorities reacted extremely harshly to any autonomous activity by young people, which could include such things as growing their hair, wearing mini-skirts or jeans and following popular music. Although reactions to such deviations varied between different countries, in the former Soviet Union such activities were punishable by imprisonment. Thus we could say that everyday life was over-politicized when even small gestures of personal self-expression were seen as threats to the political authority of the system and rendered deviant activity. This of course made such actions all the more tempting for some and resulted in a constant struggle over cultural expression. However, the authorities were powerless to prevent the infiltration of youth sub-cultures through various kinds of media. Those in border countries could watch western television and adopt some of those styles. Western radio stations were widely listened to by young people and there was widespread clandestine circulation of tapes, records and music. This allowed the scope for oppositional identities to emerge (Svitek 1990). Such cultural gestures were turned into political issues by state domination, but were condemned as western subversions and not rooted in real communist society or as decadent. By the 1980s however, western youth sub-cultures had spread to many state socialist societies and such phenomena as 'punks', 'heavy metal', 'psycho billies', 'goths', 'new romantics','skinheads', and so on were familiar at least on the western borders and to some extent further east as well. Although it was very difficult for young people to openly adopt such sub-cultural styles, they became an important source of unofficial culture. There were rock banks often with a strong following despite official disapproval and in more pluralistic societies such as Poland these were well established. For young intellectuals there were informal clubs which discussed various problems from arts to morality through samizdat publications. However, even dissident clubs tended to discourage young people from becoming too actively involved for fear of 'ruining their future'.

Since any kind of political expression was forbidden except through official channels young people carved out space for autonomous activities in other ways. In Lithuania they joined choirs, in Latvia they cultivated gardens, in other countries they helped in family projects to build country homes and they also participated in informal economic activities such as trading in Poland (Gomulka 1991) so-called 'potato trading' in Hungary (Csepeli and Orkeny 1992) and in Bulgaria the exchange and circulation of pickled and preserved food in the kinship-based 'jar exchange' economy.

Young people and the political transformations at the end of the 1980s

Given the general exclusion of young people from the political process and their political apathy and cynicism it seems surprising that they played such an important part in the 'gentle', and sometimes less gentle, revolutions of 1989 and afterwards. In fact there had been the growth of political movements through the 1980s with such young people playing an important part in such things as 'Eco glasnost',

an ecological movement in Bulgaria and in Solidarity in Poland from its formation in 1980-1. Many demonstrations were organized by students over ecological issues. One example in Plovdiv was a protest at the official decision by the central authorities to tackle the vole population by poisoning them, an agricultural exercise which was so clumsily executed that it killed most of the local wildlife in the food chain. Students arrived in the city carrying strings of dead birds and rodents which they had picked up from the surrounding fields as a protest. Young people demonstrated over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam on the border of Hungary and Slovakia.

Why was it that young people suddenly became an active political force? It has been suggested that it was precisely the role of youth subcultures as subversive activity which may have helped young people to form a more critical detachment from the system than other groups (Kabatek 1990). Another explanation lies in the fact that this generation had been born after the terrors of the Stalinist era and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia following its experiment with reform communism in 1968. This generation were therefore not as frightened of military intervention of the more extreme forms of political repression, such as deportation to concentration camps or execution, as were their predecessors. Having had no direct experience of the Second World War, this generation could see little reason for the continued occupation of their countries by Soviet troops. Finally, since much of the most militant activity came from students, we could argue that their position was the most unsatisfactory. Full employment along with economic stagnation and gerontocratic forms of elite-recruitment meant that many were forced to take jobs for which they were over-qualified on graduation. The extraordinary success of the socialist educational reforms in creating a relatively large University educated population in what had sometimes been semi-literate societies (with the exception of Czechoslovakia and East Germany) over the space of one or two generations helped to raise meritocratic aspirations enormously and these aspirations could not be fulfilled except by participating in the Communist Party. This lead to increasing discontent amongst educated groups.

This generational explanation is supported by the student activists interviewed by Kovacheva in Bulgaria. For them anyone associated with the former regime bears responsibility for the guilt of the regime 'there was no open protest, not even the slightest attempt - nothing to wipe the shame from their faces (ie of the older generation)' in the words of one student. Another expressed the opinion that the political culture of the country could only change once all of those 'born in slavery' were dead. However, this was really stereo-typing of generations because the students had good relations with their own parents and some even claimed that they had helped to socialise their parents politically!

Thus it was a demonstration by students in November 1989 in Wenceslas square which lead to the toppling of the communist leadership in Czechoslovakia and young people's participation in the 'singing' revolution in Lithuania helped to trigger the changes there. In some countries young people's demonstrations lead to violent confrontation as in Romania in 1990, in Tadzhikistan in 1991 and in Tianamen Square in China. In Bulgaria it was student occupations of University buildings in 1990 which prompted and accelerated changes in the governing elite. The first wave of occupations throughout the country came soon after the parlia-

mentary election of June 1990 when it became clear that the former Communist Party had gained the majority of seats and ended at the beginning of July with the resignation of President Mladenov[3]. The second wave of demonstrations in November through to December was better organized and promoted the resignation of Prime Minister Lukanov and his socialist government. In the Ukraine student demonstrations and hunger strikes forced the resignation of the Prime Minister and withdrawal from the CIS. Further demonstrations in 1992 forced the resignation of unpopular Prime Minster Vitold Fokin.

In Hungary the Alliance of Young Democrats was formed by a few dozen University students in 1988 as an alternative to the Communist Youth League and this was Hungary's first independent political organization (Pataki 1993). The age limit was 35. In the 1990 elections and subsequently it has proved to be one of the most popular political parties for both younger and older voters because it represented a new, fresh generation untainted by involvement in the system. This was clear in their election poster which pictured two repellent and wrinkled old communist leaders kissing each other in greeting juxtaposed with an attractive young couple embracing. The slogan invited the population to choose between them. The style of the Young Democrats was unconventional and they wore blue jeans and T Shirts in Parliament or grew their hair long in defiance of contemporary conservative norms.

In Poland young people joined the 'flying university' in the 1980s - an unofficial alternative university held in the private homes of professors - organized the Catholic Academic Youth and participated in the crucifix revolt in 1984 when the authorities tried to remove crucifixes from classrooms. They also organized against military service. In Romania, students organized protests and demonstrations in Timosoara in 1989-90 and in Bucharest and set up the free student union. In the then-existing Soviet Union students and young people were prominent in the various protests by national liberation struggles in Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia, in Latvia and elsewhere and in all countries occupied by Soviet troops there was increased resentment against them. In the DDR it was students at the Humboldt University which lead some of the demonstrations and protests and in Leipzig, they joined candle light demonstrations.

This prominent role of youth in pressuring change towards democracy in Central and Eastern Europe suggests some comparison with the student movement in the late 1960s. However the two types of youth protest followed different developmental paths.

The student movement in Central and Eastern Europe began with protest leading towards facilitating changes in the political system and then moved later towards reforms in the Universities. The student movement in the West was quite the opposite. Student protest in the USA, France, Germany, Australia, and to a lesser extent, Britain, started as local incidents protesting against University authorities and then towards broader political issues (Rootes, 1990). However, this distinction between the two types of movement reflects not so much their intrinsic nature, as external conditions. The movement in the East erupted in a situation of radical change in the social and political order, whereas the movement in the West developed in the context of relatively stable, prosperous societies. A more careful examination of

the two movements reveals one common inherent concern - the loss of legitimation of the governing elite (Habermas 1969). The research by Bertaux (1990) on leaders of student campaigns in the West, of Rootes (1990) on student radicalism in an international context, and of Kovacheva (1992)[4] on the student movement in post-communist Bulgaria indicates a deep, moral anxiety amongst young people. The actual events themselves were triggered by relatively minor incidents such as the problematising of the free speech issue at Berkeley, the gymnasium issue at Columbia, the authenticity of the Bulgarian president's remarks 'Better let the tanks come' or even the issue of vole poisoning in Plovdiv. The protest campaigns in the advanced capitalist and post-communist societies, varying in claims and tactics, manifested a common desire for self expression and an eagerness to show what 'students can do when they come to grips with the issues confronting their generation... and society as a whole' (Taylor, 1969:10).

However, there is also another way of distinguishing the two types of movement - their outcomes. In contrast with the student protest in the West, movements in Communist countries seem more successful in their aspirations for changes in the system of power. Their direct impact can be traced in important personnel changes in the governing elite, in election results, in changes in the legislative system, and most particularly in new constitutions which no longer privilege the leading role of the Communist Party.

Young people in post-communist politics

Although young people played such a key role in toppling the communist state authorities in so many countries, in most places this activism did not continue for long. In the more western post-communist societies the official Communist Youth Leagues disappeared and were not replaced with any equivalent organisation. Although young people are no doubt thankful for this relief from official duties, it means that young people's interests are no longer represented even in token form at any level of society. Thus, they are no longer represented indirectly through elected representatives nor directly through youth lobbies. There are no longer quotas for age or gender, as in the past. Although there has been some rejuvenation of the leadership, young people no longer exist as a political group. Indeed they have disappeared as a strongly constructed social category as other interest groups have emerged.

Instead there are a variety of shifting and fragmented parties, organizations and interest groups both autonomously and as youth sections of political parties. This profusion of youth unions, societies and federations turn out to be situational organizations brought into being by the rapid process of transformation and they quickly dissolve again once the enthusiasm for change is over. Very often such organizations have already dissolved by the time their emergence is announced in the mass media. In Bulgaria, the Komsomol has been recently reconstituted but as a 'non political' organization. The weakness of such organizations is partly due to suspicion towards any organized activity requiring discipline and structure - an attitude inherited from the over-organized past (Kovacheva 1992). Young people prefer to pursue movements rather than organizations which would require a more routinized and sober everyday practice. Whereas in the past the enemy was obvious and could be confronted, in a situation of political and economic liberalization it is more difficult to see who to blame. Responsibility is de-centralized. Economic reforms

imposed by external international bodes were at first enthusiastically embraced but have led to economic crisis. There are other outlets for the politically and economically ambitious but the power structures are less tangible and obvious.

However, there are examples of organizations by young people too. In Hungary the Young Democrats organized themselves as a party and following their electoral successes have had to adopt more conventional styles of activity. The age limit has been abolished and the members now nominate older and more experienced candidates. They have also abandoned their blue jeans for suits (Pataki 1993). In the more traditional Ukraine the student organizations reflect those of the dominant political groupings so that there is not so much a disappearance of the old formal structures as their re-grouping. Thus along with the reconstituted Komsomol there is the Students Union, a pro-socialist, pro-Russian organization and the Union of Ukrainian Students, a western-oriented, Nationalist organization based mainly in the western Ukraine and supported by the Ukrainian diaspora. These organizations reflect the main political power blocks in a divided region.

In the elections immediately following the transformations of 1989/90 voter turnout was high and young people participated actively in this, with voter turnout some 75-85% in Bulgaria for example. Young people were more likely to vote for the new anti-communist parties (Tonschev and Jordanova 1991) and this was also found in a recent survey in Poland in which it was evidant that young people were most likely to vote for reform parties such as the Democratic Union rather than the communist and socialist alliances which in fact won the election some months later[5]. However, it seems that in subsequent elections (if Hungary and Poland are anything to go by) voter turnout lessens and young people revert to being alienated from politics and apathetic about the changes (Molnar 1992). In the same survey in Poland a massive 35.4% stated that they would not vote at all and 30.9% were undecided when faced with the confusing variety of parties and alliances from which to choose. Qualitative interviews revealed a general cynicism about politicians and the political process which was felt to have little connection to young people's daily concerns.

A more extreme response to the post-communist changes is emigration. Large numbers of young people have left their countries since 1989, being disillusioned with the slow pace of reforms and the lack of opportunities for them in stagnating economies with rising unemployment and spiralling inflation. Some of those leaving are from ethnic minorities who are suffering most from the reforms and from accentuated political repression - for example 320,000 Bulgarian Turks left in 1989 and these were followed by 88,000 other emigrants so far. This is a loss of the young community in particular since 67% of emigrants are youth (Atanasov 1991). In 1990 a survey found that 31% of young people were actual or potential migrants and this had increased to 70% two years later (Kostova 1992). In Albania emigration by young people has been so dramatic that it has resulted in a demographic distortion of the population. Young people are now leaving the increasing number of war struck countries where there has been more or less a collapse in the physical and social infrastructure (examples are Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Armenia and Georgia) and other young men leave in order to avoid military service. Young people can see no future for themselves in such countries and their only resort is to leave.

The recent politicisation of ethnic differences as a result of the creation of new national governments in the region has encouraged more intolerant attitudes

towards other ethnic groups. Young people are influenced by this because they cannot remember a time when ethnic groups lived together in more harmony. For example in Bulgaria, following the politicisation of differences between Bulgarians and the Turkish minority a survey in 1989 indicated more intolerance toward mixed marriages than in 1982-3 and in 1991 a survey indicated a greater reluctance to establish business contacts between the two communities by young people than by those in older generations (Galabov 1991).

The political situation in most post-communist countries is bewildering for many citizens.

The single party authority has been replaced by a profusion of parties and movements, many with very small constituencies and a kaleidoscope of changing parties and coalitions. There is much confusion and inconsistency in political programmes and documents. Politicians do not necessarily hold consistent positions either and frequently change their stances as for example has Zhirinovsky in Russia. In a situation where Socialist and Green Parties are accused of conservatism and Conservative or Christian Democratic parties claim to be radical, the political spectrum is less clear than in a country like Britain. In these circumstances the traditional polarities of left and right do not count. Add to this the fact that colourful political personalities are often more important than parties as we can see from the success of individuals such as the Canadian emigre Tyminksi whose 'Party X' received one quarter of the votes in the presidential campaign in Poland and the case of George Ganchev in Bulgaria who simply projected the image of a self-made man following his stay in Britain, rather than a clear political programme (Schopflin 1991, Marody 1991). Where there are no clear rules of movements it is more difficult for young people to develop a coherent political role.

One of the results of the student protest campaigns throughout the region was the increased participation on different levels of university decision-making was conceded - from one third in Bulgaria to one half in Czechoslovakia of the representatives on the main University committees. In Donetsk there is 20% representation on the equivalent of the academic Senate. Such representation leaves western observers astonished. However, less than half of the student representatives in academic assemblies and councils at Plovdiv University have ever attended a session of these Committees and this was true for other universities as well. In Prague the students are disillusioned with this representation and feel that it achieves very little. The one attempt by Sociology students to influence the curriculum by reducing the amount of statistics they had to learn failed to have any effect! However, in Donetsk the system of electing professors and those in key positions means that students can potentially have a very important means of political leverage through these committees. This behaviour confirms the observation of Bok (1991:3) on Hungarian and Czech systems of higher education that despite their prominent role in the change from communist to democratic regimes, students seem 'apathetic and uninterested in participating in the university governance'. Young people express concern about the archaic methods of teaching and assessment, low quality of some lecture-courses, difficulties with getting the necessary information and acute shortages of equipment but these attitudes have not yet produced mass student activism. Having developed consciousness about the need for changes, students lack the motivation for personal activity to put them into practice. Their realistic fear of unemployment

and conviction that there is no relationship between their academic performance and finding a good job are all factors that discourage students from their efforts at re-structuring the system of Higher Education. The result is that over the last four years fees have been introduced into Higher Education and the costs of studying have risen considerably as students now have to pay more for dormitories, for books and for other materials. However, students have failed to react to this privatization of their institutions and to the worsening conditions of study. There have been few political protests over these changes.

Young people and the 'New Right'

Although young people are less evident in political movements generally, in one particular area they have received a great deal of press attention - their participation in movements of the 'new' neo-fascist right. In particular there is the association between the skinhead sub-culture and neo-fascists. Skinheads began as protest sub-cultures in the 1980s in the most western communist societies (they were not heard of in Bulgaria until recently and still do not exist in the Ukraine). However, under the influence of their western neighbours they turned from small cultural forms of protest into more organized political groups after the changes of 1989/90. Unlike other forms of youth protest, these are mainly youth from the lower social strata and are overwhelmingly men. In Britain it seems that it is mainly those from depressed areas who are likely to turn to extreme political solutions (Roberts and Parsell 1990) although in Central Europe it seems that these are mostly young people who are in work. Rather than the 'lumpen' image which skinheads have in Britain, in Central Europe they are seen as rather respectable, disciplined vigilantes who train themselves to keep the streets clean of foreigners and criminals. They seem to enjoy some support from police and population for this.

Originating in East London in the early 1970s, the skinheads were associated with a tough, fighting masculine image, support for particular football teams and racism (Cohen 1972). They are characterised by a distinctive uniform of rolled up jeans, shaved heads and 'doc Martins' boots. This image spread to Europe as a result of roving football club supporters and their media coverage. It was only later that they began to be recruited into neo-fascist parties such as the British Party and National Front and that their playful adoption of nazi symbolism such as the 'Sieg Heil' salute started to become more sinister.

Skinheads were active in Germany through the 1980s and were associated there with the revival of 'new right neo-fascist politics' the most respectable side of which is embodied in the Republican Party. In the 1990s however, racism is increasing all over Europe, including Britain, and far right movements have enjoyed something of a revival. Racist feelings and racist attacks are on the ascendent throughout Europe with 7 deaths reported in England last year from these causes, and the far right parties doing rather well in the French and German regional elections. In Germany, skinheads have attacked mainly Turks, but also homeless people, mentally and physically handicapped, Poles and homosexuals. In Czech lands and Hungary they have fought mainly against Gypsies (Romanies) and there are thought to be about 6,000. In Pardobice 300 skinheads marched through the city centre shouting 'Czech lands for the Czechs' and 'Gypsies to the Gas' in February this year, although interestingly enough, the Czech skinheads eschew the neo-nazi symbolism because of the unfavourable historical associa-

tions it holds in a country previously occupied by the Third Reich. In Germany the 40,000 or so right radical sympathizers published their own magazines with names such as 'Skinhead Zeitung' 'Frontal' and 'White Power'. In each country skinheads follow particular kinds of bands and music, often with racist lyrics. In 1992 in Germany they accounted for some 1600 attacks, 17 deaths (Spiegel 49/92). One of the best known of these was an attack on 23rd November in Moelln when a whole Turkish family were killed in a fire attack. However, this was only one of many fire-bomb attacks and beatings (Hockenos 1993).

The growth of these far right groups is associated with the problems of unification and opening the Eastern borders. Factors including the collapse of the former East German economy, the very high rates of unemployment amongst people accustomed to full employment, the crisis of ideology amongst those for whom the promise of the west turned out to be a disappointment and the general disorientation of youth brought up in disciplinarian organizations now finding themselves in a post-communist confusion. The politicisation of ethnicity has affected Germany as well so that the skinhead's attacks are directed against the refugees and asylum seekers (numbering about 1 million) and the seasonal and foreign workers who have entered since unification from or through Eastern Europe.

However, Germany researchers from the Youth Institute stress that there is no simple explanation for the rise of right wing violence and that it is not only associated with young people. Racist attitudes are more likely to be espoused by adults than by the young and the skinheads represent only a small minority of young people (Schneider 1990, Hoffmann-Lange and Eilders 1990). They also point out that many of the explanations which have been advanced for accounting for neo-fascist youth groups are not equally valid in both halves of Germany.

The skinheads are perhaps an extreme example of a much publicized minority group, but the revival of nationalism and the mobilization of young people in such nationalist movements is a new dimension to cultural politics which is far more significant in the context of fragile economies and democracies and the weak social integration in Eastern Europe than it was in Britain where it originated. Far more sinister than the marginal skinhead youth groups are the nationalist demagogues which have arisen in the region and have the capacity to stir up a witch's brew of potential xenophobic and racist attitudes from positions of power within the state apparatus.

Conclusion

To summarize, the situation of youth politics in communist and post-communist societies can be characterized by one of an over-politicized age group (in reality one expressing cynicism and apathy) which then mobilized to become a creative political force but later rapidly de-mobilized again into apathy. The situation now can be described as one of confusion and uncertainty with a range of unstable groups coming and going, but the growing importance of national or ethnic identities in politics.

It would seem that in general it is the more highly educated young people, and especially students, who are the most politically active, but that other young people also resort to the 'cultural politics' of youth styles which are also implicitly critical of the dominant order. These 'crltural politics' can move from symbolism to more or less explicit political identification in some circumstances and thus help to articulate the interests and experiences of sub-groups of young people.

At present it seems that the neo-fascist romantic nationalism of the extreme right in Europe is able to make a connection with the cultural politics of young people in the 1990s. However, the issues that young people in both East and Western Europe are most concerned with are issues of the environment and social justice rather than 'mainstream' politics. In both East and Western Europe, most young people are cynical about 'mainstream' politics and alienated from the political process. However, under some circumstances, when there is an overall crisis of legitimacy in the dominant order, youth politics can play a pivotal role, for example in the 'evenements' of 1968, or in the changes of regime in 1989 in Eastern Europe. This is not so much the product of youth organizing as a coherent interest group, as young people, particularly students, being seen as a 'new force' against the 'older order'.

In Eastern Europe the official category of 'youth' as a political construct has disappeared along with the official youth organization and with it many forms of youth representation in the political structure. However, because youth occupied an over politicized space, they acquired a political character. This political consciousness was only a temporary and transient articulation of interests which later evaporated to be replaced by a rapidly changing plethora of groups and interests which have yet to cohere into a clear political map. The alternative non-politicized articulation of interests through a strong civil society has yet to emerge. In Western Europe too, young people remain both politically and economically marginalised because they do not represent a strong political force.

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Notes

1. This chapter is taken from a book about youth in Eastern and Western Europe being written by Sijka Kovacheva and Claire Wallace to be published by Macmillan. Further analysis of the relationship between sub-cultures, the family, the labour market and the political system can be found there.

2. The Anglo-German study was carried out in 1989 and 1991 in 4 labour complementary markets, 2 in Germany and 2 in England. The labour markets were: Swindon, Liverpool, Bremen and Padderborn. The total of 640 young people were sampled in 1989 and 160 in 1991. These were supplemented with in-depth interviews, many of them carried out by C. Wallace.

3. Mladenov was a major figure in the non-violent re-shuffle amongst the governing elite in Bulgaria on November 10, 1989. In a public meeting protesting against the clause in the Constitution which proclaimed the leading role of the Communist Party in December the same year, a reporter recorded a phrase believed to be murmured by Mladenov... 'It's better to let the tanks come in' - thus apparently endorsing the bloody suppression of the protest. However, the record was published more than six months later, after the election in which the Communists took the majority of the votes. This remark was one of the factors which triggered the first student occupation. Mladenov neither refuted nor admitted having said the words. Students insisted on an official examination of the records and expressed concern for higher morality in the new democratic politics.

4. Kovacheva's research on the student movement in post-communist Bulgaria was a case study of Plovdiv University. By Bulgarian standards this is quite a large and old provincial higher school which expanded after 1989. The study used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including in-depth interviews with leaders and active participants in the four major forms of student mobilization, the administration of an attitude scale comparing these and ordinary students and analysis of documen-

tary sources. The sample was of 72 students and the field work was done in March 1992 with the support of The Central European University.

5. The Polish study consisted of a survey of nearly 2,000 young people with 3 labour markets: Katowice, Gdansk and Suwalki. Two cohorts of people were interviewed in each labour market, including 18-19 year olds and those aged 21-22. The survey was carried out in March/April 1993 a few months before the general elections in Poland. These were supplemented with qualitative interviews in each locality, many of them carried out by C. Wallace.

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TRANSITIONS INTO THE LABOUR MARKET IN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND

T SZUMLICZ AND K ROBERTS

Youth in post-communist Poland

Poland became post-communist in January 1990. What did this mean for the country's young people? The following analysis arises from a project based in three parts of Poland which is investigating how the young people have been affected by, and how they have responded amidst their new economic, political and social conditions.

It should be noted at the outset that young people are numerically more important in Poland than in most western countries. Demographically Poland is a relatively young society. In 1992 the population was 38.5 million, only slightly larger than the pre-war (1938) peak of 35 million, but the population sank to 24 million during World War Two. Rapid population growth since the 1940s has kept the country demographically young. In 1992, 30% of the population was under 18 while only 10 percent was over 65. This was despite the dramatic increase in life expectancy; for men from 48.2 in 1931-32 to 67.2 in 1988, and for women from 51.4 to 75.7 (Kurzynowski, 1990). Young workers are more important in Poland's economy, young voters are more important politically, and youth unemployment threatens a higher proportion of Poland's households than in Western European countries.

Our enquiries among Poland's young people were designed so that some of the findings would be comparable with earlier research in Britain and Germany (Banks et al, 1992, Bynner and Roberts, 1991). The Polish research has questioned approximately 1800 young people drawn from three areas (Gdansk, Katowice and Suwalki). A half of each local sample were in the final year of their secondary schooling at the time of the fieldwork in 1993 while the remainder were four years older. They were questioned about their experiences in education and the labour market, and about their views on a variety of social and political issues. However, the following passages simply describe the economic and educational contexts within which the young people were making their transitions to adulthood.

We will argue that young people in Poland are being affected more sharply by political and economic reforms than Britain's young people have been affected by 'restructuring' in their country since the 1970s. In some respects the predicaments of school- leavers in post-communist Poland have appeared extremely dire. Unemployment levels in some Polish regions have made Britain's depressed labour markets appear buoyant. Moreover, up to 1993 there was less state intervention in Poland than in Britain aimed at rebuilding school-leavers transitions. 'New right' philosophies have been applied ruthlessly in much of post- communist Eastern Europe. However, we will also point to signs of Poland's young people resorting to their own survival strategies on a scale suggesting that they, and maybe their society, will prove better able to handle the socio-economic transformations that are in process than has been the case in Britain.

Table I **Demographic Structure**

<table>
<tr><th>Region</th><th>Sex</th><th>% of population in age group</th><th>urban population</th><th>population density per sq. km</th><th>share of country's population</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>M/F</td><td>0-18 | >65</td><td>% | % in | in towns | towns | >50,000</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Poland</td><td>49/51</td><td>30 | 10</td><td>62 | 39</td><td>122</td><td>100</td></tr>
<tr><td>Gdansk</td><td>49/51</td><td>30 | 9</td><td>76 | 54</td><td>192</td><td>4</td></tr>
<tr><td>Katowice</td><td>49/51</td><td>29 | 8</td><td>88 | 76</td><td>597</td><td>10</td></tr>
<tr><td>Suwalki</td><td>50/50</td><td>34 | 8</td><td>54 | 23</td><td>44</td><td>1</td></tr>
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The research areas within Poland were chosen so as to illustrate conditions in different parts of the country. In 1992 agriculture was still a major industry and only 39% of the population lived in towns or cities with over 50,000 inhabitants (see Table I). Suwalki was therefore selected as an example of a predominantly rural area. It is in north-east Poland, adjacent to the Lithuania border, and is Poland's largest voivodship (region) in terms of area but contains only one percent of the country's population. Katowice (in Silesia) lies at the heart of Poland's most heavily industrialised, urbanised and polluted region. Gdansk, in contrast, is primarily a commercial centre. This region is dominated economically by the three Baltic coastal cities of Gdansk, Sopot and Gdynia.

Unemployment

In all three regions one of the earliest and most obvious symptoms of the transition to post-communism was the emergence, then the rapid aggravation, of an unemployment problem. Such a problem had no precedent in Poland since 1945. In 1989 the country had 4,000 registered unemployed but there were 490,000 vacancies at the state job agencies; 172 jobs for every job- seeker. The scale of this imbalance was much the same regardless of sex, qualifications or region. By the end of 1990, however, the imbalance had been reversed in every part of Poland. By then unemployment had risen to 1,126,000, a rate of 6.1%, and the job agencies had only 54,000 jobs. Throughout 1991 unemployment continued to rise and by the end of that year there were 2,156,000 registered unemployed. Meanwhile the number of notified vacancies shrank further to just 29,000 (see Table II). The reasons for the rise in unemployment were straightforward. Economic liberalisation unleashed market forces, establishments needed to reduce their costs in order to survive, the government needed to curtail public spending, and the 'economy of shortages' vanished. Suddenly labour was abundant and was being unloaded rapidly from all sectors except agriculture, and particularly rapidly from manufacturing. During the first quarter of 1992, when manufacturing accounted for 31% of all employment in Poland, 48% of the registered unemployed who had held jobs previously were from this sector. Services accounted for 37% of all employment and 42% of the registered unemployed. Agriculture was proving the most secure sector. It accounted for 31% of jobs but only 11 % of the unemployed.

Table II **Unemployment in Poland**

		Unemployment rate	Share of graduates (%)
1990 Quarter	I	1.5	-
1990 Quarter	II	3.1	-
1990 Quarter	III	5.0	17.0
1990 Quarter	IV	6.1	14.6
1991 Quarter	I	7.1	11.6
1991 Quarter	II	8.4	9.2
1991 Quarter	III	10.5	11.9
1991 Quarter	IV	11.4	10.3
1992 Quarter	I	12.2	8.8
1992 Quarter	II	12.6	6.6
1992 Quarter	III	13.6	8.3

The share of graduates (school and college leavers seeking their first jobs) among the unemployed grew rapidly during the summer of 1990 after the end of the school year. Their highest share among the unemployed (17%) was in september 1990. During 1991 the proportion of graduates among the unemployed declined to around 10% and this decline continued during 1992. However, the actual number of unemployed graduates rose slightly from 144,200 in June 1991 to 150,000 in June 1992. Graduates' problems in finding jobs had not lessened but had just grown less severely than other groups'. There was a steeper rise in the total of under-24 year olds on the unemployed register from 525,000 in the second quarter of 1991 to 763,500 during those months in 1992. In communist Poland workplace training had been at the discretion of each establishment. There had been no external regulation comparable to the German apprenticeship system. In leaving training to employers, Poland was closer to British than German practices. And when Poland's businesses began to shed labour in 1990 young workers were unprotected, as was the case in Britain in the 1970s and early 1980s. Young people in Poland were particularly vulnerable during the rise in unemployment for the same reasons as applied in Britain. Firstly, employers first-resort strategy towards reducing their payrolls was to curtail recruitment. Secondly, inexperienced school-leavers found themselves competing for jobs against displaced but experienced, and often fully-skilled adults. Thirdly, training was an area in which employers felt able to cut costs. If Poland's employers required non additional labour, they had no reason to train beginners. Young people's former right and obligation to work had been replaced by uncertainty (see Wallace, 1992.)

All official statistics, whether purporting to describe unemployment, poverty or crime, must be handled with caution, whatever the country, but this has applied especially forcefully with employment and unemployment statistics in some of the post-communist societies, including Poland. In Britain it is estimated that only a third of vacancies are notified to the official agencies. This estimate is based on research into firms' behaviour. In Poland in 1992 the equivalent estimates were better described as guesstimates: no-one really knew. It was clear that in many

parts of Poland the labour markets proper had almost seized-up completely. During June 1992 there were 171,300 new unemployed registrants while 62,200 left the register; 52,500 for jobs and 9,700 into training schemes or 'interventionist jobs', that is, public works programmes created in response to unemployment. In that month the number joining the register was nearly three times as great as the number who de-registered, so unemployment was rising steeply. However, the ratio of jobs starts to the total volume of employment in Poland at that time is equally interesting. During June 1992 there were roughly three job starts from the unemployment register per thousand in employment. During recessions in western countries there is normally a stronger flow into, and often out of jobs as well. Even in acutely depressed regions and cities there are always jobs being created and vacated to search and apply for, though for some this exercise can become intensely frustrating. Poland in 1992 was different; in many parts of that country the plain fact of the labour market situation was that there were virtually no vacancies in 'proper' jobs.

However, this assertion has to be qualified by acknowledging that in 1992 there were only guesstimates as to the real size of Poland's private economy. Much private activity remained 'uncivil' (Rose, 1991), meaning undisclosed to the authorities and probably involving some breach of the law such as non-declaration of income for tax purposes or cross-border trading, even when the business itself was perfectly legal. One indication of the private economy's significance can be gleaned from the previous jobs, when they had held any, of persons registered as unemployed. In the first quarter of 1992 there were 1,810,100 such persons of whom 35% had previously been employed in the private sector. The contraction of public sector employment was undoubtedly the main underlying source of the rise in unemployment. By 1992 the private sector accounted for 51% of all jobs and was expanding. The private sector was then responsible for 70% of all job offers notified to the official agencies. And the number of 'uncivil', undisclosed private jobs being filled was unknown. The market in official jobs, at least as regards entering them, may have ground to a virtual standstill but the indications were that Poland's uncivil labour market was far more fluid.

The benefit regime

As unemployment rose, Poland's benefit system became less generous, especially in respect of young people. The purpose was not to remove the 'option' of unemployment or to exert downward pressure on youth wages so much as simply to contain government spending. The Polish government was being watched closely by the World Bank and the international financial community more generally. If Poland wanted financial aid, as it did, the government needed to reduce its deficit.

Reforms in the benefit system in December 1989 tightened the definition of unemployment and the categories of people who were eligible to claim. An unemployed person had to be capable of work, willing to take up a job, currently out of work conducting no economic activity, and registered with the local job agency. Unemployment benefit could not be claimed by owners of farms whose area exceeded two hectares. However, to claim unemployment benefit no previous record of paid work was needed. The minimum level of these benefits was set by the minimum wage and its maximum was equivalent to lost earnings. Graduates with higher education but no previous employment were entitled to benefits for

three months equivalent to 200% of the minimum wage. Over the next six months they could get 150% and then 100% for nine months. Over the first three months of unemployment secondary school graduates were entitled to benefits equivalent to 150% of the minimum wage. After this time they would receive 100% of the minimum wage. This was indeed a very 'gentle' regime.

During 1990, 1991 and 1992 this regime was gradually stiffened. Following March 1992 a flat-rate unemployment benefit was introduced for all groups equivalent to 36% of the average wage in the economy. This sum would not be paid to a jobless person who turned down a job offer without justification (previously one job offer could be turned down without explanation). Secondary school and higher education graduates had to spend three months unemployed before they became entitled to this benefit, and their eligibility then lasted for just 12 months. Further changes in the legislation on unemployment benefits were anticipated in 1992, all seeking to reduce their scope and the numbers eligible even further. As unemployment became more widespread and less avoidable, the condition was made less comfortable. This applied in all age-groups, but especially for school-leavers. Many, it appeared, were being placed in hopeless predicaments, until account was taken of their 'uncivil' opportunities.

Education

Unlike in Britain, the spread of youth unemployment in Poland was not followed by the introduction of special employment and training measures designed to absorb the surplus labour and better prepare the young for jobs which, it was hoped, the market would eventually generate. The absence of special measures for the vast majority of the young (and older) unemployed can be explained partly in terms of reform in Poland, as in other Eastern European countries, occurring within a free market ideology rather than a desire to see the development of new forms of state intervention (see Cranston, 1992; Demcak, 1991; Machacek, 1991). However, there were additional, more pragmatic reason for the low level of state intervention in Poland. When local job agencies operated training and job creation schemes the measures rarely led into employment, so was there any point in continuing the measures? In any case, the job agencies' budgets were being emptied by claims for unemployment benefit.

Education was not overhauled following the collapse of communism. Nor did there appear to be any widespread demand for thorough, structural change. The only clear sign of economic liberalisation was the creation of some private elementary and secondary schools, usually under the auspices of the Roman Catholic church, and some private establishments offering training in business skills. The main curricula changes in state schools were the exit of Marxism and a strengthening of religious and nationalist elements. Virtually all schools were soon displaying the Polish flag and eagle. There were no responses to school-leavers' difficulties comparable to the 'new vocationalism' that rippled through British education in the 1970s and 80s.

Before and following the collapse of communism the first level of education in Poland has been in eight-grade elementary schools which children have usually started at age seven. As a rule, enrolment in elementary schools is preceded by one-year 'zero grade' pre-schooling in either schools or kindergartens. Elementary

education thus starts at age six or seven and ends at age fifteen. This education is compulsory. Subsequent secondary education had become the norm by the 1980s, but still remains voluntary in some regions. After the Second World War the main educational target in Poland was to provide all children with a complete elementary schooling. In 1960 45.2% of the population aged over 16 had still received less than a full elementary education. By 1984 this figure had declined by 8.7% who by then were virtually all in the older age groups (Kurzynowski, 1990).

At the close of the communist era there were three main types of secondary school to which virtually all young people were proceeding and no basic changes in the structure of the secondary school system have yet been envisaged.

(i) Vocational schools (szkola zasadnicza) offer three-year programmes, usually including some work experience, narrowly focused around particular vocations. There are some 20 types of these schools. Some are operated directly by enterprises, but this kind of patronage has disappeared rapidly since the economic reforms. Enterprises have no longer been able to afford to support schools. Nor have they wanted the graduates. The proportion of pupils attending these schools has declined but in 1992 they still accommodated 47% of secondary pupils. There are also some schools offering two year vocational courses but by 1990 this type of secondary education had declined almost to extinction. In 1992 these courses accounted for only one percent of the secondary school population.

(ii) By 1990 secondary professional schools (srednie szkoly zawodowe) had become a diverse category. They could be called *technikum* (for example, technical school of construction), *liceum* (an economic or medical lycee, for instance) or *professional liceum* (which prepared skilled labour). This education lasts four or five years. Graduation from such a school may (but does not always) lead to the matura, Poland's baccalaureate, which is necessary to enrol in higher education. The profile of professional education in these schools is much broader than in vocational schools. Professional schools accounted for 25% of secondary pupils in 1992 and this share was neither expanding nor declining.

(iii) General education secondary schools (licea ogolnoksztalcace) offer four years of education. Graduation from such schools has always led to the matura. By 1992 the proportion of entrants to secondary education being accommodated in these institutions had risen to 26% whereas three years previously it was under 20%. The expansion of general education was expected to continue, mainly at the expense of vocational schools.

At both elementary and secondary levels there have been so-called artistic schools, in most cases for music, arts and ballet. Almost, every type of school at the secondary level has 'special school' counterparts. There are schools for the blind, deaf, mentally retarded, disabled, chronically ill, youth requiring special care and so on. However, in total these schools account for only one percent of all pupils.

At the secondary level are also one or two year post-matura schools. Their objective is to provide graduates with professions after completing their secondary education. Most often they cater for individuals who have not wished or who have

been unable to enter higher education, and who have been unable to obtain jobs matching their qualifications or aspirations. Teachers' colleges, centres for pedagogic technical studies, and teachers' colleges of foreign languages have all been classified as post-matura secondary institutions.

In theory throughout the communist era Poland's education was flexible and open-ended for all pupils in the sense that, for example, after finishing a vocational programme a student could start in the fourth grade of a secondary professional school, or after finishing second grade in a general education secondary school he or she could continue in a secondary professional school. After finishing a vocational school it was possible to enrol for pedagogic technical studies. The open-ended character of the system was enhanced by evening and weekend schools in which education could be pursued while working. However, as explained below, track switching has been the exception, not the rule.

In 1992 some 65% of graduates from general education secondary schools proceeded to higher education, while the proportions doing so from all other kinds of secondary schools were tiny. In communist Poland, as in other East European countries, higher education was not regarded as a major mobility route because the intellectual occupations to which it led were not particularly well-paid. Higher education was desired for their children mainly by professional and intellectual parents as much for status as economic reasons (Kabatek, 1990; Mateju, 1989). So approximately one-third of graduates from Poland's academic secondary schools, and virtually all students from all other kinds of secondary education, attempted to enter the labour market and find employment immediately.

Poland's secondary schools have typically been grouped in complexes, so a single site might contain several vocational schools, or vocational, professional and general secondary schools with overlapping professional orientations. In Britain the entire site would be called a school whereas in Poland the title has been applied to each programme. The schools within a site have sometimes operated in shifts and shared facilities.

For British observers Poland's education has a rather old fashioned feel not just because most of the buildings are old, teaching remains traditional, equipment is sparse and records are kept in exercise books, but also because full elementary education has been retained. In Britain this kind of school was abandoned in 1944. Its retention in Poland was compatible with communism's preference for a common 'polytechnical' education up to age 15 (see Matthews, 1982). Subsequent secondary education in Poland has a distinctly Germanic or central European character in so far as it separates pupils into academic, technical and vocational tracks. As previously mentioned, in principle the systems has been open-ended and track switching has been possible, but this remained very much the exception in the early 1990s.

A complaint from Poland's schools that has rung familiarly in British ears is about their lack of adequate resources. However, Poland in the early 1990s there was general recognition that the economic situation needed to improve, rather than it merely being a matter of political will, before under-funding could be addressed. A further stark contrast, for British observers, has been that sparse resourcing cannot conceal the general respect that education commands in Poland even if this is not reflected in teachers' salaries.

As throughout Poland in 1992, in the regions selected for our study the bulk of youth were still continuing their education in vocational schools. However, it must be stressed that this type of education was declining. The new trend in all the regions was towards a larger role for 'full' secondary education, and in the next few years this trend was expected to become even stronger. The education offices in all the regions were planning such changes. This preference for general secondary education was partly due to the fact that graduates from such schools were having the least difficulty in the job market. Among unemployed graduates in 1992, five percent were from institutions of higher education, 13% were from general education secondary schools, 41% were from secondary professional schools and 41% were from vocational schools. These proportions were similar throughout all regions of Poland. The secondary professional school graduates were proving the most vulnerable to unemployment. On the open labour market they were proving less attractive to employers than graduates from general secondary or higher education, and they were not able to benefit from such close links as had been maintained in the past between vocational schools and particular industries.

Another reason for the drive to expand general as opposed to vocational or professional secondary education was that in a market-led economy it was proving difficult to predict the skills that would be in demand in future years. The authorities wanted to make young people practical but flexible as well. In all the regions there was concern that much of the vocational education being provided was out-of-date. Pupils obviously realised that some vocational courses were far more likely than others to lead into employment. Young people's choices in Suwalki had led to overflowing courses in banking, accountancy, car repairs and electronics. However, gearing education to new skills was proving difficult partly on account of the shortage of teachers with appropriate knowledge, but mainly because the school systems were operating on 'subsistence budgets'.

Post-secondary education was expanding everywhere and in the future it was envisaged that vocational specialisation would occur mainly at this tertiary level. Gdansk was planning a growth from 10 to 30% in the proportion of young people proceeding to higher education. In Suwalki by 1992 over a half of secondary school graduates were already continuing in some kind of full-time education. This was due mainly to the particularly bleak job prospects in the region (see below). Also, entering higher education was especially difficult for Suwalki youth because of the absence of any local universities or colleges.

There were multiple reasons for the absence of demands for fundamental educational reform despite the fact that for many young people secondary education had ceased to be a passport to employment. Perhaps the basic reason was that unemployment was attributed to economic failure rather than young people's or adult workers', inadequacies. The structure of education was not considered communist so much as Polish or generically European. And the existing system allowed all young people to enrol in a type of secondary school from which graduation was considered a positive achievement. School-switching may have remained exceptional but the system was flexible in so far as the proportions entering the different kinds of schools could change in response to signals from the economy and young people themselves, and further years of study could be added to all kinds of schooling. The main perceived constraint was not the structure of education but the level of funding.

In all the regions the authorities recognised that guidance services were underdeveloped. Secondary schools usually had designated careers teachers, but they were generally considered neither knowledgeable nor effective. The job agencies did not provide advisory services for young people. The youth specialists who were being appointed were dealing with immediate problems of the unemployed rather than developing longer-term guidance programmes. Everyone recognised that this was an aspect of Poland's infrastructure that needed to be developed.

School-leavers' prospects in the three regions

In all three regions school-leavers' prospects changed radically between 1989 and 1990. Up to 1989 there had been a glut of jobs. Young people's scope for choice was constrained mainly by administrative pressures on them to enter the types of employment for which they had been educated. Schooling was geared to producing conforming citizens, dependent on institutions, and usually immobile geographically (Fabian, 1991) though young people who wished to migrate had little difficulty in obtaining work in other parts of Poland. Housing shortages (see below) were a more serious impediment to migration.

Up to 1982 Poland had a system of planned employment for school- leavers. From 1950 until 1956 compulsory job warrants were given to graduates of secondary professional schools and higher education. This meant that these graduates were assigned to jobs in given firms in which they then had to work for at least three years. In 1957 and 1958 this regime was strengthened in that all such graduates were employed initially as trainees, and the traineeship period was regarded as necessary professional training, indispensable to complement school education if individuals were to become fully qualified. In 1958 compulsory job warrant were scrapped and job agencies (see below) were charged with steering qualified personnel into employment. In 1959 a system of scholarships awarded by firms and local government was put into effect to pull students in desired directions, but by 1964 efforts were again being made to introduce more comprehensive control over the employment of graduates. This control was exerted through three sets of measures: work contracts in exchange for scholarships offered by designated firms, pre-employment contracts with given firms, three-year employment in firms designated by job agencies. It was not until 1982 that this system of direct control over the employment of graduates was formally abolished and by that time other measures had been introduced towards achieving a 'rational' pattern of employment. These included loans, credits and housing assistance.

In 1945 a public (state) job agency system was created in Poland. In the beginning it was highly centralised, which meant that the discretion of local and viovodship offices was very limited. The main principles around which the job agency system was build were the obligation to report vacancies and the requirement of authorization from the job agency whenever new employees were to be hired. Also, at that time a policy of social and economic hierarchisation was enforced, which mean that preference was given to sole family providers, ex-convicts, and individuals from firms in liquidation. Simultaneously, there were employment priorities in favour of particular enterprises and institutions. However, certain institutions and professions were exempted from this system of control by job agencies; state administration, justice, teachers, and academics, skilled medical personnel and

journalists. Over time the strict guidelines of the job agency system were gradually relaxed. In the 1980s the system was effectively restricted to a classical job-matching role and in late-1991 the first private job agencies appeared (though these had to be run on a non-profit basis and licensed by the Ministry of Labour).

An important feature of the job agency system in Poland (as it operated up to the 1980s) was its recruitment function for state-owned firms. This indeed was its primary function rather than job-matching or finding employment for job-seekers. The primary role of the job agency system was really a consequence of permanent shortages of labour, a trait of the inefficiently functioning 'economy of shortages'.

After 1989 job opportunities for school-leavers dried-up in all parts of Poland, but the character of job-seekers' problems, and the solutions available, varied from area to area depending on the local economic structures. In 1950 the Polish economy was predominantly agricultural. In the 1960s and the 1970s it could still be labelled as primarily agricultural and secondarily industrial. It was only towards 1980 that the economy became primarily industrial and secondarily agricultural (see Table III). This structure continued up to 1989. Then over the next three years the economic changes led to an abrupt drop in employment in manufacturing and a pronounced increase in the proportion of jobs in the service sector though the latter's increased share was mainly relative and was caused by the sharp drop in industrial employment. There was also a slight increase in the proportion of employment in agriculture. Again, this was not an absolute, but a relative increase.

Table III **Structure of employment in Poland (by economic sector)**

Year	Sector			Type of economy
	Ia	IIb	IIIc	
1950	57	23	20	agricultural
1960	48	29	23	agricultural-industrial
1970	39	34	27	agricultural-industrial
1980	30	38	32	industrial-agricultural
1989	30	37	33	industrial-agricultural
1992	31	32	37	balanced

a - agricultural sector (agriculture + forestry)
b - industrial sector (industry + construction)
c - service sector (remaining parts of the economy)

By 1990 the Gdansk region was distinguished by the exceptionally high share of services in the structure of the economy. In this sense it was the most advanced of the three areas. Sea transport was particularly prominent in this region. The shipyard, the harbour, the oil refinery and other port-related public sector establishments were the hub of local economy, though much of the region's service employment was in culture, science, education, health and administration. In 1950 agriculture was the second most important employer in the region whereas by 1960 this role had been taken by industry but by 1980 services were dominating the local economy.

For several generations Katowice has been an industrial region, the most heavily industrialised part of Poland. Since 1950 the industrial sector has accounted for 61 to 65% of the region's economy which is dominated by mining and heavy industry, which has made environmental pollution a major problem. The region has 'green schools' outside the cities which take city pupils for part of each year while they recover from pollution. Despite this pollution, for a long time Katowice was considered the richest region in Poland.

By the end of the 1980s Suwalki had become an example of the transformation of an almost purely agricultural area into an agricultural-service region. This was due to the growth of tourism. However, in 1992 agriculture still accounted for nearly half of all employment, mostly on small farms with an average size of just 12 hectares. It was generally believed that the full tourist potential of this region was still far from fully exploited, but developing this potential was not proving straightforward. In the early 1990s a secondary school specialising in tourism was closed due to the limited employment prospects.

In Poland in 1992 the rate of unemployment varied greatly from one region to another: the lowest rate was in the voivodship of Warsaw (5.8%) while the highest was in Suwalki (23.3%). The data on unemployment outside agriculture again pointed to Suwalki (46.4%) as being the most severely affected region. Highly urbanised regions with diversified economic structures and high income levels had proved the least vulnerable to unemployment. Such was the case in Warsaw. Areas which had been worst affected by unemployment were those with low levels of urbanisation and industrialisation (such as Suwalki), as well as regions which depended on a single type of economic activity.

The unemployment rate in Gdansk was quite high, above the national average, in 1992. However, it must be noted that in the urbanised part of the region, the tricity, unemployment rates were below the average for the region as a whole. The full picture of unemployment in the Gdansk, Katowice and Suwalki voivodships is presented in Table IV. Alongside the unemployment rates it gives information on the share of graduates among the unemployed. Official data on vacancies is omitted as this information tended to be unreliable; since 1990 the bulk of new jobs had been offered outside the labour offices. However, it is worth noting that reported vacancies in 1992 were very few compared with the numbers unemployed. In September 1992 in the Gdansk region there were 17 job seekers for each registered vacancy. Given the average for Poland (61 job seekers per registered vacancy), this ratio in Gdansk seemed to rather advantageous. In 1992 in Gdansk, as in all the other regions, there was no net employment growth in any business sector. Of course, some individual businesses, usually small private businesses, were expanding, but no sector of the economy was demanding more labour. Everywhere job losses were regarded as an inevitable aspect of liberalisation and privatisation. In Gdansk in 1992 this was affecting retail occupations. Against this general background it is perhaps noteworthy that the Gdansk shipyard had vacancies for skilled labour, though not for school-leavers. Employment in the shipyard had dropped from 15,000 in 1981 to 8,000 in 1991. This reduction was achieved without any forced redundancies. Throughout the 1980s Poland had a 'shortage economy' but workers who quit the shipyard rarely moved into other

public sector jobs. Some took early retirement but others left for private sector jobs in Poland and abroad. In 1992 the Gdansk shipyard still found it difficult to attract and retain skilled labour because the work was hard, low paid, the equipment was out-of-date, and skilled tradesmen could earn much more in the private sector in Poland or in western shipyards.

Table IV **(a) Unemployment Rates and (b) Share of Graduates by Region**

1990	Poland	Gdansk	Katowice	Suwalki	Poland	Gdansk	Katowice	Suwalki
I	1.5	1.2	0.5	3.5	-	-	-	-
II	3.1	2.3	1.5	6.9	-	-	-	-
III	5.0	3.8	2.9	9.3	17.0	16.9	17.6	14.0
IV	6.1	5.0	3.4	11.5	14.6	14.2	13.1	10.3
1991	**Poland**	**Gdansk**	**Katowice**	**Suwalki**	**Poland**	**Gdansk**	**Katowice**	**Suwalki**
I	7.1	6.3	3.9	12.1	11.6	11.0	10.1	8.5
II	8.4	7.7	4.5	14.7	9.2	12.4	8.6	7.5
III	10.5	10.1	5.9	17.0	11.9	12.5	11.5	8.9
IV	11.4	11.5	6.6	18.6	10.3	10.7	10.0	7.6
1992	**Poland**	**Gdansk**	**Katowice**	**Suwalki**	**Poland**	**Gdansk**	**Katowice**	**Suwalki**
I	12.2	12.3	7.3	20.9	8.8	8.8	9.0	5.3
II	12.6	13.6	7.9	22.1	6.6	7.0	4.8	4.1
III	13.6	14.4	8.8	23.3	8.3	6.7	7.4	6.4

In Katowice the rate of unemployment was among the lowest in Poland. However, the economic structure of this region with its allegedly over-manned and poorly equipped heavy industries made it highly vulnerable to a sudden spread of mass unemployment. It was said that Katowice offered a good example of large-scale disguised unemployment. In September 1992 there were 150,000 unemployed for whom their were just 3,200 vacancies (49 job seekers for each job available; a less favourable ratio for job seekers than in Gdansk).

As previously noted, the region of Suwalki had the highest unemployment rate in Poland. In September 1992 for 54,400 unemployed there were only 196 vacancies, a ratio of 278:1. The labour office in Suwalki city had 9000 registered unemployed but only 20 jobs to offer plus 40 places on public works, mainly sweeping the city. The high level of unemployment in the region was due to cutbacks in local state factories, mainly processing local agricultural produce or producing agricultural equipment, and to the reduced ability of the local population to migrate and find employment in other parts of Poland. However, agriculture remained the region's main employer and served as a buffer for some of the unemployed who could 'regress socially' to under-employment in the countryside. Other buffers were being created by 'uncivil' employment in trade, sometimes across the country's border, and in tourist-related activities.

Bleak prospects?

Lack of jobs was not the sole obstacle facing young people on route to adulthood in post-communist Poland. Obtaining independent accommodation was another acute difficulty. In the 1980s West European countries had between 380 and 460 dwellings per 1000 inhabitants. Hungary (372) and Czechoslovakia (385) were around the bottom of this range. Poland was distinctly disadvantaged with just 287, mostly flats. Moreover, construction had declined from a peak of 283,000 completions in 1978 to around 130,000 per year by the early 1990s. Liberalisation was failing to revive the industry. Indeed, the new economic conditions were creating additional difficulties in so far as 40,000 new dwellings stood empty in 1992 due to potential purchasers' inability to afford the high interest charges.

The shortage of accommodation in Poland had led to widespread overcrowding. In the early 1990s 29% of families in urban areas and 47% in the countryside lived in shared accommodation. Among young couples (married for no more than five years) 52% in towns and 68% in rural areas were sharing accommodation, usually with one set of parents. Unfortunately most dwelling were really too small to house three generation families comfortably. In the towns 37% of flats were under 40 square metres and 60% contained no more than two living or bedrooms. However, it must be stressed that this situation had been improving. The average number of persons per room in Poland's dwellings declined from 2.75 in 1950 to 1.01 by 1988 (Kurzynowski, 1990). Young people's homes were generally crowded, and their opportunities for out-of-home recreation declined during the 1980s and early 1990s. The Communist Party youth organisation became defunct. Sports, arts and other recreation facilities formerly operated by government, trade unions and public enterprises were closed or decayed due to lack of investment.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1990 reforms there were multiple grounds for gloom on the futures facing Poland's school-leavers. Throughout 1991 and 1992 most manufacturing and tertiary employment remained in state companies and agencies, and the full effects of market forces and restructuring were still awaited (Gora and Lehmann, 1991). The country was attracting little inward investment and was deriving few obvious benefits from its association with the EC. Indeed, the most discussed effect of this association was Polish agriculture's problems in the face of competition from subsidised EC produce. Poland's indebtedness had made the World Bank a major orchestrator of reform. This meant severe restraints on public spending, and cutbacks in benefits and services. It seemed at the time that Poland was experiencing the worst of both capitalism and socialism. During the 16 months up to June 1991 GDP fell by 30% and the purchasing power of the people by 40%. Young people had been given 'freedom from' the old restriction but did not appear to be benefiting from their new 'freedom to'. The structures that had once guaranteed young people's futures had clearly gone whereas their new opportunities were less evident. It was being argued that unemployment would be especially threatening for young people who had grown up under a protective state, then found themselves with next to nothing (Suchy, 1991).

It was easy to envisage the frustrations of marginalised young people, the burden that their plights had created for their families, and the tensions between winners and losers under the market system, eroding Poland's social fabric and even over-

whelming the fledgling democracy, possibly leading to the emergence of a new authoritarian regime, more likely to be clothed in a nationalist than a socialist ideology. Under communism the Polish people had placed a positive value on the reduction of inequalities. The regime lost legitimacy partly because inequalities were perceived to be widening and becoming less meritocratic (Koralewicz-Zebik, 1984). Would the regime in the 1990s survive a further widening of inequalities? Under communism inequalities in Poland had been wider than in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but much narrower than in western market economies (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). A 1991 survey of a nationally representative sample confirmed that popularity of meritocratic values. People believed that effort ought to determine what people earned but they did not believe that individuals who had prospered since the reforms were particularly meritorious. Quite the reverse: those currently doing well were described as dishonest, lucky, taking advantage of the other people, and benefiting from their political connections (Ammeter-Inquirer Poznan, 1992).

At the same time, there were glimmers of hope and some grounds for optimism. Acceptance that recovery would be a long haul was likely to contain political demands and aspirations. In the early 1990s most Poles remained satisfied with their government even though it was not regarded as performing well (Ammeter-Inquirer Poznan, 1992). The regime was evaluated for what it was, that is, democratic, rather than for its (lack of) achievements. The contrast with the previous communist regime was so favourable that the government seemed unlikely to lose legitimacy easily or rapidly (Rose, 1991).

Dwellings may have been overcrowded but family and community structures remained strong, still knit by Roman Catholicism, Poland's national religion. In 1991 roughly three out of every five adults were attending church at least once a week (Ammeter-Inquirer Poznan, 1992). Religion seemed likely to become the source of a generation divide. Reform had given Poland's young people unrestricted access to western culture. Satellite television, the cinema and advertising were popularising western music, fashions and values. In the new liberal climate the church risked alienating young Poles by its demands, which were translated into legislation, that abortion should be criminalised.

Some young Poles' hopes for their futures hinged on their ability to leave their own country. Teachers and job agency staff had no doubt that working and living in a western country were popular aspirations, and such migration became easier in 1992 when visa requirements for entry to most European countries were lifted. The prospects of those who remained in Poland were likely to depend on the performance of the country's economy, especially the still largely 'uncivil' private sector. It was possible that this private economy, plus agriculture, would prevent the vast majority of young people sinking into long-term idleness, poverty and hopelessness. In western countries the 'fiddling' and own account working of the young unemployed may rarely achieve more than an easement of their poverty, whereas in Poland it was likely that the more successful members of future adult generations, in career terms, would include some who never held official jobs in their immediate post-school years in the 1980s and 90s. There was little chance of the majority becoming successful and prosperous entrepreneurs, but it was still possible that the private economy would prevent too many sinking out of circulation. Unemployment rates remained particularly high among under-24 year olds but the

proportion of graduates with no previous employment among Poland's unemployed peaked in 1990. Industrial production fell by 37% between 1989 and 1991 then grew by 3.5% during 1992. Exports in 1992 rose by an impressive 10%. During 1992 gross domestic product ceased to decline and actually grew over the year, albeit very marginally, by less than one percent. The majority of Poles did not feel that they earned enough in their main jobs to buy the things that they needed, but they were mostly getting-by through their involvement in several kinds of economic activity. 46% of households had land on which they could grow food, 25% of employees had second jobs (44% of which were self employment), 38% had relatives or close friends in the West, 17% had made purchases with foreign currency during the previous year, and 46% of households possessed automobiles. While considering the economic situation unsatisfactory, the vast majority regarded it as an improvement on the recent past. Among other things, they were spending less time in queues, and they expected further improvement in the future (Ammeter-Inquirer Poznan, 1992).

Poland's existing educational institutions were capable of absorbing a great deal of slack. In 1992 nearly 50% of secondary pupils were still enrolled on courses lasting just three years. It has been argued that communism 'capped' an upward growth of education that would otherwise have occurred in Eastern Europe by encouraging young people to gain work experience, which was alleged to have educative virtues, at younger ages than the countries themselves would have encouraged (Mozny, 1992). In 1990 there was certainly considerable growth potential in Poland's education. There was no evidence of a trend noted in other East European countries towards more young people terminating education at age 15 amidst a feeling that any further qualifications that they might acquire would prove useless, and in order to claim unemployment benefit immediately (Cranston, 1992). Moving towards full secondary education for all in Poland, with a general core followed by specialisation, was a realists way of reducing the supply of youth labour significantly without any wholly novel educational, training or employment initiatives.

The grounds for gloom and optimism varied considerably from region to region, and between groups of young people from different family and educational backgrounds, though everywhere and within all social groups much was likely to depend on the young people's own motivations and resourcefulness. Buroway and Krotov (1992) have argued that rather than a transition to western type capitalism, post-communism in the former Soviet Union is more likely to be characterised by an accentuation of certain features of the former economy such as work group control over production and inter-enterprise bargaining. If a similar prognosis was justified in Poland the type of economy most likely to flourish was the uncivil private economy. The population had plenty of relevant experience because most agriculture had remained private throughout the communist era, and private trading, including international trading, was also widespread. For most Poles the post-communist freedom of the market was most likely to mean wider opportunities to engage in such activities without threat or hindrance from the authorities. There was no equivalent enthusiasm for employment in large capitalist businesses (Ammeter-Inquirer, 1992). The fact that the majority of Poland's households were 'getting by' in the early 1990s, and considered that their conditions had improved despite the collapse of the official economy, suggested that the uncivil economy was operating as more than a safety net. The fact that the proportion of

school-leavers among the unemployed ceased to rise after 1990 despite the continued spread of unemployment suggests that young people must have been active in the uncivil economy. Despite the greater pace and level of change, and the higher level of unemployment that was reached during recent recessions and economic restructuring in Britain, it therefore seemed possible, even likely, that Poland's young people would prove the better able to adapt and create futures reflecting their own aspirations.

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YOUNG HOMELESS WOMEN IN DENMARK

A discussion of the hows and whys

CATHARINA JUUL KRISTENSEN

1. Introduction

We all know the images from the media of homeless people on the streets of London, Chicago and New York; the problem of people forced to sleep rough in the Western world's cities is great. In Denmark the homeless are far less visible, but they are there and estimates made by Danish researchers point towards an equal proportion of homelessness in New York and Copenhagen (Schutten et al., 1992). The Scandinavian welfare states, among them Denmark, are often emphasised as superior examples of egalitarian social systems. Social problems are seldomly recognized nor discussed. However, they exist and many are increasing and changing in nature; in some instances there seems to be a delay for the social problems experienced in Britain for example, to occur in Denmark. Whilst focusing primarily on Denmark this article also draws upon studies of youth homelessness in Britain.

The aim of the article is to illuminate and discuss a neglected problem in contemporary Denmark; female youth homelessness. The focus of attention is first upon how women as a whole express homelessness

differently than men and secondly the causes of female youth homelessness. Central to the discussion are the findings that homelessness is not merely a question of an outdated housing structure, nor can it be seen only to affect the socially and economically disadvantaged. Female youth homelessness has been found to be a problem in all groups of society. Possible causes were found to be lack of attention and guidance from parents and other adults, and intertwined with these is what I call cultural confusion. The latter cannot be changed through political initiatives. It is an inherent part of modern societies like Denmark and Britain; cultural modernisation. We live in what can be described as a post-modern condition in modernity. This implies circumstances characterized by rapidly changing culture and norms in all social classes, in all ethnic groups, and for both genders. Traditions are dissolving and different life forms and life styles are becoming possible. Alongside the cultural and normative pluralism, however, some traditional forms of life, class identity and gender roles are maintained. The post-modern condition in modernity is thus a phase in modernity with trends from the past (traditional structures such as class and gender roles) and spurs of the future (increasing normative relativity). Contradictions in modern cultural life are the order of the day. But there is nothing unusual about cultural and normative changes themselves; what is unusual is the complexity and the pace with which they are taking place. We are, in the terminology of the German social psychologist Thomas Ziehe, experiencing a cultural liberalisation. This liberalisation is inseparable from women's liberation and the liberation of youth as an independent phase in the life course which have been experienced in Western societies during the past two to three decades.

Youth, Ziehe argues, are more prone to cultural liberalisation than the older generations; but they are also more vulnerable because of their lack of life experience and their unsettled position within the labour market. They are faced with a multi-

tude of different truths, life styles and possibilities and many do not possess the necessary personal or economic resources to benefit or cope. Ziehe terms this the 'ambivalence of modernity' (1989). Like pollution, cultural confusion knows no boarders, nor class differences. It effects the young from the so-called 'better' homes; the middle and upper classes. But as is the case with pollution, those who typically suffer the most are the already disadvantaged.

Other previous causes of female youth homelessness (e.g. lack of attention and guidance from parents and other adults) are again part and parcel of cultural modernisation. At a more abstract level the German social philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1987) describes the development, in the contemporary western world towards still more systematized and goal oriented societies as the system's colonization of the life-world. The life-world is the basis of our interpretation and understanding of the world around us. It constitutes the background for our common understanding and makes possible social integration. Habermas argues that the increasing power of rationality, of instrumental, strategic actions in economic and political life, is colonizing the life-world and the various forms of life which exist in contemporary capitalism and eroding alternative sets of values and norms by which individuals come to understand the world and act in it. I will return to these theories later in this article. Bringing the theories back to the level of young homeless women, and coupled with another significant social change, the lack of time and reserves of energy to communicatively share and interpret experiences can occasion confusion, alienation and withdrawal of motivation (1987).

The issue of cultural confusion in relation to female youth homelessness is, in sum, approached from three angles: gender, youth and cultural modernisation. This entails, first, the recognition that all individuals are equal social citizens, and should be treated as such. It is in other words perceived unjust that some population groups are - intentionally or unintentionally - disadvantaged. Women and youth are examples of such groups. Secondly, it entails the recognition that female youth homelessness is not exclusively caused by economic and social disadvantage, but also by confusion and what to make of life in an ever changing cultural environment, in a world where quality time spent exchanging experiences with other people is often scarce. Before discussing these in more detail, the problems of defining 'homelessness' are discussed.

This article draws upon intensive qualitative interviews with key professionals and a small number of homeless women in Denmark (Copenhagen), and Britain (Birmingham and Bristol) (Kristensen, 1992)[1], and general research on poverty and social marginalisation. The literature on homelessness in Denmark is virtually nonexistent. The studies that have been carried out focus almost exclusively on homeless men, the mentally ill, and drug an alcohol abusers[2]. My emphasis is on the causes and expressions of women between the ages of 18-25, living in and around Copenhagen. The age-group was chosen as more recent statistics collected by the hostels for the homeless show a surprising change in the distribution of the hostel user's gender and age. National statistics (Amtsradsforeningen, 1990) show that the proportion of women in the hostels has more than trebled from 1976 to 1989. When looking at the 18-25 year old[3] women the proportion has almost doubled in the same period. Whereas the total number of women 'only' make up 17% of the total number of hostel users above the age of 24, and 18-25 year olds make up 52%. Such a distribution shows a marked increase from previous levels in post war Denmark.

Key professional workers confirm that this high percentage of young women in the hostels has stabilised around 50% both nationally and in Copenhagen[4]. Finally Copenhagen was chosen as the site of my study because it is there that the problem of homelessness is greatest in actual numbers in Denmark.

2. Defining homelessness; the problem of numbers.

In Denmark, as in Britain, the question of 'who is homeless' is subject of much discussion. As discussed below the legislation only gives a broad indication of who is eligible for help. On top of this only the hostels collect data on a regular basis. These statistics tend to be rather sketchy, unanalysed and only refer to the institutionalised homeless. One researcher, a psychiatrist from the combined hostel and welfare home 'Sundholm' in Copenhagen, Preben Brandt (1992), has tried to put numbers on the homeless in and outside the institutions. He includes what he describes as 'potentially' homeless (e.g. people sleeping on friend's floors), however his definition is still limited when related to the aim of my study. For instance, Brandt's definition does not include people living in temporary accomodation with an uncertain housing future, nor people living in housing unfit for habitation. Brandt estimates that there are about 5000 homeless in Copenhagen of which approximately a quarter are women. When looking at the 18-25 year olds the proportion of homeless women rises to one half. The figure of 5000 homeless must naturally be seen in relation to the population of Denmark, and within it Copenhagen. The total population is approximate to that of Scotland; 5 million people. The municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg (a small municipality in the heart of Copenhagen) alone have a total population a little over half a million (550,000).

Homelessness is *here* defined as that situation where a person lives under personally unsatisfactory and unsafe circumstances, and/or in temporary accommodation with an uncertain housing future. The definition of homelessness is broad to allow for the inclusion of both the hidden homeless, that is those women who do not use the hostels and thus do not figure in the public statistics, and the possible impact of cultural modernisation. The definition is inspired by Watson an Austerberry's classical work (1986) on single homeless women in Britain. however my definition goes further to incorporate the impact of the cultural dimension. It also goes beyond both the definition used by Brandt (above) and the Danish Statutory definition. I will refrain from estimating the actual number of young homeless women fitting my definition; as this would be necessarily speculative (given the paucity of reliable statistics).

As is the case in Britain, the Danish statutory definition of who is to be housed and helped, is flawed, only the roofless (two-parent families and single parents with dependent children) are eligible for help[5]. In Denmark the decisions made by the social services are discretionary. In times of national economic hardship only those worst off are helped. Hence some social service districts only help people who explicitly express their need as there is simply not enough housing or hostel beds for the social services to take uninvited action. And again, like Britain, single people without dependant children and people with psychological problems, alcoholics and drug addicts are losing out. The former are asked to move in with family or friends. The latter are unsuited to the hostels, because the hostels typically either do not have, or do not have enough, trained staff to help them. The people admitted to hostels must be self-sufficient, the ones that are not are in principle the responsibility of other state institutions. The practice, for example the district psychiatry scheme, fails to

capture a fair number of people in need of psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment. A very limited number of hostels, the welfare homes, cater for non-self-sufficient homeless. If the welfare homes are full or if the individuals are reluctant to go there they too are left to fend for themselves. The findings of my study show that women without children are often turned away by the hostels and/or the social services, if and when they seek help. Many women tend not to seek help.

3. Gender and the expressing of homelessness.

The hostels are a last resort for most women. Before going there the women have typically been moving about from one friend to another and between relatives. They have lived in illegal sublet accommodation, squatted, lived in prostitutional relationships or with abusive partners. The economically better resourced homeless women often stay in more up market short term accommodation or residential hostels in between the 'visits' to friends and family.

Only a minority of the homeless women in Copenhagen sleep rough. Those who do are typically drug abusers, alcoholics or mentally ill. None of the young homeless women I interviewed in Copenhagen had ever slept rough. They had tried almost all the other categories on the 'ladder': staying with friends and relatives; staying too long in a worn out relationship because they could not afford anything else; living with an abusive partner; returning to their parental home; and so on.

Danish professionals suggest that women are more reluctant than men to leave a worn out relationship, or their dwelling because they are more patient, practical, and used to solving problems[6]. They also put up with a lot more abuse than men. These are traditional 'female' values, brought down from generation to generation. Girls are being brought up to be the 'glue' of the family, keeping the home and family together. Their main domain is within the private sphere, and interviews with the young homeless women largely confirm this. Boys are, in contrast typically, brought up as main actors in the public sphere. These are, of course, generalisations. Gender roles are changing and the uncertainties and contradictions which flow from such changes influence the way young women express their homelessness. More and more homeless women are making their homelessness problem public (especially the young women, the 18-25 year olds).

Alongside the traditional gender socialisation are the cultural changes and relative legal and economic independence gained by both women and youth. Within the last two to three decades there has been a radical increase in the number of women living alone, women getting post 10th grade education[7] and using it, and women with dependent children in full time employment.

My studies in Britain tell a somewhat different story. Not surprisingly British homeless women also stay with friends and use a variety of other temporary accommodation, but the phenomenon of young women sleeping rough is far more common. The reason primarily being, I suggest, the distinct division in British society between the possessed and the dispossessed. There is simply not anywhere to go nor employment to get for a large group of working class British women. (And I would argue that the class structure in Denmark is a far less important factor in understanding homelessness than in Britain).

4. The causes of homelessness.

Why is it that an increasing number of young women make their homelessness visible whilst many others refrain from making their problems public? The explanation lies in the grey zone between gender socialisation, cultural and demographic

changes, women's relative economic independence of men, youth's relative independence of their parents, and ideological changes part and parcel of a decade of Conservative led governments in Denmark, and the general political swing to the right in many other Western countries (e.g. Britain, and the USA). The political swing to the right in Denmark has meant firm attacks on the egalitarian (Social Democratic) rationale of the welfare state; privatisation has been introduced in a number of areas, the social benefit system has been revised, and the educational system made more competitive, to mention but a few examples. Coinciding with the decade of Conservative rule (from 1982 to 1993) is the re-emergence of poverty (Abrahamson 1992). One of the prime aims of the post war welfare state was to abolish poverty. This was largely accomplished in the decades of Social Democratic led governments, but social researchers now speak of the presence of not only an A and a B team (the possessed and the less possessed), but also a C team (the 'under class', the dispossessed). It is now possible to speak of distinct marginalisation of specific groups of the population (Abrahamson 1992; Juul and Ertmann 1991).

It is ironic that what, on one hand, can be seen as a victory for the women's movement (an increase in the number of women making private problems public), coupled with the social and economic marginalisation of a large proportion of the population, especially young women, and the re-emergence of poverty in Denmark, adds up to a radical increase in the number of young female hostel users.

Homeless women make up a rather diverse group. The majority of the younger age-group, the 18-25 year olds, display a number of complex problems many of which are social (i.e. non-economic) in nature. The economically better off's children may be overwhelmed by the rapid cultural changes, and lack personal resources to cope.

Becoming homeless is a process which involves both socio-economic and cultural factors. Most homeless people have other and equally serious problems on top of their homelessness (eg. lack of education, long term unemployment, and perhaps incest, or the experience of persistent violence from relatives or partners). Though important, these are not the only explanations as to why some people become homeless. I would argue that the process of cultural modernisation is a significant aspect of contemporary society which makes its own impact on people's lives. Again the already disadvantaged are more prone to cultural confusion; they lack the personal cultural capital to make sense and cope. However also the economically advantaged youth are struck . They may for example have grown up with little time and attention given by their parents or other adults. They may have lacked, and indeed lack, 'a good listening to' (to borrow a slogan from the British Children's Society), and guidance on how to live and make sense of life in an ever changing society.

One of the more apparent possible explanations of homelessness is an insufficient or outdated housing structure. Despite a comparatively more wide range of tenure and dwelling forms in Denmark than in Britain the housing structure is not compatible with demographic changes (more single people in all age-groups), and the population's financial situation[8]. An up to date housing structure is a question of housing in the right places, of the right size, with the right amenities, at prices people can afford. Thus a broader and more flexible range of tenure forms (rental as well as owning), a broader range of prices, and a more sufficient number of dwellings is needed. Not everybody wishes to live in modern owner occupied housing. Many would simply like a place to live; a place where they can have a private live, where they are the ones deciding when the light is to be turned off, and who visits when.

The housing shortage in general forces many people either to remain 'living' under circumstances that are physically or psychologically unsafe (eg. in condemned housing, in areas with high crime or with an abusive partner) or to move between friends and relatives, or at some point to resort to the hostels for shelter. Those who live under such circumstances (individuals who have a roof over their head, but do not have a home) are also homeless. They are the hidden homeless. They are not taken into consideration by the Danish or the British statutory provisions of who is eligible for public assistance. It is a discretionary matter for the social services whether an individual sleeping on a friend's sofa is homeless or not. In a time of economic crisis, coinciding with a lack of political goodwill, the individual is likely to be judged 'not homeless', and thus not the responsibility of the state.

The lack of available affordable housing is inseparable from the problems of high unemployment and the general economic crisis. Which of them actually causes homelessness is impossible to pin-point. The web of causes can however be argued to be a problem more significant for women than men. In Denmark about 11% of the working age population are without paid employment. Two recent reports from the Danish Social Commission (Socialkommissionen, 1992; Ingerslev et al., 1992) show significantly higher unemployment figures for the 15-25 year olds than for the working age population as a whole (the 15-67 year olds). When including the youth on youth training schemes, roughly 20% of the 15-25 year olds are without formal employment. When focusing alone on the young women the figures are even more alarming. More young women than men are without formal employment and more young women have never held formal employment. Finally far less women than men in this age-group hold formal qualifications.

On the basis of the Social Commission's reports it can further be concluded that in the cases where the young women do have a job, they are typically lower paid than men. In other words, social marginalisation strikes young women harder than young men. Women's economic dependency on a man in a relationship is thus likely to be the greatest. Even though a woman may wish to move away from her partner, she may be forced to stay because of her lack of money to obtain housing of her own. The available housing is commonly the more expensive owner-occupied housing: it is simply too expensive for most single women. Studies of homelessness in Copenhagen (Kristensen, 1992; and Merved, 1990) show that the lack of affordable housing forces some women into prostitutional relationships. In other words, some women as a last resort find themselves forced to pay for shelter with sex.

Cultural confusion is the last explanation considered in this discussion of the hows and whys of young women's homelessness. By cultural confusion is not only meant the circumstances many second-generation immigrants experience, but also general cultural confusion. The cultural turbulence, the on-going dissolution of traditions and norms, is an immanent part of contemporary social development. It has always taken place but at different speeds. As mentioned earlier, contemporary Western societies can be described as being in a post-modern condition in modernity; a condition characterised by multiplicity and complexity. What is significant is exactly the rapid changes in norms and values; our tools for interpreting our surroundings. Also of significance is what Habermas (1987) describes as the colonisation of the life-world's communicatively based tradition of norms by 'system rationality' (strategic and instrumental action); a development which threatens to erode

the basis of society in cultural reproduction of the life-world. The life-world is our basis for interpretation and understanding of life. It is our bank of knowledge. Communicative action ensures cultural reproduction. Communication and the passing on of experiences, norms and values (world interpretations) requires time and effort. When under pressure economically, socially and perhaps also culturally, everyday life becomes overtly system rationalised. Simultaneously the state and market have taken over and institutionalised many tasks that earlier laid with the family (within the social and familiar networks).

Everyday life for many is a rush against time in a carefully laid out schedule, of when to bring and collect children from various institutions, paid work, house-work and family life and (other) leisure activities. Communication is often cut down to one way communication; the passing on of messages. The children are told to get out of bed, the partner is asked to remember to pick up the clothes from the dry-cleaners, etc. Lack of care and love is often not the problem; lack of time is.

Parallel to the dissolution of the known is the continuation of certain life forms. Ziehe describes this as cultural 'unsimultaneousness' (1983). A contradictory development is hence taking place. What can be described as the passing down of traditional gender roles, and class specific norms for example, take place at the same time as the break up of the very same roles and norms, and the (at least theoretical) expansion of possibilities for self-creation and life style. The latter Ziehe terms 'cultural liberation'. The co-existence of the developments is described by Ziehe as the 'doubleness' or 'ambiguity' of cultural liberation. Like Habermas, he argues that cultural liberation is simultaneously creative and destructive. Liberation opens new opportunities and new life forms to adopt. It also brings about confusion, experiences of meaninglessness and valuelessness: the feeling that everything and nothing goes. The modern Western societies have reached the end of predictability, while still being entrenched in social constructs such as class and gender roles.

Ziehe also argues that young people are more prone to cultural liberation than the older generations. Thus age is important when analysing cultural modernisation. Beyond this it is pertinent to bear in mind the importance of geographical space. Cultural modernisation varies between countries and even within countries. Thus the penetration of cultural dissolution is likely to differ between rural and urban areas but also within cities or regions. Finally, the penetration of cultural liberation is likely also to differ between social classes. To summarize, not only geographical space, social class, gender and race, are important, but also age differences are vital when attempting to understand the impact of cultural modernisation.

At a more concrete level the high level of use of daycare institutions for infants and children, after school care for the older children, and evening youth clubs for teenagers in Denmark[9], puts great demands on children's and youth's flexibility and their ability to adopt to different sets of norms. Most children, Lis Hojard argues, spend most of their time awake outside the family (1985). The children spend the day in two or three different and sometimes incompatible worlds (e.g. the family, the school, and the after school care institution). The parents, the child and the personnel in the institutions may communicate, but the different worlds will never be fully compatible. Ole Langsted and Dion Sommer (1988) argue that 'ordinary' modern children are double socialised. To cope presupposes support,

guidance and attention from adults. This again presupposes time spent together communicating, exchanging experiences, views and interpretations. The parent(s) on the other hand also act in different normative spheres during the day, having different roles. These too need to be communicated and adjusted to the family. The socially and economically disadvantaged children are subsequently likely to be multi- socialised; as interviews with key professionals points towards a background characterised by frequent moves, followed by change of school, institutions, and friends(10). The pressure on the already disadvantaged youth to cope with diverse norms are likely to be greater than for 'ordinary' youth.

When related specially to young women lack of attention (time) and guidance from parents and other adults can intertwine with a world dominated by choices to be made with limited resources and very little space for mistakes(11) can result in withdrawal and escape; psychologically as well as physically. Some youth feel alienated or outright excluded from society, others feel an outspoken need to be alone, to have solitude and space. Two cases in point are Emma, a 23 year old homeless woman interviewed in Bristol, and the 22 year old Hanne interviewed in Copenhagen(12). Emma desired space: she ran away from her parental home (after having returned from an unsuccessful relationship) and what she felt as an ever present demand to adjust and comply. When fleeing Emma sought shelter under a stairway in a shopping precinct. Not surprisingly she soon found that that was not what she was looking for either, but she felt unable to get on with her life, to make decisions, to seek help. Life was too overwhelming. Eventually Emma was contacted by an out-reach worker from the social services and was helped to get a bed in a hostel. Hanne, in contrast slowly let other people take over her life, among them her domineering and at times psychologically abusive partner. Hanne did, in her own words, not know what she wanted from life, and did not feel that she got any help or advice from anybody (mother, teachers and social services). As coping was hard enough she left the decision making to others. Sometimes she complained a little, but she never attempted to influence or change the circumstances around her.

On the basis of the studies carried out in Denmark and Britain (Kristensen 1992) it can be concluded that some women react to the ambivalence of having a vast choice on paper but not the necessary personal and economic resources to take advantage by running away, escaping to solitude, and leaving the responsibility of their lives to others. Some of these women end up homeless. The already socially and economically disadvantaged youth appear more likely also to lose out in the turbulence of modernity. However, youth from the 'better' homes, the middle and upper classes, are also struck by cultural confusion.

5. Conclusion and future perspectives.

To summarize, several explanations of the causes and expressions of female youth homelessness have been discussed. Alongside the cultural modernisation and its irreversible erosion of tradition, is the trend towards a re-emergence of poverty and a re-enhancement of class divisions in Denmark. Simultaneous with cultural modernisation, general political and economic circumstances are making an impact upon people's lives. From the early 1970s onwards Denmark has experienced economic recession and high unemployment. The post-war welfare state has for better or for worse been shaken up. The changing Conservative-Liberal coalition governments have since the early 1980s acted as catalysts to this process. In the same period the social divi-

sion in society has widened. The rich are becoming far richer and the poor poorer - and a large proportion of the people in their early and mid twenties have been sidelined. They are unskilled and out of work depending primarily on social benefits.

Young women are especially affected by economic hardship, and some by outright poverty. It is thus possible to speak of relative poverty among women in contemporary Denmark, but not a feminisation of poverty. The notion 'feminisation of poverty' originates from the US American sociologist Diana Pearce's work on women, work and welfare (1978). Usually it implies the emergence of a majority of women among the poor. The distinction between an increase in the number of poor women and a majority of poor women is vital, I will argue. What can be spoken of in Denmark is new poverty - and that only in the sense that the composition of the relative poor has changed. The poor are getting younger and an increasing number are female. When studying statistics and reports on women's living conditions, the division between men and women, between age-groups and between ethnic groups are striking. If a person is below the age of 25 and female that individual is very likely not to have a formal qualification, not to have a permanent job, and/or never to have held a formal occupation. If the individual is also a single parent and/or of non-Danish origin the above combination of misfortune is even more likely[13].

The lack of economic resources forces many women into hidden and/or visible homelessness. Again it is necessary to distinguish between the 'feminisation of homelessness' - a concept arising from the US American debate on homelessness - and new homelessness. In Denmark there is a strong trend toward the feminisation of homelessness. 52% of the visible homeless between the age of 18 and 25 are women, but overall the women 'only' make up about one fifth of the visible homeless (Amtsradsforeningen 1990). What can be said with certainty is with the new homelessness we see a radical increase in the number of 'untraditional' visible homeless; women and youth - and especially young women. All in all, women - and in particular young women - are marginalised. The increasing visibility of homeless women shows the worsening of the problem. The future too looks bleak. Statistics from the street level hostel for under 18 year olds 'Dognkontakten' and the now closed Children's Hotel (both in Copenhagen) show that the majority of the users are female; and that the numbers are not decreasing. Again key professionals in Copenhagen hostels estimate that the high proportion of female hostel users in the younger age-group is there to stay. The proportion has been stable around 50% since the mid-1980s and is expected to stabilise there: including the hidden homeless, the problem is colossal.

In January 1993 a Social Democratic led coalition government took over the political leadership of Denmark without election. The Conservative Prime Minister and with him his Cabinet, was made to resign due to the 'Tamil refugee scandal'. The new government is the first Social Democratic led government since 1982. With regards to the worsening social division in Denmark there is little hope of radical change in the near future. The government is a mid-spectrum coalition consisting of four parties of which the other three[14] have either formed government with or otherwise supported the Conservative Party: it is a compromise government. Despite being a majority government the opposition on either side is large enough to cause obstruction. At the moment issues such as re-adjusting after the second Maastricht referendum and the recently ended presidency of the European Community, and the

crisis in the financial and insurance sectors in Denmark are pressing for and given prime attention. Pioneering legislation and other political initiatives with positive impact upon the homeless's living conditions are unlikely to be initiated in the foreseeable future. In interviews in the social worker's union magazines *Socialradgivern* (3/93) and *Socialpeedagogen* (10/5/93) the Minister of Social Affairs, Social Democrat Karen Jespersen, promises thorough social reforms coordinating initiatives between the ministries of Labour, Housing and Education, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. But this will take time, adjustment and research must come first, she tells us. The odds are, nevertheless, against the success of the government.

But not all the factors causing homelessness are directly related to political priorities or lack of priorities. Two interrelated factors stand out: cultural modernisation and the erosion of social and familiar networks. The increasing proportion of women in paid employment, the increase of children and youth in institutionalised day and evening care, the pressure of making it in life at the first attempt, all occur as part and parcel of the colonisation of the life-world and cultural modernisation. The consequence, can, however, be eased. Children and youth can be supported and the symptoms of the youth's developmental crisis can be reduced (Thorslund, 1991). One way of going about this is to apply pressure upon the government to take positive action. The solution is not, as many a Conservative Liberal government would have us believe, to 'wind back the clock' and try to reestablish nuclear families with a main breadwinner (the man) and a main carer (the woman). The call should be for flexible initiatives taking into account the cultural diversity of the population, and cultural changes, allowing people time and resources - in the widest possible sense of the words - to live. The other vital means is mere action by ordinary citizens. Individuals are not like Eliot's hollow men '...Shape without form, shade without colour/ Paralysed force, gesture without motions/...'[15]. Individuals are agents influenced by but indeed also influencing society. The problem of homelessness and its causes must be tackled at its roots; this is a call for joint action and responsibility by the state (government) as well as by the population.

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Notes

1 The article is based upon a study (Kristensen 1992) carried out in 1990-92. Fifteen young homeless women and some twenty five key professional workers were interviewed as part of the study.

2 See Jarvinen et al. for a comprehensive account of recent homelessness research in the Nordic countries.

3 The hostels only accept people above the age of 18. The under 18 year olds are in principle housed and cared for either by their parents or guardians, or by the municipalities in children and youth 'pensions'.

4 Brandt (interviews), and Schutten et al. 1992.

5 Law of social assistance, 'Lov om social bistand af 25. marts 1987', SS 31 and 105.

6 Interviews, with among others, social workers in two Copenhagen hostels (who both wish to be anonymous).

7 In Denmark all children must attend and pass at least the first 9 grades of school. The 10th grade is voluntary. Thus youth cannot leave school in the middle of a school year, at a given age, as is the case here in Britain.

8 The proportion of tenure forms varies between the two countries. The proportion of public and private rental and private ownership differs. The rental sector is far greater in Denmark than in Britain. Furthermore Danish tenants are better secured than the British once they have obtained rented housing.

9 Just to mention a few figures, 42% of all 0-2 year old Danes were in formally paid daycare in 1983 (compared to 18% in 1975); and 57% of the 3-5 year olds attended formally paid kindergartens (compared to 35% in 1975) (Hojgard 1985). As indicated these figures do not include the non-taxed , informal childcare - a not uncommon phenomenon caused by insufficient and expensive daycare provision.

10 Interviews with psychiatrist Preben Brandt, hostel leader Helga Ottosen, and an anonymous psychologist at 'Psykologisk Center' Copenhagen.

11 In Denmark for example all education is free; however the post 10th grade places are limited. Admission onto post 10th grade education is largely based on marks obtained in school/college. And as substantiated above unemployment is a more than tangible fact for all age-groups. The pressure to be thankful and comply when succeeding in getting a job is thus high.

12 Emma and Hanne are pseudonyms.

13 See eg. the Social Commission's reports (Socialkommissionen, and Ingerslev both 1992) and Peter Abrahamson (1992).

14 The Centre Democrats, the Christian People's Party, and the Radical Left.

15 T S Eliot (1961) ' Hollow Men', Selected Poems, Faber and Faber, p.75.

PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES AND PROJECTS IN YOUTH SERVICES IN GERMANY

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This discussion addresses firstly, the structural problems of youth services and, secondly, the lines along which youth services seem likely to develop in the 1990s. Finally, as an example, we describe some projects to address the marginalisation of the young homeless. Our purposes are:

- *to present arguments to politicians responsible for policies on youth for building up youth services on a secure and long term financial footing and as an everyday part of services in local communities;*
- *to argue the case that practitioners receive more support in their demanding and stressful work (reasonable standard of pay, staffing levels and suitable premises);*
- *and thus to hope that, finally, young people can secure help with crises in their everyday lives which will allow them to grow up able to cope successfully and in a healthy way with conflicts within themselves, with their environment and with other people.*

Youth work and youth welfare services (Child and Youth Services) = 'Jugendhilfe'[2] should be viewed as an essential investment for the future by society as a whole.

1. The Structural Problems of Youth Services.

The development of Youth Services in Germany is marked by a basic contradiction at present. On the one hand the incidence and intensity of the difficulties experienced by young people is increasing, on the other, the funding authorities are obliged to save money and this limits the working potential of Youth Services. The increasing strain in Germany is a result of various, not unconnected, social problems. For example:

- *even in such an obviously rich country as Germany over 10% of the population lives in poverty, according to the latest figures;*
- *the number of homeless and those living in very poor conditions is increasing; there is a shortfall of about 2 million dwellings;*
- *unemployment and a shortage of training and apprenticeships have hit young people in the former East Germany particularly hard; but in the former West Germany too, the move into the world of work in problem regions is difficult, especially for girls; altogether, 15% of young people do not have the requisite qualifications on leaving school;*
- *the number of young runaways coming into contact with prostitution in the big cities has increased;*
- *the increase in the international drug trade increases the danger to young people from actually taking the drugs to their being led into criminality.*

Added to these 'hard' risks are the other strains in the socialisation contexts and experiences of young people, which stem from the changes in family life such as:

- *a high rate of separation and divorce among parents*

* *the increasing number of children growing up in one-parent families;*
* *the increasing number of only children.*

In view of these difficulties experienced by young people, it is clear that youth services must react to these social changes and develop further in such a way as to raise its political status as a field of social policy.

The latest (8th) Federal Youth Report[3] shows that at the present time not only the perceived object but also the philosophy on which youth services are based is changing significantly: youth services can no longer limit themselves to reacting to problems as they arise, but see themselves more and more as 'a part of the modern welfare services; the Jugendamt (Youth Department) will change from being an intervention authority to being a social welfare authority.' (p. 195). This has led to changed ways of working in many areas, which in turn has lead to youth services consciously overstepping the boundaries into other areas of society - a strategy of active intervention instead of a reactive policy. This strategy might include, for example training and occupational opportunities for endangered young people, social work within schools, socio-pedagogical help for families, street work with people with drug problems, work within the youth culture and the support of self-help groups.

To enable youth services to attain their aim of being proactive and oriented to the life context, there is no alternative to developing longer-term extensive strategies of action, and no other instrument for this than planning. The planning of youth services implies both the organization of a political process for linking the examination of existing efforts and the development of new aims, content and methods. Contemporary youth services should meet the following requirements:

* *orientation to social spaces instead of quantitative areas to be covered,*
* *orientation to problems instead of the planning of institutions,*
* *open planning of process instead of statically laying matters down,*
* *intervention instead of setting boundaries,*
* *expert policy making discourse instead of conflict avoidance,*
* *participation of those involved instead of detachment.*

But there have been significant changes too in the traditional fields of endeavour of youth services. The Federal Youth Report, reports, for example, on the founding of Madchenhauser (Girls' Hostels) as a response to the problems faced by girls and young women; and new crisis intervention centres are exploring ways of helping young people who would previously have either ended up in police custody or been sent to homes (for example, young prostitutes of both sexes absconders, etc.).

2. The Lines of Development of Youth Services in the 90s.

During the phase of expansion of the social infrastructure of the welfare state in West Germany the development of Youth Aid followed the path of modernisation (essentially: differentiation, institutionalisation and professionalisation) and was based on the expansion of facilities and programmes/provision. The development of youth services in the 90s in contrast, will be marked above all by a permanent change in their internal structure, whilst their institutional framework, especially legal framework (see below) and the level of financial provision for youth services will remain relatively static.

These trends towards social change find expression in giving people the chance, if not forcing them, to individualise the way they lead their lives. For youth services, this will lead to a tailoring of support and intervention services to suit individual need and to an individualisation of the way the service is used by clients. A diversification of clientele is to be expected. With this, the characteristics which qualify people for 'client status' will change, as has happened so often in the past, as services have changed from poverty relief schemes to a 'people- oriented' social service.

The following overall trends of development in youth services can be identified:

- *a trend away from a centrally provided service towards one which is based in the community, that is, a wider, more relevant provision of facilities, where the supply/demand interface will be increasingly diffuse;*
- *a trend away from a 'reactive' aid based on well defined areas of conflict towards 'preventive' intervention;*
- *and finally a trend away from legally well-defined 'case-work' towards an approach based on communication with clients.*

In the context of the 'Neuordnug der sozialen Dienste' (Reorganisation of Social Services), facilities are placed on the scale: generalised - specialised. This scale is clearly demonstrated when one thinks of the question of 'difficult' youth in the context of the polarisation between caring and rejecting, helping and punishing, advising and controlling.

The individualisation of the demand for services and resources, which may be provided by the private or commercial sector, but which also belong in the jurisdiction of Youth Services, will lead, especially in 'soft' areas, to a diversification of methods, for instance in youth and family work. It can be predicted that in the realm of prevention, those activities which have no direct connection with any very obvious or conspicuous problem areas will expand, giving much greater room for manoeuvre.

It is often the case that classical labour market, training and youth services structures offer no suitable chances for integration and development to young people form disadvantaged backgrounds or to those adhering to alternative value systems. As a reaction to this, a number of autonomous initiatives have appeared, especially in the last decade, in which new ways of living, learning and working are explored. It is increasingly falling to Youth Services to stabilise and support these alternative opportunities for integration and participation, without labelling them as either 'normal' or 'deviant'.

In order to extend the points of access to facilities, it will become increasingly the case that, besides the institutionally independent areas of Youth Services, expanded facilities will be established in the institutions which 'process' lives. These are, namely, kindergartens (which are going through a process of broadening their function), education and training organisations and, in the case of some clients, work places. New forms of practice will develop in social services in the same way as they have done already in the health and legal systems, for example, in the case of the establishment of community-based projects under the term of 'Jugendgerichtshilfe' (Legal Aid for Young People) and in the interplay between youth services and psychiatry with young people.

It seems appropriate here to look at youth services from the perspective of its responsibilities and services as they arise in the context of the personal development of the client. If one lists the facilities and procedures of youth services in accordance with the course of personal development, one obtains the following:

Family-oriented Youth Services

Children in modern industrial societies are vitally in need of help which families can only provide to a limited extent because the family is such a very frail social and personal system. Because of their restricted opportunities for development they can only deal with the structural changes in society, internally as well as in their dealings with their environment, in a limited way. With regard to the family as a social system, youth services has established a number of ways of working which extend to measures designed to support the family (such as training and rest and recuperation facilities).

Youth Services as a Regulatory Institution

Historically, of all institutions of youth services, kindergartens alone have managed to gain an accepted place in the organisation of the average life cycle. The kindergarten has established itself as a social locus for all 3 to 5 year olds. Present tendencies suggest that this process will continue, given the present conditions in the labour market and in women's politics.

Youth Services as Support in the Community

A characteristic of modern Youth Services is that it supports the functions of other social systems. Here the field of 'Schulsozialarbeit' (social work in schools) is a good example. Social work accompanying the school career and later training can also be found within this framework. With the beginning of compulsory school attendance the organisational centre of life is divided between school and family. The demands of the school impose on the lives of children and young people and these have to be accommodated.

Youth Services as Help during Transitional Phases

The dialectic between the institutionalisation and 'biographising' of the life cycle following the sequence of family, kindergarten, school, training and work carries specific risks at the point of transition from one phase of life to the next, because each phase places its own demands on the individual. At these times of transition, institutional rules, market conditions, personal abilities and resources present diverse constellations of problems. To meet these, there are various measures of social work on offer, ranging from help for parents to types of social work geared to the world of work.

Youth Services as an Infrastructure

Youth services, in the context of youth work, function as a social and cultural infrastructure for young people. This infrastructure comprises part of the social prerequisites for the development of individual style, finding one's identity, establishing social networks and constructing an individual world. Especially in cites, with their new satellite estates, which offer little autonomous room for young people's development but also in their older neighbourhoods, which are being gentrified, and thus forcing out the original inhabitants, youth services provide an important stabilising force. It is also important to provide young people with space not formally associated with any commercial, organised or educational activities, in which they can explore their own personal and behavioural boundaries. Rationalised town planning tends to ignore this.

Youth Services as a Promoter of Network Building
With the individualisation of life patterns and the specialisation and diversification of institutions individuals will have to rely more and more on their own resources in the establishment and maintenance of social networks. At times of stress the ability to cope is dependent on the ability to mobilise resources within one's personal and social network. At the core of preventive youth work, therefore, is the promotion of these networks. Existing networks can be strengthened and alternative networks built up, but youth services themselves provide a centre of support for these youth networks.

We now turn to an example of contemporary youth services in practice, in order to put flesh on the bones of a rather abstract discussion so far.

3. Projects to address the disintegration and marginalization of the young homeless in Germany

3.1 The Current Situation
Homelessness is an issue even in the wealthy Federal Republic of Germany. The social and youth agencies have noted continually increasing numbers of the homeless and particularly an alarming increase in the percentage of homeless young people and young adults. 'Street kids', or 'train station kids', run-aways and homeless vagabonds are part and parcel of the urban scene, above all in the neighbourhoods around train stations. They have often led difficult lives, they have spent time in correctional homes and other institutions of the youth services agencies and are unemployed and have no regular income. The transition into the drug-addiction scene and to prostitution is swift and easy.

The causes of the situation in Germany are comparable to those of other European countries. They lie within the disproportion between the stagnating availability of affordable housing and the existing demand, in the exploding costs in rents and real estate and within the growing pressure on the living conditions of socially weaker groups and marginal groups due to unemployment, loss of unskilled jobs due to rationalization of production and simultaneous increases in living costs.

In the case of young people and young adults the following additional factors play a determining role: The so-called 'baby- boomers', born in the late Sixties and early Seventies are currently streaming into the housing market as customers. The demographic situation of these very numerous age cohorts alone leads to a disproportionally great demand which in no way corresponds to the limited availability of suitable accommodation, particularly in the class of small and cheap flats sought by young people. The transition from school to work has become more difficult and risky for many of them. This is especially true of less-qualified young people, who make up the major portion of the unemployed up to the age of 25, and also of foreign youth. In the western Bundeslainder the percentage of unemployed young adults is approximately double that of older employed people and has been stagnating around 16%. In the new Bundeslander in eastern Germany the percentage is significantly higher and in some areas reaches a level around 40%

In comparison to their contemporaries these young people are disadvantaged. Young people today have considerable difficult in meeting their needs for independence,

which concretely means moving out of their parents home and getting their own flat. The chances for achieving the transition to independence are all the more severely compromised for disadvantaged young people. Particularly in the case of young people of the socially weaker groups, when their parents are themselves suffering under unemployment and its social and psychological consequences, conflicts with the parents arise which are frequently accompanied by physical violence. This problem will be addressed later. These conflicts intensify the pressure finally to leave home and to plunge into financially unrealistic rental obligations. This is all too frequently the beginning of a cycle which leads to excessive debt, pawning, job-loss and finally homelessness.

3.2. Homelessness among young people - a problem of youth policy?

The traditional view has it that the family bears the primary responsibility for the care of children and young people. In Germany the right and duty of parents to care for their children is even explicitly covered by a special clause in the Constitution. In terms of the law and of social policy children and young people have therefore an 'indirect' status; they do not represent themselves as persons entitled to receive benefits, instead it is their parents who are entitled to receive support for the raising of their children.

This is also the case in the areas of home construction and rental obligations. According to tax law and social policy regulations the construction of 'family homes' is encouraged and subsidized. Parents who build a family home can deduct their children from their taxes and also benefit from tax reduction. The assumption is that children and young people 'normally' live with their parents until they move out to start their own families.

Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the problem of youth and living arrangements was not regarded as a legitimate area of state youth policy or of local youth welfare services. At most the services of the youth agencies were called upon in exceptional cases in which the family had collapsed and could no longer take care of the children and young people. In these cases the children were mostly placed in foster homes or in youth residences. Since the seventies, however, there has been an intensive debate in Germany on the organization of youth residential care. The objection was raised that this form of youth care led to 'hospital-syndrome' and to stigmatization, which undermined the success of youth residential care. A search began for alternatives to these traditional forms of youth care. In this context the alternatives of young people living together and assistance for young people in finding and financing apartments were raised as important issues for youth services. As a result, a series of models and new forms of service arose.

The new Federal Child and Youth Services Act (Jugendhifegesetz), which came into force on January 1, 1991, succeeded the traditional Youth Welfare Act of 1922 and provides the legal basis for the area of public and private youth services. This law makes certain fundamental changes and improvements in the handling of the problems of young people and young adults, including the area of living accommodation. The Act's preamble states that youth welfare service in general should 'contribute to the creation of positive living circumstances for young people and their families as well as contribute to the creation and maintenance of an environment that is responsive to the needs of children and families'. An adequate flat of one's own is regarded as part and parcel of the elementary preconditions for positive living circumstances. Youth social services are called upon to function in

a preventive capacity where the shaping of young people's living circumstances is concerned, and are expected to involve themselves in local housing policies as the advocates of the interests of children, young people and families.

The problems of finding affordable housing are particularly acute for young people when their job training requires that they move away from home. For this reason the Youth Services Act states explicitly that: 'Young people can be provided with living accommodation through the assistance of social workers during their school or professional training or during the period of their integration into employment.' This formulation is a guideline for youth agencies particularly as regards the needs of disadvantaged youth, who require special help in securing and completing professional training because of poor educational qualifications and social disadvantage.

Within the context of the overall group of policy instruments and legislation that fall under the heading of 'Hilfen zur Erziehung' (the statutory social-educational provisions for young people with problems), the new act formulates that these young people are to be provided with accommodation offering appropriate educational and therapeutic possibilities 'in a facility with daytime and night-time accommodation or in other forms of supervised living'. These provisions should 'encourage and support the independence of these young people', because, 'young people should be prepared for an independent life and should be advised and supported in questions of life conduct, training and employment'.

In those cases where crisis intervention is called for, the act stipulates that: 'The youth services office is required to take the child or young person under its care and protection when an immediate threat to the welfare of the child or young person renders this measure necessary. Provision of shelter and protection for a child or young person implies the provisional placement with a qualified person or in a facility or in another form of supervised living'.

This summary of the general and specific regulations covered by the Youth Services Act demonstrates that the issue of young people and their living needs has become an established part of the tasks of the youth services agencies, at least in those individual cases where these needs are visible. However, the comparatively weak position of the youth service offices within the overall hierarchy of local authorities, together with the problematic developments within the housing market have lead to considerable practical difficulties in the realization of these policy goals. In order to overcome these difficulties the youth services offices and agencies have developed a variety of innovative models and ideas.

3.3. Youth services projects to meet the living needs of young people

3.3.i. Crisis intervention: Schlupfwinkel Nürnberg ('Nüremberg Niche')

Young people who seek the aid of a youth services agency are frequently in a situation of acute homelessness. They have often run away from home or from a children's home. Their psychosocial conflict is bound up with searching for a roof over their heads. For this reason it is necessary to combine crisis intervention and counselling with providing shelter. The project Schlupfwinkel Nürnberg sees itself as a safe haven for young people in crisis situations. Thanks to its offer of temporary shelter, it can both contribute to crisis-management and prevent a descent into the street and drug scene. Various facilities offer help with family problems.

Schlupfwinkel's special quality lies in its direct contact with the young people; parents and other significant persons are generally included later. Primary working principles are, firstly, the voluntary presence of the young people (they are free to come and go) and, secondly, the role of advocacy for the young people on the part of the personnel. Schlupfwinkel Nürnberg was founded in 1985. Its rooms are located on the 3rd and 4th floors of an apartment house. A round-the-clock (including weekends and holidays) telephone counselling service and admissions policy are combined with the offer of temporary sleeping and living quarters. Two floors of the building are available; the lower floor offers a spacious, comfortable furnished 5-room flat with two bedrooms for 4 to 6 young people, a living-room, a large kitchen, a room for counselling and a separate living-room for the night-time advisors. The rooms of the upper floor offer another bedroom which is primarily reserved for older and more independent young people. The atmosphere of the facility is more that of a normal home than that of a counselling facility or of government/local authority offices. In 1992 six professional social workers took over the daytime advising and supervision, and the 'night-shift' was covered by volunteer workers.

The Schlupfwinkeld is uncomplicated and easy to reach. There are no waiting-lists, the telephone is open around the clock, so that the young people can come in person immediately and at any time. Parents contact Schlupfwinkel only rarely (1992: 8.4%). More frequently, the young people are referred by third parties such as the Youth Services Agencies or other social institutions, but even here, the young people are not compelled to come. Most remarkable is the high percentage of young people who turn to Schlupfwinkel of their own accord (1992: 47.6%). The motivations for contacting Schlupfwinkel are varied. The most important role is played by family conflict (1992: 44.3%); often the conflict is intensified by the young person having run away (22.7%) or by having been kicked out of their families (9.6%). When one compares the latest figures with those of past years, one finds an alarming increase in cases in which violence plays a role. In 1989 parental violence was the reason for young people contacting Schlupfwinkel in only 32 cases. In 1990 there were 60 cases and in 1991 114. In total, 411 young people came to Schlupfwinkel in 1991; 84 took up temporary residency. On average they stayed 18 days (in 1989 they stayed on average only 8.3 days - this development may be due in part to the continually worsening situation on the housing market).

Schlupfwinkel offers a constructive approach to crisis - management in which those seeking help are encouraged and empowered to solve their problems themselves. The emphasis is on acute crisis-intervention, but can in individual cases be comparable to regular family therapy in terms of length and intensity. The therapeutic situation in Schlupfwinkel often involves making an appointment with the young person, sometimes with his or her family as well, and withdrawing to a separate room for the counselling session. But this is not an iron therapeutic 'rule'. It is just as often the case that the counselling takes place in the context of everyday life, particularly where the young residents are concerned. There are many opportunities for contact between the young people and their advisors, during cooking and at meal times, in the living rooms, and so on. The counselling includes the possibility for staying at Schlupfwinkel for a limited time, so long as a return to the family is impossible or not

desired. Schlupfwinkel's social workers also intervene in an advocacy capacity with public authorities and employers and they accompany the young people to appointments with such agencies. The integration of counselling within the broadest possible spectrum of concrete offers of living accommodation and general support significantly increases the credibility and effectiveness of the counselling itself.

Recently, many other German cities have established similar programs. Frankfurt's 'sleep-in' program, run by the Association for Vocational Training and Social Education, is worthy of note here. In Frankfurt it is estimated that there are around 300 homeless young people at any one time. Since summer 1992 homeless young people can make use of three floors of a building in Frankfurt's inner-city. They can come informally and spontaneously, shower, wash their clothes, and sleep in the 16 available rooms, and also speak with the two social workers. Each young person can stay a total of six days and nights per month, and receives a toothbrush and toothpaste, soap and towel as well as a bed in a 2 or 3-bed room. All come of their own free will and no one is forced to take part in a counselling session. If the young people only want to eat and sleep, that is acceptable. The only requirement is that they identify themselves; because the provisions of the Children's and Youth Services Act require that the social workers inform parents of their children's whereabouts. If the young people wish to remain anonymous, they are only allowed 3 overnight stays per month. The project's clients are primarily those who want nothing more to do with public authorities, youth services or (often) their families. They often have a 'career' in children's homes or foster homes behind them, or have run away from desolate, non- functional families, and live on the street and amongst the drug scene.

3.3.ii. Alternatives to residential care: supervised live-in accommodation

In Munich the Association for Social Work with Young People and Young Adults, with the support of the Youth Services Office, created the project 'Supervised Living Accommodation' (sozialpadägogisch betreutes Wohnen) in 1987. In this holistically conceived program trained social workers offer social case and group work as well as social training and crisis intervention. The educational goals are above all aimed at teaching the young people to cope with life independently, helping to improve education and training qualification levels, monitoring the transition to employment and generally easing the process of social integration. The Association has at least 64 beds for young men and women, spread over 61 flats. The young people are counselled by 24 social workers.

These young people are between the ages of 16 and 21. For them the usual forms of shelter and care (foster families and residential homes) are inadequate and the possibility of a future in their families and original milieus no longer exists. The association provides them with flats in which they live alone or in pairs - alone, but not abandoned. Life in one's own apartment is an important step towards independence. Here the young people live in close touch with reality. They are presented with the challenge of solving problems on their own, and it is the policy of the programme not to take this challenge away from them. The social workers' task is to support them in their efforts. The young people must attend school or work regularly or, with the support of social workers, be willing to try to do so. They must choose the programme of their own free will and must be able to organize their daily lives in at least a rudimentary fashion.

The 'Supervised Living Accommodation' project was originally planned for only 11 sleeping places, but the overwhelming demand led to continual expansion. At present, four teams of four social workers, with the assistance of temporary helpers work in the programme. Two thirds of the clientele are young women, one third are non-German citizens. One central function of the Association is the renting of flats that its clientele would not be able to obtain on their own. The Association takes over all rental responsibilities (leasing agency fees, deposits, rent). The counselling aims at greater independence, taking on responsibility, coping appropriately with money, neighbours, friends and parents, vocational qualifications, maturation and stabilization of the personality. Even after the young person's participation in the programme has concluded, the Association sees to it that s/he is provided with an inexpensive flat. The costs of participation in the programme are covered by Youth Office and are significantly less costly than traditional residential care.

This form of supervised living has become practically a necessity for youth services in many parts of Germany, in the old as well as in the new Bundeslander. As has been previously mentioned, supervised forms of living are explicitly mentioned as an appropriate means of youth care under the terms of the Children's and Young People's Welfare Act.

3.3.iii. Living and working together: Youth services and urban renewal.

The general task of youth policy, as specified in the preamble of the Children's and Young People's Welfare Act is to secure or regain positive conditions of life for young people. These aims have best been realized through innovative projects in the context of urban renewal. Here the problems are extremely complex and require cooperation with other agencies (such as housing offices) as well as with other professions (i.e. architects, estate agents, finance experts).

In the early eighties there was a wave of squatting throughout the cities of the Federal Republic. Young people took part in self-help and citizens' initiative movements, including the unemployed and the marginalized, and took over empty and run-down buildings that had been left unoccupied and neglected for years due to real-estate speculation. In this way they drew attention to the increasing lack of affordable housing for young people and also to their need for new forms of collective living in which living together and employment were combined. For these reasons the squats were also an indictment of the local authorities, the real-estate speculators and the urban-renewal policy makers, who transformed previously affordable rented accommodation into expensive owner-occupied residential developments and booted out the tenants who could not keep pace financially with these changes.

In 1981 the Berlin City Government requested the Berlin Social Welfare Institute (a non-profit foundation of the Worker's Welfare Foundation of the city of Berlin) to act as negotiator between the squatters and the Senate of Berlin. The Institute combined the office of negotiator with the additional task of acting as the body responsible for the buildings involved and for the self-help groups, within the context of restoring and modernizing old housing stock. In November 1981 the final contract was signed with the City of Berlin, in which the Institute was installed as trustee for building restoration and modernization within the context of urban renewal. The terms of the contract are: 'The Trustee is responsible for the development of new instruments for the implementation of a policy of sensitive urban renewal. The

Trustee is called upon to include self-help groups in the maintenance, improvement and renewal of buildings. The Trustee is called to combine self-help initiatives in the domain of housing renewal with self- help initiatives in the social domain. In particular, measures and projects for groups of socially weaker and needy citizens are to be carried out, and these groups are to be offered appropriate building space. In addition, projects are to be carried out in which living, job-training and employment opportunities are to be created for young people, within the context of youth services and under the rubric of "help for self-help". In addition, new forms and opportunities for the participation of population groups of foreign origin in the process of modernization are to be developed and tested'.

This form of urban renewal and rubric of self-help is generally divided up into three steps. First, the groups of people living together or the self-help groups must incorporate themselves as a legal person, in general as a non-profit registered association. The Berlin Social Welfare Institute then negotiates as trustee of the City of Berlin with the property owners of the buildings in question and clears up questions pertaining to occupation and use rights or to transfer of the property. In the event that the building is purchased, the Berlin Senate is most frequently the purchaser. The Institute then, thirdly, finalises a contract with the building occupiers covering occupation and use of the building in question, so that the groups can maintain and manage the building themselves. In this way the autonomy of the groups is recognized and independent responsibility in the area of self- help in building matters is encouraged. Together with an architect of their choice the building associations work out a renovation and use concept, which is then decided upon in discussion with the trustee. The plans for renovation and use together with reports on building damage lead to a construction plan for which the Institute takes over the financial calculations and decides on the individual construction tasks. In this way the building associations are recognised as landlords in the context of the current building law. The associations are obligated to contribute 20% of the total construction costs of the building renewal through their own construction labour. Proceeding or following the construction work, the buildings are legally transferred to housing associations, which often takes place via negotiating construction rights on the property with the original owner. The transfer of the property includes the provision that affordable housing is to be permanently available for groups of socially weak young people and for social- initiative groups, that the restored buildings are not to be transferred to unsuitable third parties and that the buildings will be fully used in the manner stipulated in the contract.

This type of building modernization and restoration not only provides new affordable housing, but also provides a variety of new opportunities for vocational qualification and social learning. Vocational training measures have been integrated into many building modernization projects. Through their very concreteness, the demands of construction work assist in the finding of practical answers to individual social problems, or to problems in group dynamics. In this way the construction process is inseparable from the social process. Carrying out the construction work on one's own brings about an impressive improvement in one's manual skills. The necessary negotiations with architects, firms and professional builders

encourage the development of communicative and cognitive competence, and provide a good framework for learning realistic decision-making. The regular visits from the city building inspector have an immediate socially integrating effect; they are an important, visible stage in the overall process, represent a real challenge for the group, are of decisive importance for the next step, and at the same time provide recognition and validation for the participants. The construction progress is visible and touchable, and at each stage the goal comes nearer. Social integration is no longer merely the obligation of paid social workers and educators, but is rather a primarily self- determined process.

The Berlin Social Work Institute has managed 18.3 million DM as trustee for construction subsidy and the value of 3.2 million DM as expressed in terms of the self-organised labour of the associations. About 40 persons are employed within the framework of the modernization projects and an additional 45 have limited work contracts. 22 places within vocational training institutions were created in the context of the modernization projects. In the course of the modernization projects 19,100 square metres of living and work space were created and transferred to 14 projects with a total of about 300 participants.

The example of Berlin has been followed by other cities. A good example is the 'City Construction, Hamburg, Inc', a similar body responsible for modernization in a trustee capacity. Another example is the 'Neighbourhoods Foundation;' in Hessen, the 'Living Forum' in Munich as well as a variety of smaller projects.

3.3.iv. On the way to an alternative housing market

Many large cities, facing the shrinking availability of affordable housing for socially weaker groups, and especially for young people, have adopted the course of buying up housing, or of taking over rental obligations and options in order to be able to provide shelter. This development presupposes the creation of a subsidized alternative housing market, similar to the way in which an alternative labour market has arisen under the pressure of permanent unemployment, supported by social policy, above all subsidized by local authorities. For example, in recent years the city of Nuremberg has created housing for a total of 410 homeless people in this fashion.

In the Bundesland of Berlin the Association for Urban Development, which is integrated into the Berlin Social Work Institute, has taken on this obligation. In 1988 the Senate voted to delegate the task of managing, referring and making permanently available living and commercial workplace space for clientele of the Youth and Family Services agencies, under the condition that this space is used for non-profit purposes. In order to meet this obligation, the Association, in the capacity of general tenant, rents flats from the urban housing associations and form private landlords. Because of the increases in rental costs, these are mostly run-down (and therefore affordable) flats, which are then renovated as much as possible through training projects of the youth services office or by the future inhabitants. Since its founding the Association has obtained or rented 253 living units.

The 'Model Project Living Forum' in Munich has taken on a similar obligation. Within two years five flats were renovated and made available to groups of young people and young adults living together.

Characteristic for these projects is a mix of financing strategies, in which monies of the local youth services in accordance with the Children's and Young People's Welfare Act, as well as instruments of the Social Assistance Benefits Act, the Promotion of Employment Act, and of the Act for the Promotion of Construction and the Economy are combined. Recently, funds of the European Community have played an increasingly significant role, such as EC regional funds and EC social funds.

The Federal Task Force of the Youth Offices of the Lander determined during a convention in 1992 that the development of a socially subsidized 'alternative housing market' is indispensable; The Task Force put together the following catalogue of proposals and demands, with which we would like conclude our report:

- *The making available of housing units for particular groups of clients within the context of state or local programmes for the promotion of subsidized housing in old and new buildings;*
- *making use of already existing housing construction programmes through the supplementary financing through the funds of the youth services or social services;*
- *Projects of the youth agencies within the framework of urban renewal; exhausting all resources and instruments of the funds available for modernizing and reconstruction as well as self-help projects, with the purpose of keeping the renovated housing permanently available for the socially weaker groups;*
- *contracts between cities and housing associations;*
- *eliminating bureaucratic and legal hindrances in the process of transforming housing space for the goals of youth social work.*

Notes

1.

a. The German Youth Institute (Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V.) is a social research institute not attached to a university. Its tasks are to conduct fundamental but application oriented research on the living conditions of children, adolescents and families, to initiate and evaluate pilot projects involving youth and family services, and to look at the relationship between youth and sociological theory.

b. Alongside its research, the DJI offers various services: publications (books, the journal DISKURS, a bibliography of youth services, the information magazine DJI BULLETIN); the development of data bases (for specialized literature, statistics); congresses and educational meetings for experts.

c. Free copies of the DJI-Bulletin in English can be ordered by writing to the editor's address: Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V. (DJI), Freibadstrasse 30, D-81543 Munich.

2.

Youth Work and Youth Welfare Services (Child and Youth Services) = 'Judendhilfe':

The welfare of young people is the concern of the home and the school, supplemented by youth work and youth welfare services, as provided by the statutory bodies, in particular the youth work and youth welfare office, and the voluntary organisations.

Youth work and youth welfare services advise, support and encourage parents in their task of bringing up children. In addition to the education provided by the family, school and vocational training, 'Jugendhilfe' offers supplementary facilities whenever the family alone cannot cope.

For these purposes, the following provision is made by the bodies responsible for youth work and youth welfare services:

- *help for families who cannot cope with their problems on their own*

- *day care centres for children (creches, nursery schools, day care centres for school age children, placement with a child minder)*
- *play grounds, recuperative health schemes*
- *family and parental counselling*
- *child guidance*
- *community work for disadvantaged groups*
- *youth work*
- *adoption procedures and implementation*
- *accommodation in/referral to, foster homes and other homes*
- *guardianship*
- *social enquiry and juvenile cases*
- *protection of young persons in public.*

Youth and youth welfare services receive about 70% of their funding from local authorities and about 25% from the respective Lander budgets. The remainder is covered by the Federal Government, which supports central establishments, associations and international youth work.

3.

In accordance with the Child and Youth Services Act the Federal Government is required to submit to the German Parliament a report on youth work and youth welfare services in every legislative period and to give a general survey of this field in every third report. The reports provide information on innovations, results and deficiencies. They are compiled by independent experts.

Between 1965 and 1989 eight reports were published. The fifth and the eighth report examined the overall development of youth work and youth welfare services and made recommendations for improvement. The sixth report dealt with the need to create better opportunities for girls. The seventh report looked into supportive provision for the family as part of youth work and youth welfare services. The ninth report, currently in preparation, focuses on the situation of young people and youth services in the new eastern lander.

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YOUTH - RACISM - XENOPHOBIA - EUROPE

MARK TAYLOR

Introduction

This article concentrates on efforts made across Europe to try to communicate understandings of the phenomena of racism and xenophobia and to motivate young people to oppose racism and promote active tolerance. Although the main focus is placed on the work of youth organisations an attempt is made to incorporate current initiatives within the Council of Europe and the European Union.

'Ethnic cleansing' in what was Yugoslavia; attacks on accommodation for asylum-seekers and refugees in Germany; desecration of Jewish cemeteries in France; higher rates of unemployment for 'migrant' youth everywhere; housing policies in London's East end; political gains of the extreme right wing parties in Belgium, Russia and Italy; violence against African students in Hungary and Slovakia; the fear (Schengen, Trevi, etc.) of the creation of a fortress Europe[1]. This list could go on and on; it is not difficult to find examples of institutional or day-to-day racism from across the continent. Due to the work of publications such as **Searchlight** in the UK the picture has become more complete over the past few years; and their example is followed in other countries: BIT, the Hungarian Progressive Youth Organisation, works with the Martin Luther King Egyseult in Budapest to collate and publish a diary of racist attacks (Taylor, 1993, p.C/11). That is a small, but important, instance of concrete action by a youth organisation.

Sharing ideas and finding out if they can be adapted in other situations is one of the advantages of international co-operation between youth organisations. Systematic publication of the exchange of such ideas is rare. Part of the Council of Europe's Youth Directorate[2], the Advisory Committee of the European Youth Centre (EYC) and European Youth Foundation (EYF) is a body which brings together 25 representatives of international youth organisations and national youth committees. Members saw the need for proactive, mutual support around these issues and their meeting of April 1992 saw the beginning of a process which would result in the publication[3] of **ALIEN 93 - Youth organisations combatting racism and xenophobia** in September 1993. The aim was to produce useful material from youth organisations which could stimulate thought and action, not to publish a general book about the causes of racism. Although over 80 organisations replied to the request for submissions, it could not hope to be more than a first look at what has been done. Despite the somewhat anecdotal nature of the results, they do contain a richness in approaches and suggest avenues for future work.

Terminology, Language and Culture

Definitions are both dangerous and attractive. 'Dangerous' for two main reasons: once something has been defined it can be attacked; and, once defined, it does not have to be thought about again. 'Attractive' because agreed definitions enable us to communicate with one another but, once we have found a definition we agree with, we hold onto it and do not have to re-examine the concept. Defining 'racism' is not easy. Defining racism to the point where it would be possible to

determine whether any particular action, thought or process could be labelled 'racist' would appear to be verging on the impossible.

Arriving at agreed definitions at international level poses enormous challenges and necessitates a high degree of commitment. Young people from Britain have the apparent advantage of speaking English and, unlike the majority of the other participants in most international youth activities, they will have little difficulty in saying what they want. Interpreters will struggle to summarise even some of their ideas and other participants will either switch off or demand interpretation into the 'real English' they learned at school[4]. Especially for those who are well-versed in the terminology and arguments of the race debate in Britain, it can be surprising to find that Black young people from the continent may reject the description 'Black', no matter how inclusive the definition used to justify it[5]. Only recently the Council of Europe Minority Youth Committees[6] (CEMYC) has started to use the terms 'black' and 'ethnic minority' as 'a political expression to include all those who are systematically discriminated by white European racism' (CEMYC, 1993, p.1). In each country the discourse is different, each shaped by the complex interplay between cultures and history. Each person defines him/herself within this process and most require some guidance to help them see that others have different starting points and view things through their own set of ethnocentric spectacles. It is accepted practice in many European countries to talk of 'migrants', there is even a Migrants Forum funded by the Commission of the European Communities. To those British passport holders from Manchester who are of, say Jamaican origin and whose parents were born in Britain, it comes as something of a surprise to learn that this Forum could be for them.

When youth organisations talk or write about racism and xenophobia there would seem to be general understanding about the meaning of 'xenophobia': fear based on prejudice of foreigners, strangers, aliens, the other. As the Red Cross Youth of Spain puts it: 'The process of xenophobia is a clear example of "the little fish that eats its own tail": we fear people who are different from us because we don't know them, and we don't know them because we fear them' (Cruz Roja Juventud/Equipo Claves, 1992, p. 69). Confusion set in, for me at least, when trying to compare definitions of racism produced by different youth organisations.

The general tenor is reflected here:

- **Jeunesse et Reconstruction** *(a workcamp organisation):*
  Racism is the generalised and definitive valorisation of differences, real or imaginary, in favour of the accusator [sic] and against its victim, in order to justify its privileges or aggression. [...] Each one of us is racist right from the moment when we feel more important than others, even though this feeling may be unconscious. *(Jeunesse et Reconstruction, August 1984, p. 6)*

- **International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations** *(ISMUN):* It was agreed that racism could be described as discrimination against one group of people by another, based on prejudices which were attributed to physical characteristics. It was stressed that racism was an attempt to create false divisions within the human race, and had no valid scientific basis. There was only one race on Earth: the Human Race, and even by using such terminology as

'racial discrimination' or 'race relations', one risked legitimising part of the false premises used by racist theorists and groups. *(ISMUN, 1983, p.20)*

- **Third World First** *(a development education organisation):*
  It is generally agreed, however, that whatever else racism may be, it is basically to do with power plus prejudice. Power, when used to maintain inequality and thus underdevelopment in the Third World (or inequality and racism in this country), is absolutely fundamental to the operation of racism. Power, whether it be the power to deny black Britons jobs or health or education, or the power to deny Third World countries a fair price for their goods; is generally the power of the white West, the power of racism. *(Third World First, 1985, p.3)*

In some instances the muddle between definitions is clear: prejudice and feelings of superiority can mean racism; we are one human race and, therefore, racism is false. The third quotation, although coming from Britain, is not alone in taking the line of 'power plus prejudice equals racism'[7]. These definitions speak to us from the middle of the last decade, but once we get into the nineties it is possible to witness a more differentiated analysis and there is a realisation that the racists have changed tactics. Amongst others Pierre-Andre Taguieff[8] (France) has played a crucial role in identifying the new battleground as the multicultural society and in highlighting the neo-racists' methods. The Young Socialists in the German Social Democratic Party demonstrate that the messages have hit home, and they show how words can carry a lot of historical baggage:

- In public debates the terms 'Auslanderfeindlichkeit' or 'Fremdenfeindlichkeit' [meaning hostility towards foreigners] are the ones which are mostly used when intellectual or active rejection of foreigners is being talked about - only rarely will the term 'Rassismus' [racism] by used. We want to use the term 'racism' not because it conveys the character of sharper moral and political accusation, but rather because it is the clearer historical and analytical category - in contrast to the other terms - and because it asserts something about the contexts and causes of rejection and hatred of foreigners. [...] 'Neo-Racism' is no longer based primarily on physical characteristics, rather it takes cultural differences as its starting point. Statements about superiority are partly forgotten and, instead, it is 'merely' pointed out that the culture of a people ('Volk') or of nations is necessary for their identity and would be endangered by cultural or social mixing *(Jusos in der SPD, 1992 p.11).*

What To Do?
Recent research carried out in Belgium suggests that it may be possible to break down the population into four main groups:

A *people who are already aware of the problems of racism and more or less actively involved in anti-racist activities (about 10%)*

B *those people, who are tolerant, but do not (yet) engage in anti-racist activities (about 40%)*

C *those who have racist tendencies, but do not commit racist acts (about 40%)*

D *racists who openly show their attitude (about 10%) (reported in: Youth Directorate, December 1993, p.74)*

What is true for Belgium is not necessarily applicable across the length and breadth of Europe, but anti-racist activists (from other countries) who have seen these figures do agreed that the general proportions are similar to their own estimates. They also agree that greater percentages of young people are present in the sections A and D. Official statistics for 1992 quoted in the **Kolnischer Rundschau** (2.6.93) newspaper state that seventy seven per cent of violent racist attacks in Germany were committed by people under the age of twenty one. Racism does not stand on its own, it has links to and origins in unequal power relations, the effects of unemployment, ignorance and social marginalisation. To change the face of European society to the extent that the majority exercise active tolerance calls for combinations of economic, social and educational responses. A fair degree of tolerance and dialogue would seem to be required between people and organisations involved in this work; sometimes it is easier to criticise those who have similar goals (but different strategies), than to concentrate on striving for change(9).

Symbolic actions

Here the emphasis is on public display, a message of solidarity. Logically, these actions involve co-operation with other organisations. Following publicity nationally and through the Youth Express Network(10), a local youth association in El Entegro, Spain (Association Cultural Linares) received over sixty decorated cloth squares from youth organisations in Spain and the rest of Europe. The theme of the resulting patchwork was, 'La juventud contra el racismo en Europa or Youth against racism in Europe'. Media attention is also a goal of more traditional types of demonstrations, but like the demonstrations it tends to be short-lived. Member organisations of the Austrian Youth Council (OBJR) were heavily involved in the SOS Mitmensch 'Lichtermeer' or 'Sea of Light', this demonstration organised in Vienna in January 1993 was the largest seen in the city for over fifty years.

Political action

Depending on the political culture of a country, demonstrations can produce change, but most of the work happens behind the scenes in lobbying activities. Many youth and anti-racist organisations are preparing demonstrations and lobbying strategies for the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament. Groups such as Comrade in Spain and Nero e Non Solo (or 'black and not alone') in Italy are trying to co-ordinate 'a common European platform' with a series of demands to prospective MEP's 'relating to the situation of refugees and inmigrants [sic] resident in the EU, as well as measures taken to combat racism and xenophobia' (Comrade, 1994).

Practical action

Here the messages of solidarity mean contact, negotiation and participation - often long-term. Some national branches of the International Young Catholic Students (IYCS-IMCS) are involved in refugee camps, and organising literacy courses for street children (IYCS-IMCS, 1993, pp. 9-15). In 1992 the European Playworkers Association organised a week of Intercultural Community Action in the Karolinenviertel of Hamburg. International volunteers helped to organise a festival, children's activities and roundtables between local people and visiting Roma gypsies.

Education and publication

Youth for Development and Co-operation (YDC) start the report of their seminar 'The control gates of Europe' in this way:

Why has YDC chosen migration and racism as the topic for this seminar? [...] When bombs are planted at migrant centres and migrant youth is assaulted by skinheads on the streets of European capitals, being primarily a European youth organisation, we must try harder to raise awareness among young Europeans of the real causes of migration and the dangers of racism. (YDC, 1992, p.3)

We all have different starting points and perspectives depending on our cultures, our histories, our languages and we need intercultural approaches to help us work with these differences and find common goals and strategies. Youth organisations, being part of the informal education sector, have been able to experiment and take more risks with educational methodologies that schools. Intercultural learning principles have been tried and developed with the aim of enabling young people to function within international and multicultural environments (EYC, 1986). Cross-fertilisation with the more formal education sector happens increasingly. Exchanging and documenting a wide range of examples of good practice from educational methods to action plans to leaflet design becomes more worthwhile. The members of the German National Youth Council (DBJR) understood this and created a body[11] in 1992 which could collect and disseminate all relevant materials.

Networking in Europe

Publications can be useful tools but they can never replace the necessity for people to meet and be in contact with each other. It can be argued that, in principle, networks involve looser relationships than those necessary for the running of 'organisations', co-operating organisations can come and go as they please, participating in common actions if they so wish. Back in the early eighties SOS Racisme (France) developed the 'touce pas mon pote' yellow hand (which was translated into English as 'hands off my mate') as a symbol of anti-racist solidarity. SOS Racisme has branches in nine European countries, but does not seem to have taken root in Britain. Other anti-racism networks are building up a strong momentum, examples include the European Network Against Racism and UNITED for Intercultural Action. The latter was initiated by international youth organisations but now boasts 162 supporting organisations and a mailing list of 1,800 (UNITED, February 1994). What is certain is that such contacts will continue to multiply and enrich the work of anti-racist organisations and their allies.

Towards 1995

A European youth campaign against racism, xenophobia, intolerance and anti-Semitism is being planned in the Council of Europe for 1995, which is also the Unesco International Year of Tolerance and the EU Year of Racial Harmony (and the tenth anniversary of International Youth Year). Add to all that the proposals to reorganise or renew most of the EU youth programmes and it looks like being quite a year, 1995.

Council of Europe

We welcome the idea of the European plan of action against racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance and as youth organisations we look forward to playing a key role in encouraging active and full participation of all young people in our societies. (CENYC, ECB, October 1993)

This is part of the declaration which the representatives of the Council of European National Youth Committees (CENYC) and the European Coordination Bureau of International Youth Organisations ECB) wrote to the Council of Europe heads of state summit held in Vienna[12]. The heads of state agreed to a relatively substantial campaign which, although focusing on youth, will also include reviews of existing legislation and proposals for future actions in member countries. As to the content and running of the campaign, the Youth Directorate held a symposium where many productive ideas were shared: political life, the media[13], out-of-school education and training, formal education, social work, participation, legislation, the role of the national committees and highlights of the campaign (Youth Directorate, December 1993). Structures foreseen for running the campaign entail the creation of a European steering group and the building of national committees[14] which should include youth representatives alongside those from governments and their nominees.

Some governments can expect criticism for their lofty pronouncements about the combat against racism at European level whilst practising racist policies at home, but there is a seriousness to the campaign preparations which gives rise to hope that at least some of the words will become reality.

European Union

Co-operation between the EU and the Council of Europe is predicted for the above campaign and the Year of Racial Harmony; no details have been made public yet. Members of the European Parliament have been particularly active in analysing racist trends and in calling continually for the action promised in the joint declaration[15] against racism and xenophobia of 11 June 1986. Similarly, the Parliament has been one of the main motors in extending the range and resources of youth programmes, introducing budget lines for priority actions in the youth field in 1991 and, in 1993, introducing a fresh budget heading entitled 'Youth Policy' (!) to cover the exchange programme 'Youth for Europe' and the priority actions.

In its second phase, the 'Youth for Europe' programme has seen a more lively debate[16] on the way youth exchanges can be used as a positive means of overcoming racist and xenophobic attitudes and behaviour[17]. There have been cases of racist harassment and violence directed towards members of exchange groups, so there is also the process within exchanges themselves to be considered. On behalf of the Commission, the Youth Exchange Centre (YEC) will be hosting a European seminar in April 1994 'to discuss the issues involved and to begin to develop future strategies' (YEC, 15.12.93). Very interesting in itself but doubly so in view of a key justification in current proposals for adopting the 'Youth for Europe III' programme:

> *it should be stressed how important the proposal [is] in the fight against racism and xenophobia. Indeed, Community action to encourage understanding between young people beyond the frontiers is essential, for it is one of the guarantees for peace, cohesion and solidarity for the future. The fight against racism and xenophobia thus constitutes a major added value for Community action in the youth field. (Commission, 1993, p.13)*

If agreed by the Parliament and Council 'Youth for Europe III' will constitute a significant expansion in mobility opportunities for young people and youth workers.

These opportunities need sound intercultural planning and education or they could end up reinforcing the prejudices and racism they are meant to fight.

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Notes

1. See, for example, Webber, F. (1993) 'The new Europe: immigration and asylum', in Bunyan, T. (ed), *Statewatching the new Europe, a handbook on the European State,* London, Statewatch.

2. Currently, the Council of Europe has 32 member governments with Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Latvia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine on the waiting list. The Youth Directorate has three main areas of work: intergovernmental co-operation on youth matters; the European Youth Centre (a residential educational establishment) and the European Youth Foundation.

3. Following a decision of the Governing Board of the EYC and EYF in its meeting of December 1992. In a system of co-management, ten governments and ten youth representatives make decisions jointly about the activities to be financed and supported by the EYC and EYF.

4. For a description of other types of international non- communication, see: European Community Youth Exchange Bureau, 1992, pp. B/33-35

5. I make no pretence that the debates in Britain about the term 'Black' or the relationship between the Black community and racism are over. See, for example, Murray, K., (September 1993), 'The Black Experience', in *Shabaab,* National Youth Agency.

6. Despite appearances to the contrary, CEMYC is an international non-governmental youth organisation, founded in 1988, and not an organ of the Council of Europe. CEMYC provides opportunities for ethnic minority youth to meet at an international level and network through seminars, conferences, training courses and its newsletter CEMYC NEWS.

7. See also: International Federation of Liberal and Radical Youth (1986), *Put the hands together: IFLRY against racism and xenophobia,* Brussels

8. 'The anti-racist movement must be aware of the shift that has taken place in racist arguments and images in recent years, away from biological inequality towards the absolutism of cultural differences'. Taguieff, Pierre-Andre, (1992), *Face au racisme. 2 volumes.1. Les moyens d'agir. 2.Analyses, hypotheses, perspectives,* La Decouverte, Paris.

9. Unless otherwise stated, the following examples are drawn from Taylor, 1993, pp.C/10-11.

10. A network of youth workers and organisations 'working with marginalised, excluded young people in Europe'.

11. Known as the Informations-, Dokumentations- und Aktionszentrum gegen Auslanderfeindlichkeit fur eine multikulturelle Zukunft e.V., or Information, documentation and actions centre against hostility to foreigners and for a multicultural future.

12. For those interested to find out more about the history of CENYC and ECB and the relationships between them and the Council of Europe, see: Corbett, R., (1989), 'The remarkable example of youth organisations, in *The New Federalist,* Brussels. His article is reprinted in European Youth Centre, (1991-93), volume five.

13. A suggestion to MTV (who else) runs along the lines of adapting the Beavis and Butthead cartoon: 'huhhuh this racist sucks huh, switch the channel ...okay, huh ... this is cool, yeah huh that tolerant chick is really cool huhhuh, this is cool huh' etc.

14. The governments and youth organisations of Norway and Spain have experience of running such campaigns already.

15. Signed by the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the representatives of the Member States.

16. And training courses for youth workers, for example one organised by JINT and APAIJ the national agencies of the Flemish and French-speaking communities of Belgium; see: JINT, APAIJ, 1994.

17. Of course this debate is not restricted to 'Youth for Europe'; see, for example: Berg, W. (1993), p. 539, whilst critical of some of the overblown claims made about youth exchanges, he does see them as part of the means to creating a culture where racism and xenophobia cannot thrive.

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WORKING SPACE

Youth Work in Russia and in Great Britain Compared

RADOST SVIRIDON

This article is the result of the author's ten week trip to Great Britain with the aim of getting acquainted with the contemporary principles and methods of youth work in England. Nowadays with radical changes embracing all spheres of the Russian society great changes are also taking place in work with Russian young people - in the transition they make into the adult society and in the process of their socialization. That is why the exchange of experiences and the study of progressive innovations can help youth workers of both countries who have many problems in dealing with young people as well as skills and knowledge in how to cope with them.

Russian Youth Movements like English ones have had a long history. With the foundation of the Boy Scouts in England in 1907 by Robert Baden Powell and with the rapid expansion of this movement throughout the world, the first Russian Scouts appeared in 1909 and in 1914 the movement took its shape as a uniformed organization; in 1918 there were 50,000 Scout members in the country with their own edition of the 'Russian Scouts' magazine (Gribanova, 1992, p.27).

As for the primary aims of the organization of Russian Scouts of those days, in addition to 'physical fitness' and 'character building' as in the English Scouts organization, concern was also given to the aesthetical, moral and ethical aspects of the development of young people (Borisova, L.A., 1993, p.15).

One of the Russian scholars I.N. Zhukov noted that the Association of Russian Scouts was not a military organization but a knightly one. Developing the main principles of scouting Russian scholars understood it as a social phenomenon, a unique system of informal education and socialization connected with such educational institutions as family, school, church and society, other youth organizations, the objectives of which had much in common with those of school and family (Borisova, 1993, p.15).

It should be noted that great attention was paid to the all-round development and self-education of a child. As L. Borisova put it, the attractiveness of romance, entertaining games, taking into consideration such characteristic features of every child as an inclination to everything heroic, brave and mysterious, the possibility to come into close contact with nature when camping: all of these were the components of the Russian Scouts System. As I.N. Zhukov wrote, these 'led the spontaneous movement and needs of young people, and especially their necessity in peer organizations, to the definite route and direction, ennobling them and their souls greatly'. According to A. Mikhailova, Baden Powell appeared' to have undone the knot that separated children from grown ups' (Borisova, 1993, p.15).

The advantage of such a new youth movement as scouting over school pedagogy was apparent. Having involved all adult society in participating, having promoted

the purifying of the whole society, scouting promoted effective methods and approaches for youth workers in organizing work with youngsters.

But while uniformed groups were successfully developing in other countries, in Russia by 1926 the Scouts organization was regarded as incompatible with the main objectives of the emerging young communist movement, the primary aim of which was to involve children into the class struggle. The Scout movement ceased to exist, leading to the formation of one monopolistic ideological and political organization - Young Pioneers.

Whilst in Great Britain the Scouts and other young people's organizations were effectively excluded from the school system as far back as the outbreak of the 1st World War (Jeffs, 1979, p.8), which made them independent agencies, in Russia during the whole period of the Soviet State the bulk of youth provision was school-based and it was mainly teachers who were engaged in youth work activities through extra-curricular activities. Perhaps this explains the well-known 'high intellectual content' of the work of Russian youth workers. As Jeffs noted:

> *Teachers as a consequence of their status as the qualified 'experts' in working with young people and as the possessors of above average leisure time inevitably come to play a key role in the Youth Service (Jeffs, 1988, p.117).*

Improved relationships with children are also benefits of the involvement of teachers in informal contacts with their pupils.

With the evident advantage of such youth provision side by side there were great disadvantages when children were not provided with the opportunity to choose and to decide what they would like to do most of all. As Jeffs pointed out:

> *The school embodies the dominant culture and only those young people who have the appropriate 'cultural capital' can make full and effective use of it (Jeffs, 1988, p.85).*

'Troublesome' and 'problem' children were not involved in such sorts of activities, they were excluded from youth work of any kind, for according to Jeffs, 'those who reject education tend also to reject the Youth Service' (Jeffs, 1979, p.79).

In Great Britain as long ago as the 1930s it was understood that 'recreation unorganized is a danger' (Jeffs, 1979, p.1), and a lot of attention was paid to the positive all round development of young people, which resulted in the emerging and vast growth of Community Centres and Clubs. In Russia, however, the tendency mostly to the 'pedagogization' of youth work turned out to have contributed a lot to the transformation of it into an appendage of school, not possessing any social status of its own. The shortage of youth provision particularly of the kind attractive to the youngsters was obvious, and as the country became more and more overtaken with the crisis, the youth movement was also declining.

Modern Russian youth movements are very dynamic and varied at the present time. On the basis of the former All Union Young Pioneers organization a lot of new units and associations are coming into being. Some of them retain their relationships with

the parent organization and they form the Federation of Young Pioneers organizations that are not political nowadays and the stress in their names is on the meaning of 'first', 'innovator' and 'explorer'; other organizations are independent.

As the chairwoman of the Federation Y. Chepurnykh states:

> *This new unit is a voluntary, independent, self-governing social organization of children, young people and grown-ups which does not belong to any political party and rejects any policy of dictation. The aims of it are not to adapt Russian young people to ruling ideology but to provide appropriate conditions for their social creative work through different forms of activity and to promote their successful transition into the society. (Chepurnykh, 1993, p.29).*

At present the priority in the work with pioneers is given to the social security of children, to the upbringing of the true citizens of the country, to help young people to get ready for independent life, to become active members of the democratic society (Ivashchenko, 1992, p.40).

Nowadays this organization of young people adheres to the position not to substitute school as a social institute, the main aim of which is to give young people access to vitally important knowledge, but to create necessary conditions for informal education, for self-realization and self-identification of a young person.

The Association of Russian Scouts is being revived as a form of social informal education of children and young people in the spirit of patriotism, humanism and religious education (Dubrovits, 1992, p.18). Now there exists the Federation of Russian Scouts with branches in all parts of Russia and in some former Soviet Republics.

But despite all these positive trends in the development of the present-day youth movement there are substantial obstacles retarding this process of which the main ones are: the youth movement is not included in the system of the state policy; there is no law relating to young people's organizations and associations and the support of them by the state; and although the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the Soviet Union in 1990, adults being busy with the complex problems overtaking the whole Russian society pay almost no attention to the process taking place in youth culture, the lives of young people, their leisure time and the like.

In 1991 in the country there were 40,000 different spontaneous youth associations including ecological, political, historical, patriotic and charitable organisations. This means 30-40% of young people took an active part in their activities and about 13% of youngsters were members of different informal youth associations (Khotchenkov, 1991, p.4). These days, because of high rates of inflation and insufficiency of financing of youth work, a number of young people have found themselves in the streets where nobody is concerned with their problems except the vast growing informal groups mostly of criminal character. For many spontaneous youth associations are rapidly decreasing and there is no such youth organization as Komsomol any more.

Society is anxious about high percentages of crimes committed by young people; it is three times the adult crime rate; teachers are worried about 'alcohol expansion' (Blinov, 1993, p.29) among pupils: 40% of senior pupils drink alcohol, 12% take drugs (Blinov, 1993, p.29).

Overcoming these difficulties, Russian youth workers and teachers are working hard to find the proper ways of organizing different kinds of activities to involve young people in participating in them; taking into consideration the peculiarities of the time they are trying to attach new forms to their work and their efforts are not in vain.

As an example let us look at the biggest city in the middle of Russia, Krasnoyarsk, with a population of more than one million people. The main venues of the bulk of youth provision in the city are the Pioneer Palace, the City Palace of Culture and the Sport Palace. These days youth work is no longer school-based work and the majority of schools are concerned with matters of education rather more than with the problems of informal education, leaving it to other agencies which are very far from the needs of young people sometimes.

This year the Krasnoyarsk Pioneer Palace has marked its 50th anniversary, nowadays 5870 children from the age of five to 18 attend more than 300 different societies, hobby groups and amateur theatres. Business schools are very popular among teenagers, the Choir and Dance company are famous all over the Krasnoyarsk Territory, summer camping is widely used by children and their parents and there are some activities aimed at work with disabled young people. The City Palace of Culture is the main venue for the meetings of youth subculture of the city. It is primarily used by University and College students who very often organize a lot of concerts of rock and pop music, discos and evening parties, exhibitions of pictures of amateur artists. Sport provision is mainly at the Palace of Sport, where there are different kinds of sports clubs and sections where children and young people who are keen on sport can go for swimming, skating and the like.

In every district of the city there are of course the so-called Palaces of Culture, where some youth provision aiming to help young people to spend their leisure time is available, but they are not enough. As a rule meetings of teenagers in such venues occur in large sessions giving opportunity for youngsters to see and to communicate with their peers. But if a young person has got some problems with his or her parents, teachers, classmates or peers he/she will face such difficulties as to find somebody who is able to give a useful piece of advice, to help in solving his/her problem.

That is why the majority of Russian scholars more often nowadays refer to the figure of the social and youth worker in Western countries as a qualified expert in dealing with young people, who is capable of providing a disease-prevention service. Such special youth projects as for alcohol and drugs, and for crime seem to be worth considering and it would be helpful for youth workers to use them in Russia. Nowadays it is high time for the Russian youth workers to start their work with small groups of youngsters in order to cover a great number of

young people. Youth provision should be given in every yard, every school of the city. Criteria such as 'pleasure' should be taken into consideration while organizing work with young adults. By doing this urgent matters such as juvenile delinquency and boredom in leisure time can at least be decreased, even if they cannot be solved.

It is difficult to predict what shape Russian youth work will take in the future, for now it is in the process of developing its main form and content. But one thing is clear: it should be diverse, it has to embrace small groups of young people as well as the larger ones, it should be to some extent school-based and some venues must be independent. Only if the principle of differentiation and the method of individual approach are observed can we speak about the success of youth work, and about the Youth Service as 'an emergency service, that deals with young people's immediate expressed needs and problems, that deals with crisis intervention' (Popple, 1993, p.66). Only then can we convince youngsters that they are a part of the society, a part that is cared for.

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REVIEWS

Brian Corby
Child Abuse: Towards A Knowledge Base
Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993
ISBN 0-335-15747-5 (hbk)
IBSN 0-335-15746-7 (pbk)
£37.50 (hbk)
£12.99 (pbk)
pp 195

David M Cooper
Child Abuse Revisited: Children, Society and Social Work
Open University Press, 1993
ISBN 0-335-15727-0 (hbk)
ISBN 0-335-15726-2 (pbk)
£35.00 (hbk)
£11.99 (pbk)
pp 118

Roger Fuller
In Search of Prevention: The MARS Project
Avebury, 1992
£30.00 (hbk)
pp 121

CLAUDIA BERNARD

Since the early 1980s, there has been a deluge of books on child abuse and child care, all attempting in one way or another to examine the nature of the relationship between theory, policy and practice in this field. Although many of these texts raised valid points, some made little attempt to challenge or criticise existing policies. In the constantly changing area of child protection work, it is always good to see new books offering a different perspective. Some books seem to only reiterate ideas which have gone before them, and end up being just another mediocre title in the sea of child care texts. Therefore, I was curious to see what these three books had to offer in the way of advancing or challenging existing debates about child protection, and work with children and families generally.

Fuller's book is an evaluation of preventative work with children and families in one social work agency, whilst Corby and Cooper's books are re-assessments of child abuse, and consider the major theoretical debates that are important in understanding child protection work. However, Corby and Cooper's approaches differ widely. Corby's approach is to examine the research and theorizing from different academic disciplines, notably sociology, history, psychology, social policy, and medicine. He argues that these different knowledge bases have much to offer those working in the child protection field. Cooper's approach is to look at the way child abuse has been defined, and the patterns that have been created in response to this. Both books examine

issues about the historical location of child abuse work, as well as the dominant ideologies prevalent in child abuse thinking, and are therefore successful at contextualising their subject matter.

Corby's book, **Child Abuse: Towards A Knowledge Base**, has been clearly written, is easy to read, and is virtually free of jargon. The subject matter is firmly located within its broader historical, social and political contexts, and a number of existing debates have been thoroughly expanded. He begins by giving an historical account of the social construction of childhood, and examines its relation to the shifting debates about what constitutes child abuse. There are good summaries of debates about definitions, as well as others on the incidence and prevalence of abuse. Corby evaluates a range of explanatory models to explore with depth the inherent problems in operationalizing definitions of child abuse. Equal consideration is given to all aspects of child abuse, and he provides some good summaries of the major child abuse inquiries during the 1980s to highlight what lessons have been learnt from these inquiries, and to note what reforms have been brought about in child protection work.

When looking at the relationship between research policy, and practice, Corby's review of evidence and research in the child protection field is helpful. He provides a very comprehensive review of research from different disciplines and shows how they are relevant to social work. Though he is very positive about what use those in the social work field can make from these disciplines' work, he is at pains to stress that there needs to be critical evaluation of the research that is available, because of the differing value bases and theoretical standpoints that may influence outcomes. For example, he highlights the way psychologists and medical researchers have favoured a view that there is a measurable correlation between certain social and psychological factors and the propensity for abuse (page 145). He goes to great lengths to stress the limitation of this perspective.

A particular strength of Corby's book is the balanced way he has tackled issues about race, class and gender. For instance, in his analysis, he addresses the way familial ideology, which puts mothers at centre-stage, permeates the research and thinking of many of the academic disciplines he examined. He cites a number of research projects that present mothers as either 'colluding' or 'failing to protect' their children, even when their male partners were the abusers. His argument throughout is that dominant theoretical explanations of child abuse are built on historical and cultural assumptions about mothers, and that these are supported by their own underlying theoretical explanations. His handling of anti-racist practice in this area is also done well. He refers to theoretical works which explain the patterns of abuse but do not recognise or examine the extent to which race shapes the experiences of black children and their families. He examines the way a number of texts deal with race only in away that reinforces stereotypical assumptions. His discussion not only helps further the debate, but examines why such debates are ignored in theory and practice. Overall, his discussion here provides sound pointers towards a better deal for black children and their families.

In Child Abuse Revisited, Cooper attempts an evaluation of child abuse work in Britain since the 1970s. He examines the way child abuse is defined, and how social and political forces have influenced the patterns of our responses to it. Topics discussed include: the moral panic about child abuse; the relationship between child care legislation and child abuse; the historical development of state social workers in the child care field; the gap between the rhetoric and practice of working in partnership with parents; the importance of the child's voice; and the challenges facing social work and its impact on child protection work. Overall, he manages to impart some core knowledge about child abuse.

One of the book's greatest strengths is the illuminating chapter on partnership with parents. Here he locates his analysis in relation to some of the issues raised by Cleveland, Orkney, and Rochdale. He argues that the debates prior to major legislative reforms in this field were influenced by a number of factors, including, incidents in Cleveland and pressure groups such as Parents Against Injustice (PAIN).

I particularly liked his use of fiction to illustrate his discussion of the different components of child abuse. It is pleasing to see this in an academic text, as surprisingly little use is made of fiction in most theorizing of child abuse. Some of the most powerful images of child abuse can be found in fiction and auto-biographical works. For instance, some of the works of Maya Angelou, Alice Walker and Toni Morrison, to name but a few, all give testimony to the strength of literary images. Cooper's use of passages from *The Famished Road* by Ben Okri greatly enhanced this text, and gave it a pleasant difference.

Though Cooper addresses issues around class, gender and race, he does not examine them in a way that I felt was convincing. There were two things in particular that troubled me. Firstly, in his discussion about race and gender perspectives, he refers to these as the major 'ISMS' in social work (page 41). This immediately struck me as dismissive. I was left thinking that Cooper maybe feels he cannot ignore these perspectives, and felt obliged to include at least a tokenistic item about them. Although he acknowledges that feminist perspectives in particular have helped to shape current thinking in child sexual abuse work, I was still left thinking that he does not seriously value this perspective due to his dismissive labelling.

Secondly, he mentions ideas of anti-racist perspective, but does not consider these issues in any depth so as to add new insights into this area of work. He points out that debates about anti-racism have contributed greatly to how we construct definitions of child abuse (page 56), but he does not go on to show us how. Cooper therefore offers no new ideas to help practitioners develop the skills and knowledge necessary to understand the processes and factors which may influence the responses of black children and their families to child abuse.

What he does have to say about an anti-racist perspective appears as criticism that is not constructive, nor is it backed up with examples. He implies that an anti-racist perspective is too political, and suggests that its proponents are over-zealous practitioners. This comes across in his dis-

cussion about the language that is used (page 42). I was left thinking that Cooper believes that any perspective that makes its value base explicit, especially one that challenges the status quo, is seen as political and invalid. Those perspectives which do not make their value base explicit or present themselves as neutral are not charged with being political.

Notwithstanding these omissions, Cooper's book is useful in terms of providing a comprehensive analysis of child protection policies and their impact on child protection work, and will be helpful for all those struggling to make sense of child protection work.

Fuller's book,**In Search of Prevention**, is concerned with an often neglected area of social work: evaluating preventive work in practice. Fuller documents and analyses the findings of an empirical study of the **MOBILE.. ..ACTION....RESOURCE....SERVICE (M.A.R.S)** Project, a child care unit in the city of Dundee. This project is managed by Barnado's, and is jointly funded by Barnado's and Tayside Regional Council. A central aim of Fuller's book is to evaluate an aspect of social work with children and families who had experienced some unsuccessful intervention in the past by a range of conventional social welfare agencies (page 1). He examines the concept of prevention in social work, and attempts to measure the outcomes of effectiveness in practice which had some defined aims.

A strength of Fuller's work is that he addresses the interlocking complications involved in measuring the effectiveness of outcomes. Methodological difficulties are explored, and he highlights the complexities involved in researching the intangible concept of prevention. A very positive feature of this book is that it incorporates the viewpoints of clients as well as professionals.

Perhaps the most troubling limitation of this book is that Fuller fails to reach clear conclusions as to the effectiveness of validity of the work he carried out. This can be best summed up in his assertion that 'how useful it is to describe the Project as engaged in preventive work is, perhaps, in the eye of the beholder; (page 100). He alludes to the idea that maybe the concept of prevention is not an easy one to research, but also that his research methodology failed to tie down the concept and measure the outcomes (page 101). What he does mange to highlight is that there is still much to be learnt in researching the area of preventive services, because prevention is not an easy concept to measure.

Additionally, I felt another important element was lacking in Fuller's analysis of his work. Considering this is research that sets out to evaluate the effectiveness of the service and sought clients' views, it would have been helpful to have had some examination of issues concerning client empowerment and the power of the professionals involved. Working-class families are a prime site for social work intervention, and a major locus of state surveillance, and it could be argued that social work is used to regulate family life. Some discussion to show how practitioners considered this, both in terms of their impact on the families, and in terms of the choices that were open to families to influence the service they received,

would have been helpful. Analysis of these issues would have given new insights into the social worker-client relationship.

Despite omissions in each, these three books will be important additions to the existing body of work in the child protection and child care field. They have all addressed issues that will continue to preoccupy theory and practice in this area of work. Both Corby and Cooper's texts provide very good reviews of research and theory in child protection work. Fuller's book is useful for the way it pursues the concerns it addressed, and whilst aimed at an academic audience, this book will also be of interest to the research-minded practitioner. All three books are useful additions to child care literature, and provide some pointers for practitioners to work effectively. They will also be of interest to those involved in social work education and training.

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Barbara Tizard/Ann Phoenix
Black, White or Mixed Race
Routledge Press 1993
ISBN 0-415-08879 8/9
£35.00 (hbk)
£11.99 (pbk)
pp 192

BEVERLEY PREVATT GOLDSTEIN

This book has two main aims and their interaction is an important consideration. In the introduction to the last chapter the authors summarise it thus: 'The main aims of the research reported in this book were to explore the racial identities of young people of mixed black and white parentage...'. However in their first chapter and throughout the book the authors address their other main aim, 'A major aim of our study was to examine the assumptions underlying the social work policy that mixed-parentage children in care should be adopted or fostered only in black or racially mixed families'.

The latter aim clearly structured the process of the research and the questions asked, all of which appear to be in the context of challenging the social work policy quoted above. The viewpoint of the authors can be inferred from the questions selected, the language, quotations and research mentioned e.g. there is no mention of the conflicting evidence from the young people in 'Black and in Care' and the one press quote is of a 'bizarre' proposal by a spokesman for Liverpool City Council sup-

porting a placement in a family of similar background, quoted from the Daily Telegraph. It would have helped the reader set the arguments in context if the authors had been more explicit about their perspective.

Another area that needs to be clarified is, that despite the fact that one of the authors and many of the interviews are black, this book is largely written from a non-Black perspective. We are generally given less information about the views of black people than white e.g. on attitudes to people of mixed black and white parentage, on being with someone of a different colour, or the subsequent problems in the 'mixed' marriage, on whether they had regrets. This is due to the limitations in the available literature as well as the sample in this research but the effect on the reader in continuing the marginalisation of Black people still needs to be noted. While we are told the number of black parents prejudiced against white people and the number of Black and white parents prejudiced against African-Caribbeans and Africans, we are not told the number of white parents prejudiced against black people. Overall this non-Black perspective leads to some positive assumptions for which there is sometimes no evidence, e.g. in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain 'not all, not the majority shared the views that black people are subhuman', but perhaps most worryingly it leads to statements contradicted by events over the last few years. Statements on 'the increasing liberalisation of white attitudes', 'changed societal attitudes to mixed marriages', 'anti-racist ethos in some London schools', deny the reality of the politically induced pressures on schools which militate against this ethos and the well documented rise in both the vicious and politically acceptable faces of racism.

Providing the reader is clear about the framework of this book there are many positive aspects. The book is well structured with clear headings and summaries within each chapter. The statistical information is included in an appendix, and the authors carefully explain their research methods and its limitations. The authors address, as well as class, the effect of school and neighbourhood. They lead the reader logically through the results of their research and their argument. Tizard and Phoenix grapple with both fundamental definitions e.g. 'race' and the complexities of identity, culture and coping strategies. They carefully explore individual differences and show considerable empathy. They also usefully summarise existing historical information on people with one black and one white parent.

The research itself gives us much important information on the experiences of young people with one Black and one white parent, providing we recognise the limitations of the sample. The sample consisted of 58 young people, with 61 percent being from Class 1 and 2, and of 18 parents, with the majority being white, middle class women, sending their children to independent schools. Some of the crucial findings are that 85 percent of the sample (admitted to be a likely under-representation because of the gender imbalance in the sample) had experienced racism in one form or another and that 60 percent of the young people had a positive identity (the authors include one person who thought of themselves as white in this category),

another 20 percent were not proud of their colour, another 20 percent had what the authors term a 'problematic' identity. This is the category most people would refer to as negative, i.e. often including wishing to be another colour. Tizard and Phoenix include a wealth of other information around identity, naming , affiliation, culture; and a mass of co-relations are supplied. They emphasise the high co-relation between attending a multi-racial school and having a positive identity.

In summarising their findings Tizard and Phoenix draw conclusions and then make recommendations to parents, government statisticians, schools and fostering and adoption agencies. This is a very helpful process. However these recommendations both benefit from the care with which the authors have tackled complex issues e.g. multiple and varied identities and cultures and suffer from the limitations of their research and their perspectives.

Their recommendations to government statisticians benefit from the value they place on each individual view point. The suggestion that space is created for self-identification and multiple identities and cultures could usefully be considered by anyone involved in monitoring or census data. However the issue of the purpose of the data and its link with categories used, is not addressed in this book.

The recommendations to parents benefit similarly from the care taken with individual complexities, and suffer similarly from the lack of a political context. The authors do very helpfully introduce the concept that identities are likely to change but do not address which identities or communities are most likely to be supportive as the young people move out of their relatively protected worlds and encounter more racism. They seem unaware of the real costs of some of the strategies or that discrimination makes the strategy of private education or excellence unavailable to many.

But Tizard and Phoenix devote most space in their recommendations to issues concerned with adoption and fostering, the real agenda of this book. However their sample can with difficulty support the number of variables involved, which include class, gender, school, neighbourhood of young person as well as politicisation of parent and amount of communication about 'race'. Many other significant variables e.g. gender of parent and relationship between each parent and child, were omitted. The consequence is that conclusions are drawn as to the irrelevance of a Black parent on the positive identity and coping strategies of young people with one black and one white parent from a sample where the Black parent is more likely to be male (likely to be less involved in parenting), upper class, sending their children to predominantly white, independent schools, living in predominantly white areas, while the white parent (often single) is more likely to be in a working class area, sending their children to multiracial schools and themselves 'politicised'.

Their recommendations to fostering and adoption agencies are based largely on the above conclusion. They ignore the reality that fostering and adoption involve issues that are additional to birth parenting and overlook

the varied strengths of Black people and Black communities, because they do not form part of their unrepresentative sample. Therefore the authors do not provide the evidence to challenge the attempts by some agencies to place children with one Black parent in families with one Black parent. They do however encourage, albeit from a small sample, those agencies who carefully assess each potential carer to continue to look at a wider range of issues. Some of these issues could be the need for the carers to be politicised, able to communicate about dealing with racism, and the likelihood of anti-racist, multiracial schools being used.

There are recommendations, additional to the ones suggested by Tizard and Phoenix, but also supported by this research, that can be offered both to parents and youth and community workers. This is about the reality of racism for this group, the need for communication about coping strategies and the value of providing environments that are not all white. There is a message to parents, schools and youth groups to challenge racism; to affirm those young people who have achieved a positive identity and to support those who are struggling. The painful and devastating impact of racism needs to be recognised and links made with Black Communities who have practical experience of those coping strategies, outlined by Tizard and Phoenix, as well as an understanding of their real costs.

While this book offers a clear structure, an analysis of some complex issues, and some useful insights into the feelings and experiences of a small group of young people with one Black and one white parent, it needs to be read with an awareness of both the limitations of the sample and the perspectives of the authors. The reader needs to be particularly wary of being swayed by the findings of a small and unrepresentative sample into joining the authors and the popular press in their attack on the attempts by some agencies to place children with one Black parent in substitute homes with one Black parent. This is particularly critical at a time when draft legislation is being considered to reverse these attempts. The current legislation: The Children Act and Handbook of Guidance volume 3, gives a clear mandate to Local Authorities to take account of 'race' and culture, and also to prepare young people while in care for their life after care. The reader may also wish to refer to the British Association for Fostering and Adoption's Practice Notes on 'The Placement Needs of Black Children' where this complex issue is clearly addressed and many of the questions posed by the authors answered.

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REVIEWS

Lawrence M. Brammer
The Helping Relationship: Process And Skills
Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1993
Fifth Edition
ISBN 0-205-14538-8
pp 187

JOHN HORNCASTLE

Readers are not advised to study this book alone or unsupervised. However, the health warning, for such it is, can equally be applied to many books of this genre in that they appear to take little notice of what we have now come to regard as a pivotal element of social work training in the U.K. - the integration of a gender and race perspective. 'A helping approach called feminist counselling has arisen' Brammer informs us in one paragraph, but there is no evidence in the rest of the book that this approach has influenced his philosophy or examples from practice. There is a slightly greater acknowledgement of the importance of cultural factors and the need for helpers to address their ethnocentrism, but again readers are referred on to specialist reading. These omissions may reflect the date of publication of the book's first edition (1973), or the fact that most literature in the general area of Helping or Counselling appears to suffer from what might be termed the Hoover Syndrome (preference for inventing a working vacuum).

The proliferation of formal counselling as an activity, and the burgeoning of associated literature has been seen as a source of concern by analysts such as James Hillman. When there are at times more therapists than plumbers in Yellow Pages, he views the activity as tending to internalise emotions, to personalise essentially structural problems and to look backward rather than around. Democracy for him depends not on the skills learnt in therapy - feeling and fantasy - but on an intensely active citizenry. Whatever the validity of the argument, it seems indisputable that a growing market for personal help exists, and in these needs-led times, market is boss.

Brammer's position is unusual, in that he writes from a generally 'anti-professionals' stance, taking editorial liberty to comment on their interdisciplinary disputes, elaborate entrance rituals and dominant power position. He seeks not to mystify, but to offer a clear and handy guide mainly to nonspecialists in caring occupations. In this quest his choice of title is significant and no doubt deliberate, choosing to reject more fashionable and pretentious terms such as counselling. However, such is the rampant definition confusion in this area that he can use the same word - help - and yet be light years away from the social skills model offered by Priestley and McGuire (1983); at the same time offering a depth of approach to relationships more akin to Nelson-Jones (1988).

The book is a wide-ranging manual of, essentially, 'counselling' skills, designed for use as a self-teaching tool or in training groups. Its language is unusually clear (disproving the old saw that the United States and England are two countries separated by a common language), though the mention of potential litigation sets its provenance as clearly trans-Atlantic. It seems less flaccid than Egan, with helpful summaries at the conclusion to each

section; regular, brief exercises are set to encourage readers to test their understanding, but the impression given is not one of didacticism.

There are conventional chapters on the stages of the helping process, the identification and development of helping skills, and more active, behavioural approaches. In addition, there is mention of a number of ancillary resources, such as self-help groups, or Zen, and the whole is supported by numerous research references and suggestions for further study.

However, there are more unusual and appealing elements: for example, an excellent section on the development of strategies for helping with loss and crisis, and (to warm the cockles of teachers' hearts everywhere) a very accessible chapter on the need for, and ways of developing, a personal theory of helping. But the most impressive aspect of the book is that the author has really succeeded in distilling years of experience of teaching and practice into an approachable and apparently uncluttered tome. He portrays 'helping with a human face', enhanced by instances of the use of common sense. for example, he suggests that workers should not always encourage 'helpees' to ventilate their feelings, and offers guidelines for recognising inappropriate occasions; a further feature is the inclusion of a sensitive formula for giving feedback.

While Brammer does not specifically discuss empowerment - again, presumably, a sign of the book's age - it is clear from his approach that he considers the needs of the helpee as paramount and frequently stresses the need for openness between helper and helped, as when formulating a reward system in a behavioural approach. And, while the book is principally for paraprofessionals, it nevertheless is grounded in a highly ethical value system. Helpers are also encouraged to consider their own life experiences from time to time, and in particular their reasons for wanting to help.

In all, this is an accessible, user-friendly book with a good selection of ideas, despite the fact that it is written from a narrow, rather sanitised perspective, where all parties involved inhabit a relatively affluent stratum of U.S. society. And, although written for the non-professional, U.K. social workers will find much that is stimulating and useful, even in the current purchaser/provider atmosphere.

Finally, although Brammer is occasionally acerbic about the protectionism, power-seeking and control of qualified workers, he recommends professional supervision for his helpers so that they can develop a sense of appropriate responsibility and 'distance' (and hopefully some more relevant equal opportunities perspectives). I certainly approve of this involvement, but there again, as a professional, I would, wouldn't I?

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Hillman, James and Ventura, Michael (1992), *We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World's Getting Worse.* Harper, San Francisco

Nelson-Jones, Richard (1988), *Practical Counselling and Helping Skills,* Cassell, London.

Priestley, Philip and McGuire, James (1983), *Learning to Help,* Tavistock, London.

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Sylvia West
Educational Values for School Leadership
Kogan Page 1993
ISBN 0-7494-0839-1
£14.95
pp160

Nicholas Foskett (ed)
Managing External Relations in Schools
Routledge 1993
ISBN 0-415-06834-7
£13.99
pp256

TONY JEFFS

These are depressing books - profoundly depressing. Not, I must quickly add, for the usual reasons that most of us might acquire a pervasive feeling of melancholy from a book. They do not discuss unpleasant subjects nor seek to challenge hard won prejudices. Actually the last thing any of the writers want to do is upset anyone and there in lies the root cause of the depression. These left me downcast precisely because they are so smug, self-satisfied and comfortable. Here is the new educational orthodoxy; it is timid and it is servile. In the post-Baker, post-1988 world described here Uriah Heep would be a front-runner for any headship.

It is difficult to grasp what West is trying to achieve with her book apart from telling anyone who'll listen just what a marvellous and super job she is doing at her school. The book is very much in the 'watch me folks and you'll see just how the new super-manager operates' style. A genre which at the moment, as any fleeting visit to the education section in your local bookshop will confirm, is flavour of the month with publishers. At the heart of the book lies an unassailable belief in the idea of leadership, the divine right of the Headteacher to rule and a conviction that the best heads will be those who most approximate to her approach.

Four modes of Headship are identified: the *reactive* who merely follows the crowd; the *closet* who although unhappy with mainstream values lacks the guts to oppose them; the *oasis* who achieves 'value congruence internal to the school' but either fails or can't be bothered to convince the outside world that they are the right values; finally we are offered the *proactive* who 'comes up-front with his or her values and attempts to involve parents more in the debate' (p.34). These are illustrated via a series of interviews with headteachers and governors. The models are a sham constructed in order to enable 'new improved brand X' *proactive* head to appear the only feasible option. Each ignores the reality that most headteachers are highly pragmatic. That like Youth Officers and other educational managers they slip from one style to another according to the needs of the moment. As anyone who has spent any time researching schools or informal educational practice knows instinctively - anything a manager tells you must always be care-

fully checked out. When all schools perceive themselves to be locked into a battle for survival then each will seek to portray the best possible image. It has become so much second-nature that few managers are now aware that they are selling you the party line. Only by measuring what they say against their practice, in particular how they treat and speak to subordinates, and by questioning colleagues and students can any sort of worthwhile evaluation take place.

Largely absent from the book is any evidence of what junior staff (those that do the teaching and the menial work) or students think. Both appear to be groups that are o.k. as long they are content to follow their leader. They are to be managed, led and manipulated but not to be given power or authority. The students in particular are seen as the appendages of the customers, their parent(s), or worse as walk-on publicity aids who when required speak their lines and tell the world what a wonderful job the head is doing. West warns us that no school is safe from political activities. She is right but sadly seems more concerned about those in the community who might challenge the Head than those in Whitehall. The former might be an irritant but the latter with their centralised control over curriculum and funding are now seriously dangerous. Their agenda is to eradicate any agency that prevents them creating an educational system that serves their narrow ideological ends. If that means destroying local democracy and the teacher trade unions so be it. Sadly far too many headteachers and youth officers are delighted to collaborate if it means they no longer have to endure interference from elected councillors or unions. This is not surprising because the authoritarian style of the government matches in most cases the management approach they seek to enforce within their own fiefdom. This book is a must for those who have decided to wholeheartedly collaborate. It will help then erase away nagging doubts about what they are doing and construct a fresh set of values to suit every new circumstance.

Foskett has likewise produced a book that has a ready market. One full of usefull hints on how to sell your school and help put your competitor out of business. The reader is advised how to exploit the community, form alliances with anyone with money (and eskew those who might be a drain on resources) and market the school like a hamburger. Although a few of the contributors retain some commitment to education they are swamped by the majority, by rabbits who really are capable of believing anything they are told. One, for example, tells us that 'control of the curriculun has moved into the hands of the schools and away from Higher education... Teachers and schools are now at the helm of the school curriculum' (p.90-91). Another that for FE 'marketing has provided a vital and liberating force that has benefited colleges and students alike' (p.88). Really? I tried to square this with the behaviour of one local college that sent a member of staff during enrolment week to fly post the bus shelters outside a 'rival college'. Or the head of department who shouted at a colleague that it was 'time she stopped going on about education and woke up to the fact she was working in a business now'. Or the recruitment of students for a franchised programme without any investment in books or journals. Foskett

introduces us here to individuals who will market anything and exploit every angle for financial gain. It is not a pleasant encounter.

After prolonged contact with these texts an antidote was desperately needed. The solution was simple - I reached for a short essay by Bertrand Russell entitled *Competition in Education*. Like a preceeding one *Patriotism in Education* this is a withering attack on the type of unquestioning acceptance of the status quo which pervades these texts. It is difficult to imagine Russell, if he were alive today, having much patience with those who seek value congruence, construct Mission Statements or aim for uniformity via TQM and similar garbage. You see be believed that the presence of competition in education even if useful was not

> *in itself admirable, since the emotions with which it is connected are the emotions of hostility and ruthlessness. The conception of society as an organic whole is very difficult for those whose minds have been steeped in competive ideas. Ethically, therefore, no less that economically, it is undesireable to teach the young to be competitive.*

Thank you Bertrand. Now before I put you back on the shelf let me see what you would have made of a youth work curricuulum, a National Funding Agency, a National Curriculum emphasizing Christian...

Tony Jeffs University of Northumbria

Igor Kon and James Riordan (eds)
Sex and Russian Society
Pluto Press 1993
ISBN 0-7453-0683-7
ISBN 0-7453-0684-5 (pbk)
pp 163

CAROL PACKHAM

You may think what has this got to do with me or youth work. This was certainly part of my initial reaction when asked to review this book. However, it has great relevance not just for those who work with young people, but also to all affected by the debates around democracy and freedom and, particularly, about the changing role of women in society.

This collection of seven essays by Russian and European 'Russian experts', in Psychology, Sociology & Sexology, charts the rapid change in sexual attitudes and behaviour, particularly post 1985. The book along with other recent works such as the BBC *Omnibus* programme (the Russian Striptease Nov 93) illustrates how attitudes and behaviour are

controlled and often determined by state and institutional policies. Also how 'freedom' is culturally specific and relative to former experience. Whereas 'it has never occurred to Russians that women won't work' making the emancipation and equal opportunities struggle of the West inappropriate in Russia; women in Russia are now taking up what have historically been viewed as the shameful and exploitative occupations of prostitution, (and striptease) as lucrative and legitimised occupations.

The move towards a free market economy and democratisation has resulted in the removal of communist ideologies which submerged sex to the collective goal of labour and production. The removal of censorship laws have resulted in free availability of sexually explicit material'; everything for everybody'. Now sexual freedom is regarded by many Russians as a sign of liberation - 'one look at people's attitudes to sex and you know their attitude to democracy' (Sergei Orgarkov).

This book charts the historical development of these attitudes and behaviour, particularly in relation to women, young people and 'sexual minorities'.

Pre perestroika the church then the state are said to have suppressed all but marital sex, this has led to great ignorance. The Russian Revolution of 1917 allowed abortion on demand and decriminalised homosexuality but 'free love' was mainly enjoyed by 'liberated intellectuals'. By 1934-6 Stalin's drive for a larger workforce resulted in the criminalisation of male homosexuality and abortion and an end to sex education. Stalinist principles decreed that the individual desires (sex) were thought to distract the masses from collective ideological struggle. Meanwhile however the party elite lead lives of sexual 'debauchery'. In the 1970s the moral climate slowly changed - but 'the long years of repression have taken their toll - the sexual revolution is today taking place in an environment of social, political, economic and moral crisis and amongst a sexually ignorant conservative, and fundamentally sexist population ...'. 'The new thinking presents a threat to firm traditional law and order and security' (Riordan).

Many of the consequences of the years of sexual neglect and repression are dealt with in this book.

The psychologist *Igor Kon* (the book's co-author) is a campaigner for the decriminalisation of homosexuality and his two chapters present an historical overview of sexuality and of the status of gays and lesbians in Russian and Soviet society - 'who are systematically discriminated against, victimised and humiliated' - who many believe have an inborn or socially conditioned mental disorder - and who can damage and pervert children.

Russia now has the highest rate of abortion in the world (on average 2 or 3 per woman). The chapter by *Larrisa Remennick* (an expert on Reproductive Health) studies patterns of birth control 'showing the high cost paid by women and society for the long reliance on abortion. The lack of condoms (an average 3 per year per man!), other means of birth control' and inadequate information and incompetence. *Lynne Attwood* (one of the most authoritative Western writers on Soviet women) details

the Development of sexual pornography in film from the virtually sexless films before 1985 to the 'Perestrokia situation' of the 'virtually obligatory' feature of the sex act. Since the end of censorship so called 'erotic scenes' have been included, but they are usually of rape and other violence towards women.

The other result of the end of censorship is the increase in beauty contests and striptease shows in the name of 'erotic art'. Many involved in these areas of 'art' viewed the result of communist ideologies as producing a 'whole generation of masculine women'. They argue these new 'art forms' are in no way related to prostitution or the oppression of women and that 'we suggest (women) see their bodies as art not commodity'. However, it is difficult to do otherwise when for many women economic necessity has given them little choice and when it is known that 'a Russian prostitute earns more in a day than a Russian professor in a month'. These women become bread winners for the family and have the added opportunities of travel to the West - the dream of many post Perestroika young people.

Elizabeth Waters - who has written widely on women and the family and social problems in Russia and the USSR traces the evolution of beauty contests since 1988 and discusses the dilemma they pose for a society in transition from its puritanical past to market driven future. *Dr Sergei Golod* has written about the remarkable changes in young people's sexual behaviour and attitudes in recent years. He shows how young people's rebellion against the old 'morality' has resulted in considerable sexual promiscuity. This coupled with the total lack of sex and AIDS education has resulted in a high incidence of venereal disease, HIV, AIDS and pregnancy amongst young people. The breakdown in morality and the crisis in society is also discussed as a cause of higher juvenile delinquency, general crime and violence with a particularly high increase in sexual violence against women by young men. This would not seem altogether unexpected. The role of women in new Russian society has changed so dramatically from that of the comrade worker of equal worth to that of object and victim of sexual 'freedom'. Coupled with this I was informed by several people on a recent visit to St Petersburg (Leningrad) that the increase in juvenile crime was the result of women being economically forced to go out to work and so leaving their adolescent children neglected.

Traditional family values are still very much to the fore and there is little evidence in this book of the structural analysis of the causes of discrimination and oppression. For example, Golod notes the lack of a women's movement and uses a Freudian analysis of the causes of male violence. This pathologising of recent trends in sexual activity as opposed to locating in a structural context is epitomized in the emergence of medical sexology and sexopathology (of which *Lev Scheglov* writes).

The book as well as identifying the problematic consequences of an unplanned leap into sexual freedom discusses some of the recent developments in sex education and research (particularly sexology).

However, the authors state that in the absence of support for sex education from the authorities the way forward is being shown by voluntary trusts and charities. Following this they make a plea for research material or opportunities and publishing arrangements outside of the 'new Commonwealth'.

My Russian visit left me feeling regret at the outright rejection of many communist principles and practices and at the blind acceptance of all that is Western in the name of democracy and the free market economy. This book reminds us that we have a lot to learn from each other's experience. This, however, is not the only reason the authors urge us to take note of what is taking place in Russia and give our assistance. Igor Kon states 'we are certainly not as great as we once pretended, yet we are a very big country that cannot be ignored. In the final count it has to be said that our problems are your problems too'.

Reference

BBC *Omnibus* 'The Russian Striptease', November 1993.

Carol Packham Manchester Metropolitan University Faculty of Community Studies, Law and Education

Jerry Wellington
The Work Related Curriculum
Kogan Page 1993
ISBN 0-7494-0601-1
pp 268

BRYAN LANGLEY

Although this is a well-written, soundly researched, comprehensible book, I hope I never have the misfortune to read another one like it. Publications such as this are painful on two counts; firstly it reminds me of the period when jocular Jim Callaghan was destroying the Labour party, secondly (and much more important) was preparing education for slaughter on the altar of Tory dogma. I well remember the outrage I felt about the Ruskin speech in 1976. In my experience, industry was in no way handicapped by the failure of schools to provide a skilled work-force. At that time I was working as a careers teacher and can swear that for every worthwhile job vacancy there were several well-qualified, suitable young candidates. Certainly, the most academically gifted stayed full-time within the realms of Higher Education, and surely the self-esteem generated by comprehensive schools greatly increased this band. There was much to do e.g. making school really meaningful to non-academic youngsters, but progress was being made. By the middle 1970s, contrary to the popular mythology of wet, trendy, loony socialist teachers (William Tynedale has a lot to

answer for), schools were in the main, happy, creative, optimistic places. Change was properly structured and paced. By the time HMI, DES, LEAs, school governors and headteachers agreed on an initiative, it was statistically probable that misconceptions, mistakes and impracticalities would have been removed from schemes. It still seems amazing to me, that an HMI Curriculum Publication Group could begin work in April 1975, and proceed throughout the time of Ruskin and Keith Joseph, without reference to these events (and in turn be completely ignored by both political parties). The document they produced (Curriculum 11-16 Towards a statement of entitlement - 1983. HMSO ISBN 0-11-270537-5), remains to me a shining beacon of civilisation, illuminating the dark ages - an educational relic of a bygone age, a veritable Book of Kells.

Building on the conceptual analysis of profound thinkers, it offered the opportunity to convert rhetoric into reality. Based as it was on genuine partnerships (mainly teachers !! LEA advisers! and HMI), it flew the flag of 'Areas of Curricular Experience' (Aesthetic/Creative, Ethical, Linguistic, Mathematical, Physical, Scientific, Social/Political and Spiritual), and framed a working definition of what young people could expect from their secondary schooling:

> *Pupils have common needs to develop, with maximum enjoyment, the skills and attitudes necessary for their INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY now and in the future. For work and political and social participation in the democratic society to which they belong. They face the common experience of living in a world which is increasingly international, multi-ethnic and interdependent both economically and politically. Their curriculum should be based on a common framework which provides coherence, and while taking account of INDIVIDUAL NEEDS AND ABILITIES, still ensures the provision of a broadly based common experience.*

I do not know any teacher who would deny youngsters access to the development of knowledge, skills and concepts appropriate to the world of work. I know several employers of the Thatcherite, pitbull pedigree who would deny youngsters the joy of learning - especially if it endowed them with the foolish expectation of being treated with employment dignity and being paid a decent wage. Jerry Wellington blends an idiosyncratic group of authors into a cohesive, lively team. The publication is organised into five closely linked sections:

The Evolution of the Work Related Curriculum
Education for Employment
New Technology and the Vocational Imperative
Student Identity of the Work Related Curriculum
The Education - Work Relationship for the Future.

In general, the book is crammed with fascinating facts presented in table after table. Especially worthy of close scrutiny, are those on ITEC Rationale p149, Vocational Education versus Liberal Education p.228, and the Chart of Occupational Employment - 1971- 2000.

The establishment and demise of TVEI is entertainingly described. A weird, unholy alliance of Mr 'Bun' (then Minister for Information Technology), David Young and Keith Joseph, impatient with DES Civil Service dithering bought the secondary curriculum for a 'mess of pottage' (very appropriate, since TVEI was freely based upon the Hebrew charity - Organisation for Rehabilitation through Training). How strange that Mrs Thatcher should be sold on TVEI, proclaim it a success and allocate £900 million to an extension phase in 1986, BEFORE the evaluation of the pilot phase had been completed. Indeed, Carole Fitz-Gibbon was already indicating that TVEI as a 14-18 project was not tenable, since YTS was offering stipends to leave the programme at 16! By 1986, just as TVEI money was becoming Kosher, the years were being rolled back by the implementation of the reactionary National Curriculum ; the two could not be easy bed-fellows, thus raising the notion that education has not been deeply thought through by successive Secretaries of State. Anne Jones (ex Headteacher, and by 1987 MSC Education Programmes Director), always adept at circus riding two horses, found that too many schools had shown 80s enterprise, taken TVEI money for non Youngsian projects, AND that contemporary gimmickry associated with TVEI did not fit Baker's World. She was having trouble:

> *Justifying to the Treasury what was distinctive about TVEI. There was a danger that the Initiative had become TOO EDUCATIONAL (sic), not work related enough to fit within the Department of Employment.*

Always the opportunist, Jones then claimed (no doubt as her job was disappearing), that the National Curriculum would collapse without TVEI, 'take the Initiative away, and its nothing more than a 1957 grammar school curriculum'.

The obscenity and degradation of school-employer compacts is noted, especially, just as for TVEI its virtues were being extolled by the cabinet BEFORE formal evaluation. The book concludes that in times of mass youth employment the gimmick of promising jobs to those who work hard at school doesn't immediately look like a winner!

I did enjoy Wellington's review of City Technology Colleges - those Tory Beacons of Excellence. The Government spent £33 million on 3 CTCs i.e. that is £3 million more than on the introduction of National Curriculum into all remaining secondary schools in England and Wales.

Carpeted, computerised, superbly staffed, civilised, Wellington has nothing but praise. But then, what about the 3 out of 4 rejected applicants, oh, and the rest of our school population. Could it be that most, if not all schools would flourish if properly funded:

> *If all comprehensive schools were designed, modernised and equipped to this level, we could then truly have secondary education for the information age.*

It is valuable indeed to have this assertion made public.

Just as encouraging, is the statement that the notion of transferability of skills from school to work has never been proven, i.e. learning is for learning. It confirms as a myth the notion of transition from school to work. Transition from school to unemployment,now that's a different matter.

There are several amusing aspects of the book, e.g. the arrogance of Tony Watts in the chapter 'Connecting Curriculum to Work' where he is the author (or part author) of every reference

There is also the usual gratuitous gibberish:

> *The difficult task facing each programme is to ensure that curriculum change remains the subject of its own objectives.*

Last but not least, Wellington talking about Baker setting up a string of Information Technology Centres from Scotland to Northumberland!

I hope this finally rolls the rock across the tomb of Vocationalism. It certainly has the weight and substance, for most of us in education, we cannot know for sure what we are doing.

With W.B. Yeats, we are dropping berries into the streams and perhaps catching little silver trout. Gillian Clarke in her poem 'Miracle on St David's Day' (Letter from a Far Country) shows clearly the abstract, indefinite, infinite nature of education, when a 'big, dumb, silent, labouring man' rediscovers a voice lost for 40 years when he recites 'The Daffodils':

> *Since the dumbness of misery fell*
> *He has remembered there was a music of speech and that once he had something to say.*

Is the time ripe for educationalists, as one body, to similarly, miraculously recall the 1983 Statement of Curricular Entitlement.

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Roger Greenaway
Playback: A Guide to Reviewing Activities
The Award Scheme Ltd 1993
ISBN 0-905425-09-X
£7.99 (pbk)

STEVE BARRIGAN

Designed as a practical handbook, the author introduces us to *Playback* in a style that encourages workers to 'review activities in ways which stimulate and support personal and social development'. The collection

of techniques and methods presented are for use by anyone using activities with young people in a multitude of settings ranging from exercises, games and sports, to expeditions, residentials and work experiences.

Stressing the importance of reviewing, Greenaway challenges some assumptions about reviewing and moves the reader to consider not only using discussion or analysis of mistakes and ways ahead, but to place more value on the learning outcomes of a review. The description of a four stage sequence in the early part of the book is a good starting point for facilitators, but could have been extended with more detail. However, the question of how much reviewing should take place and the terminology and purpose associated again encourages us to include reviewing on our agendas.

By attempting to separate the overlap between evaluation and reviewing the learning aspects are again highlighted. The idea that young people should express themselves more and provide evidence of their learning and development serves as a worthwhile reminder as to why we work with young people. It should, as the author points out, help to make evaluation easier which could be a welcome bonus to us all. Easier said than done and although Greenaway's statements are convincing, more examination on this separation would help to carry it further.

As we move into the main part of the book the theory behind reviewing slots into place. There are ideas and practical considerations in the 'Methods' section that are well thought out and detailed. They are presented through an index which is both effective and clear. Stages of reviewing helps the worker to plan with consideration to the individual and group and could also help maximise learning outcomes. An overlapping style of categories broadens the potential for review and the quick reference chart may help the facilitator choose at a glance which method would be most useful. There are symbols to highlight plus and minus points along with 'interesting' points which increase the potential use of the exercises.

The range of methods offered to the reader incorporate activities such as visual and expressive art, drama, feedback (giving and receiving), varieties of group discussion and individual focus. There are also ways to introduce and examine issues using various mediums which could help young people confront or discuss important aspects of their lives. Another stage encourages the use of ideas which help present ways in which people display how they want to be seen by others. This raises the opportunity to help challenge stereotypes and examines oppression and expectations. Pages turn to offer exercises which offer inroads into developing strategies which could help bring positive changes and decrease negative attitudes for individuals and groups.

There is a chapter which looks at the issues which could prevent reviews from getting started. Once again the author examines both sides of the coin and allows the reader to consider their own resistance as to

the value of the exercise and the resistance by others to take part in a review. Through raising such questions, Greenaway's section on the worries and concerns of reviewing leaves the reader with very little excuse as to why much more general reviewing of our work does not take place!

The activities and methods could be applied to most groups and consideration to new groups is pointed out.

Moving onto to examine the 'risk factors' involved, a section explores the reviewers skill and confidence and encourages people to find the right level on which to start the process. Timing of sessions and informal approaches are looked into and although I would have welcomed more emphasis on the dangers of releasing emotions the areas are highlighted. The risk factors are handled directly and sensitively and challenges on the dangers of not reviewing in a supportive atmosphere are discussed effectively.

The Playback handbook is a worthwhile resource to have access to, it could be of great use to both young people and facilitators.

Steve Barrigan, Senior Project Worker at Walker Detached Youth Project with Newcastle upon Tyne YMCA.

Des Stockley, David Canter and Daz Bishop
Young People on the Move
Psychology Department University of Surrey

BREN COOK

Young people on the move is a detailed report on a piece of research, based on the geographical area covering the counties of Surrey, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight looking at the experiences of homeless young people.

It has 12 chapters and three appendices printed in an A4 format with a liberal helping of charts and graphs.

The report starts with a summary which describes in some numerical detail the research procedure, the sample, movement of young people through to implications for young people.

There is a highly detailed description of the research procedure itself which suffers from the absence of any sense of what the research was looking at apart from a very broad idea of the homelessness of young people. If the research had any clear aims they aren't spelt out in the report which targets a group of some 87 females and 227 males with questionnaires to provide the data with which to saturate the text.

If this work was aimed at workers in the field, it missed. I approached the report with the hope that in its pages I would glean some insight into the world of homeless young people and that it would be based upon some solid evidence, I hoped that I would find something which would inform my practice or at least my understanding into the motivations of dispossessed young people but alas I was disappointed.

What I found was page after page of descriptions of statistics. Instead of letting the charts or graphs show trends and figures the authors bombarded the report with prose versions of the graphics. I found that very soon the words and numbers didn't mean very much and little stayed in my memory. At the end of each chapter there seemed to be an attempt at drawing conclusions but unfortunately there wasn't always a clear connection between the hypothesis and the evidence, as the report says in chapter 7 - *Service Families*'.... and since the study is only exploratory any conclusion must be speculative' and in conclusion to that chapter 'However, despite this speculation we do not know the reason'.

I felt like saying 'come back when things are less fuzzy and then we might have something that is useful'.

I am sure however that this research would be useful to professionals in the Surrey, Hampshire and Isle of Wight areas as the data is ever present in huge quantities and may be relevant to their situations.

Without a clarity of purpose, a profusion of raw data and little in the way of interpreting it so that mere mortal's like myself could make sense of things, it seems that this report is best confined to the psychology department at Surrey University and the immediate area involved in the research. It would have been more useful to have read about the actual stories of the people involved in the research.

Where the report does use the words of the young people involved it comes alive. It would be better if the statistics had been limited to the tables and charts and the text left to bear testimony to the actual experience of homelessness.

The problem is that it is difficult to know what the authors were intending in the first place.

The biggest part of the report is the description of the results and not being a statistician I was soon lost in the relentless parade of numbers, technical formulae and abbreviations eg;

> *There was an age variation, 37% of 16/17 year olds had been refused IS and 19% HB. Compared to 24% of 24 and older who had been refused IS and 9% HB....*

After a while I couldn't absorb any more numbers and the whole thing became meaningless, which I find sad because of the potential for a useful amount of data had been generated but not packaged in such a way that makes it accessible.

The report concludes with three recommendations marked a) to d) (sic) and they are sensible, interesting and forward looking; for example, they recommend that 'advice and counselling services for young people should be based around facilities such as coffee bars or non alcoholic pubs where young people can freely and without threat socialise with each other'.

Whilst concurring with this notion I feel that it didn't need the research to come up with it and that the other recommendations seem to have come out of the writers thoughts and conversations with professionals working with the young people rather than the research.

This is a shame because of the obvious work done in the project, and not to tie up the ends gives the whole piece a feeling of being disjointed.

The final section ends with a set of 'Basic Questions' which make some useful points about the appropriateness of bureaucracy in the caring professions and its effect on the flexibility of response to ever changing needs, and some far reaching questions about the causes of homelessness in the young of our society.

I would have liked some answers to the questions rather than being left with them and a lot of assumptions about the data.

To sum up, this work is a very specific piece and I doubt that it has a relevance beyond the boundaries of the counties and the College involved.

Bren Cook District Trainer - Preston & District Youth and Community Service

Inge Bates and George Riseborough (eds)
Youth and Inequality
Open University Press, Buckingham 1993
ISBN 0-335-15695-9
£13.99
pp 260

MARK K. SMITH

This book contains eight qualitative and ethnographic studies of different groups of young people plus an introduction by the editors and a concluding chapter by Ken Roberts on career trajectories and the mirage of increased social mobility. The research from which these pieces are derived formed part of the worthy, but hardly exciting, ESRC's 16-19 Initiative. The result is a major disappointment - with substantive theoretical questions left unaddressed, and the experiences of large numbers of young people excluded.

We get a picture of the problem in the introduction. In order to make a collection of ethnographic and qualitative studies work, the editors need to provide a substantial introduction - not so much to the studies - but to the socio-political and theoretical context in which they have been produced. They would also need to develop some theories or leading ideas about the supposed focus of the studies - youth and inequality. With a title such as this we could expect a discussion of the relations of power within a particular society or societies; a mapping of the structures of inclusion and exclusion; an exploration of who are the winners and losers; and an examination of the experiences of people within different groups. There would also have to be some problematization of the notion of youth - particularly at a moment when, according to the writers of this book, 'transitions' are subject to considerable change. Unfortunately, little is said about these things.

Things do improve as we get into the first chapter by Inge Bates - a study of the 'Care girls' - a group of young women who were on a YTS programme training mainly for jobs as care assistants in homes for older people. Bates is able to draw out some key dimensions of their working roles and experiences - such as having to deal with death, violence, incontinence etc. She then begins to address the apparent transformation in the young women's attitudes over a period of nine months to jobs that they initially viewed with abhorrence. Her focus on class-gendered cultural preparation in the family provides some useful lines for further research. What would be particularly interesting here is to explore how these may link with the formation of group and occupational cultures among the young women themselves.

In a further study (chapter 3) Bates reports on an ethnographic study of students on a BTEC national diploma in fashion design. Here she runs through the gendered appeal of fashion design, the impact of social class and family background and the role of vocational training. Again we get some sense of the process of filtering and adjustment that is vocational training -and a hint at the way in which elements may interact and interconnect. Reading these two chapters, I was left with the feeling that there was book trying to get out here. The areas of experience explored here by Bates deserve more breathing space.

Robert MacDonald provides a piece (Chapter 4) on the practice and politics of youth enterprise. He succeeds in highlighting the shameful nature of 'enterprise' policies. As he comments, 'it seems a particularly cruel form of economic policy which places the task of individual prosperity and of local economic rejuvenation squarely on the shoulders of some of those least able and qualified to take the burden' (103). If I had not already encountered MacDonald's very helpful book on this area *Risky Business. Youth and the enterprise culture* (1991 with Frank Coffield) I would probably be making a good deal more of this chapter.

Political and cultural options for A-level students provide the focus for John Quicke's chapter, 'A Yuppie Generation?' - however this paper is available

elsewhere *(Cambridge Journal of Education 21:1)*. His analysis confirms the central role that parents occupy in maintaining a student's sense of self and identity; the continuity of self-concepts; and the impact of the family experience of mobility and of social class on the emergence of a political consciousness oriented to the politics of the centre. He begins to explore the ways in which these young people define themselves 'politically' - snobs, yuppies, socialists, hippies and so on. It would be a useful addition if he could secure research funding to take this forward.

Debra Roker, in Chapter 6 examines how private education helps some young women gain the 'edge' over young people educated in state schools and colleges. In some respects, this chapter acts to confirm what we already know of the experience of private schooling - although it is possible to argue, as Roker does, that the role of the private school experience as an influence on youth socialization has largely been neglected. Several things are worth noting here. First, there is the expectation of, and planning for, career success among the families of those involved with private education. Second, there is 'the relative freedom from the constraints of gender experienced by many other groups of young girls' (130). Third, the focus on prestigious careers results in an almost total detachment from the constraints of the local labour market.

Roker's study is complimented by a chapter by Patricia Allatt on the role of family process in 'becoming privileged'. She examines how three middle-class families use their resources to enhance the life-chances of their young - and how these are mediated by family processes. This study was helpful in that it highlighted not just the significance of different forms of economic, cultural, social and emotional capital, but the ways in which certain qualities were emphasized through family practice. These included responsibility, individualism, hard work, effort and pleasure in achievement, social competence and access to critical social networks. Significantly, in the families studied emphasis was not placed on economic reward for its own sake, but on fulfilment, job satisfaction and contribution to society.

George Riseborough contributes two chapters to the book - the first is an ethnographic study of some BTEC National Diploma students; the second focuses on a group of 'YTS Boys'. I had a fundamental problem with the latter of these chapters. It basically comprises a short introduction followed by 66 (yes, sixty six) pages of what are basically transcriptions of conversations that involved the lads and their lecturers. This is indulgence on a grand scale - a waste of paper, and a waste of reader's time. The extracts are organized around the rhythm of the daily round - starting the day, break time and so on, with the voice of the researcher present as part of the recorded conversation. There is little or no critical comment. This failure by the writer to engage in an open conversation with his material is deeply problematic. Ethnographies achieve their representation of social/sociological reality not simply by transcription but by contextualization and interpretation. Readers are not onlookers but participants in an event - and if writers fail to engage with them as active makers of meaning then the result is to undermine critical reflection. As Atkinson (1990: 180) suggested in *The*

Ethnographic Imagination, ethnography requires a reflexive awareness of its own writing, the possibilities and limits of its own language, and a principled exploration of its modes of representation. This chapter is dumped on the reader with no discussion of these areas.

To round the book off Ken Roberts contributes, as might be expected, a thoroughly competent chapter on career trajectories and social mobility based on material from the ESRC 16-19 Initiative research. His main argument is that the career prospects of the young people studied had depended mainly on their social class origins. He brings out the mediating effect of neighbourhoods, private schooling, qualifications etc. and the extent to which the influence of social class is cumulative. He highlights the changes in routes into the British labour market.

Overall, the book is not helped by the focus of the study on the 16-19 age range. If we are to approach inequality we need to have some sense of young people's experiences over a wider range. Furthermore, these accounts basically deal with a fairly narrow slice of experience - further education, taking 'A' levels and participating in Youth Training. We get little impression of young people as viewers, shoppers, workers (part-time or full- time), carers, travellers, parents, players or as partners in relationships. Each of these dimensions is important when we come to reflect on the nature of inequality and how it is experienced in people's lives.

Crucially, while there is some useful material here on differing experiences around class and gender, little is said about the construction of ideas and experiences concerning youth and 'race'. This might, arguably, be excusable if this were an account of a particular ethnographic study - but in a collection it is disturbing. There is no sustained exploration of the way in which different discourses around gender, sexuality, ethnicity and race, class, dis/ability, age and geographical location intersect and feed one off another. Unfortunately, problematic notions such as 'underclass' appear from time to time without being properly interrogated.

So, as can be seen, this is a book containing some useful material - and some that is an indulgence. It suffers from a failure on the part of the editors to use 'the red pen'. It is thoroughly mistitled.

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Richard Jessor, John E. Donovan, Frances M. Costa
Beyond Adolescence
Cambridge University Press 1992
ISBN 0-521-39417-1
£27.95 (hbk)
pp 312

ANNETTE THOMSON

'Beyond Adolescence' reports a longitudinal study tracing the life patterns of some 400 American High School and about 200 College Students through adolescence to young adulthood. The authors tell a compelling story, allowing us to catch a glimpse of the pragmatic side of longitudinal research as well as giving us a window into the lives of the 'almost thirty something' participants in their study growing into young adulthood in the late seventies and early eighties. The clarity of this book is exceptional. The reader's interest is maintained through a clear sequence of questions which the authors ask of the data, presented in 10 well written chapters.

We are, however, given far more than a good story to satisfy those curious to explore systematically what others' lives look like and how they progress through two important life stages: the project is obviously carefully thought out, both theoretically and practically , and a copious amount of statistical detail is provided at every stage.

At the same time, the concise and 'user-friendly' summary paragraphs at the end of each passage/chapter and the final concluding chapter allow those interested in a more fleeting glance at the project to follow its main aims, results and conclusions.

The first chapter introduces the reader to the study and presents its aims: to provide descriptive information about young adulthood, to test the usefulness of the chosen theoretical base - Problem-Behaviour Theory - in accounting for variation in problem behaviour in young adulthood, and to trace the course and direction of psychosocial growth and change linking adolescence and young adulthood. The chosen cohort - baby boomers of the first half of the 1950s, adolescent during the Vietnam era and youth protest years, young adults in 'the complacency and inertia of the Reagan years' - arouses curiosity about how the children of an exceptional time turned out. At the same time, the possibility that any conclusions drawn might only apply to the largely middle class cohort in question throws doubts on generalizability, a limitation which the authors readily acknowledge.

Chapter 2 introduces us to the theoretical underpinnings of the study, its concern to trace the relationships within and between three systems of psychosocial variables: personality system, perceived environment system and behaviour system. The wider social environment is also considered. The concept of '- psychosocial proneness' is used as the key concept for prediction and variation in problem behaviour, comprising instigation and control factors. All systems, variables and definitions are clearly explained and illustrated, and the focus is far wider than the term 'Problem-Behaviour Theory' initially suggests, to account also for variation in non-problem behaviour.

Indeed, the term 'behaviour' may well be too narrow here, since we are looking at phenomenological accounts, tapping into people's approaches to life, attitudes, their 'perceived environment'.

The details of the study are reported in Chapter 3, giving a clear outline of design, samples and questionnaires. Measures of the Personality system variables included for example value/expectations of achievement and independence; Perceived Environment measures included parental friends' controls, perceived life area stress etc., to give but a few examples of how wide ranging the items were.

Chapter 4 basically outlines the respondents' replies, providing qualitative information about the young adults' lives, though the specific areas of involvement with drugs and alcohol are reserved for the next chapter. In the sphere of political behaviour, we find that most of the participants voted in elections, with a liberal outlook prevailing slightly over a conservative one. The general direction of change reported tended to be towards greater conservatism, a first hint of the overall finding of greater conformity in young adulthood which the authors report throughout (in this chapter also noted with respect to religiosity and moral outlook). Other areas examined include family life, sexuality, work life and leisure time, friendship, health and health-related behaviour and overall life satisfaction. The authors note that the respondents appears to be 'optimistic, healthy and somewhat conventional', clearly indicating the non-clinical nature of the sample, although several men and women were found to be different - unconventional in various respects.

Problem behaviour is the focus of Chapter 5, defined as involvement in problem drinking, marijuana use, use of other illicit drugs, involvement in general deviant behaviour, and involvement in cigarette smoking. The findings here mirror those of other studies. Problem behaviour measures tend to correlate with other relevant measures, confirming the construct validity of the measures used. Male vs. female and High School vs. College differences are reported, with the High School males most involved in problem behaviours, to give a brief flavour of the main findings. However, this doesn't do justice to the careful analysis and level of detail reported in this chapter.

Next, the psychosocial correlates of problem behaviour are examined in an attempt to unravel the relations between young adult personality, perceived environment and behavioural characteristics in those most involved in problem behaviour. The authors identify their findings as providing support for the usefulness of Problem-Behaviour Theory, since several invariant aspects between adolescence and young adulthood are shown up, e.g. the importance of personality and perceived environment variables. The concept of psychosocial proneness features strongly here, and although there is a hint of circularity in the concept, much of this chapter could form the basis for important follow-up and intervention studies.

The transition between adolescence and adulthood forms the central focus of Chapter 7, providing interesting descriptive data on a little researched life transition. Generally, there is much evidence for stability of individual difference across this transition, though also for an overall tendency towards increasing conventionality and conformity. The flower power children have become respected citizens, it seems.

Chapter 8 picks up the focus on problem behaviour again and examines whether involvement in problem behaviour at the adolescent stage can predict such behaviour later. Yet again, remarkable consistency is reported. Even though general involvement in problem behaviour decreases, those most prone in adolescence are also most involved at the later stage. Similarly, conventionality in adulthood is found to have its precursors in adolescence.

While some of the findings presented in Chapters 7 and 8 may not seem all that surprising, Chapter 9 takes up a fairly novel and interesting angle: the authors ask whether involvement in problem behaviour at the adolescent stage is likely to have lasting consequences as in e.g. limited success or achievement. The findings are rather encouraging here; earlier problem behaviour involvement does not appear to compromise future attainment, though we are cautioned that it may be too early to tell at this stage. And indeed, we are left wondering how things will turn out for this cohort. At the same time, one cannot help wondering if similar patterns could be traced in another place, at another time, and similar research in the UK would seem to be valuable and important.

A book well worth reading.

Annette Thomson Open University Tutor

John Frain
The Changing Culture of a College
Falmer Press Limited 1993
ISBN 1-85000-907-4
£30.00 (hbk)
pp 256

SUE HARLEY

This is a detailed and reflective report of an action research project, undertaken by the Principal of South Mersey college. It spans four years in the life of the college, following Liverpool City Council's reorganisation of its further education service in 1985/86. It provides a pertinent and relevant account of the changes in a further education college during the late 1980s.

Whilst recognising the limitations of a college Principal as participant observer, the study provides a comprehensive review of traditional and contemporary management theories and their connection to current issues in further education, such as cost effectiveness and responsiveness.

The book begins with a useful discussion of education research methods, then goes on to locate the college in its environment within Liverpool,

following with a description of the further education reorganisation there. An open-system approach to organisation analysis was adopted for the new college, and there is a detailed rationale and discussion provided about this and its application to management.

Changing the culture of the college proved a central issues for the study, as the title implies, and the book goes onto describe the 'cultural recipe' followed to develop aspects such as motivation and commitment of staff. There are also discussions about managing the internal environment, including organisational growth, communication, leadership and decision-making. The external environment is set against the backcloth of Merseyside, of declining traditional industries, developing chronic unemployment and the growth of the new service sector in industry. This is added to by the increasing intervention of central government and turbulence within the local authority.

The study, in fact, illustrates the typical kinds of issues which most further education colleges have had to face over the last few years. Although it predates the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act, bringing with it the new funding body, incorporation and increasing competition, the issues are pertinent to any organisation faced with continual change.

The significance of this book is that it links theory to practice in a systematic and thorough way, and whilst it is a study devoid of accounts of individual experiences within the college, it makes a valuable contribution to the study of both management and further education. It will be useful for both the student of further education, and managers- especially those doing some reflective thinking and searching for management strategies.

Sue Harley is Programme Director for Continuing Education and lecturer in Sociology and Education at Gateshead College.

Young: the Nordic Journal of Youth Research
Volume 1, Issues 2, 3, and 4, 1993.

ROBERT MACDONALD

1991 saw the launch of a new journal devoted to youth research. *Young,* as its subtitle suggests, is produced by academics from institutions in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. Its aim is to provide a forum for the discussion of the empirical results of research projects on young people as well as exploration of issues of theory and method. It forms part of the Nordic Youth Research Information network and provides a central place in which research (in that geographical area) can be shared. This of course, provides a valuable resource for British readers who can now tap

into the comparatively vibrant field of Nordic youth enquiry. European youth research has for many years held a more central and lofty position in academia than in Britain and the launch of this Journal perhaps reflects the higher esteem in which such enquiries are held outside the British mainland.

Equally, *Young* provides a new forum for the publication of articles authored by British writers (the preferred language is English) and about British youth issues - number two contains, for instance, pieces by Angela McRobbie and Paul Gilroy. Given the very limited number of journals in this country dedicated to youth issues this is a very welcome addition to the field.

The articles in the second, third and fourth issues of the Journal cover a pretty broad range of youth topics (issue one is out of print and was unfortunately not supplied for review). Each edition contains four articles, a short book review section and information on forthcoming conferences, research grants, etc., totalling around 64 pages. yearly subscription costs £25 for UK individuals and £34 for UK institutions (plus £4 air mail service).

The Journal is attractively presented in a clear, clean style and seems to have benefited from reasonable pre-launch funding (from various Nordic youth foundations and government departments). The editorial team comprises academics from Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Norway and the main editor is Johan Fornas (c/o Unit of Media and Cultural Theory, Department of Journalism, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden), to whom articles should be sent. In addition there is an international editorial advisory board (the British members being Paul Gilroy and Angela McRobbie). The advantage of developing from such a professional base is apparent in the editorial team's ability to produce four issues in a year to their stated deadlines and to have attracted a reasonable level of contribution (although this review cannot comment on the success of particular articles).

The range of the articles is certainly interesting, and whilst the editors aim to make the journal interdisciplinary most tend to take a generally culturalist approach to youth. For instance, McRobbie looks at codes of femininity in contemporary youth cultural forms and makes some interesting comments about gender and rave culture (itself a much under-researched, under-reported and largely British phenomenon); Keith Roe writes about academic capital and the musical tastes of Swedish adolescents; Gester Gudmundsson examines the relationship between international influences and national culture in Icelandic rock music. Fascinating stuff for those of us interested in youth culture who have been rather deprived of such empirical and theoretical discussions in the British context over the past decade or so.

The articles do make a rather esoteric and exotic cocktail which will probably hold limited appeal beyond the bounds of youth studies but, nevertheless, I'm pleased to see that issues of youth *culture* still hold prominence in Nordic youth research. Unlike *Youth and Policy* this journal does not really have an explicit practitioner focus and there is much less (in these three issues) which would appear to be of immediate, obvious practical interest to youth workers (as opposed to, say, youth sociologists).

There *are* articles which examine more structural issues (like Hammer's discussion of the causes of high levels of youth unemployment in Norway) and it is to be hoped that *Young* will continue to draw in contributions which cover the range of youth research interests. If it can do this, if it can become truly interdisciplinary and if it can attend to one or two small problems (e.g. I became worried about the standard of the English translation in one or two of the articles - I really did think that the subtleties of the meaning of the author's argument had been lost) then I'm sure that *Young* will make an important contribution to the furtherance of European youth research.

Robert MacDonald, University of Teesside and Member of Youth and Policy Editorial Collective.

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For an article:
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And for a report:
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